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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS CRISES OF 1964, 
1967, AND 1974: A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Erciyas, Okhan 
MA, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Özgür Özdamar 
 
August 2014 
 
This thesis analyzes Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, 
and 1974. It summarizes the Cyprus question in the 20
th
 Century. The thesis 
examines the Cyprus crises and Turkey’s ultimate decisions in each crisis by 
‘poliheuristic’ decision making model. The decision making processes of Turkish 
leaders will be analyzed.  
By comparing the crises, this thesis studies how Turkish decision makers 
decided to use force in 1974, whereas refrained from using force against Cyprus 
in the previous crises of 1964 and 1967. The thesis argues that during each Cyprus 
crisis, Turkish decision makers framed some of the policy options as ‘non-
compensatory’ which resulted in the decision not to intervene in Cyprus during 
the 1964 and 1967 crises, and resulted in the intervention decision during the 1974 
crisis. 
Key words: Cyprus question, Turkish foreign policy, Poliheuristic theory, Foreign 
policy analysis  
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ÖZET 
 
1964, 1967 ve 1974 KIBRIS KRİZLERİ KARŞISINDA TÜRK DIŞ 
POLİTİKASI: ‘POLIHEURISTIC’ YAKLAŞIM 
Erciyas, Okhan 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi:" Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özgür Özdamar 
 
Ağustos 2014 
 
Bu tez 1964, 1967 ve 1974 Kıbrıs krizleri karşısında Türk dış politikasını 
incelemektedir. 20. yüzyıldaki Kıbrıs meselesini özetler. Tez, ‘poliheuristic’ karar 
alma modeli ile Kıbrıs krizlerini ve Türkiye’nin nihai kararlarını araştırmaktadır. 
Türk liderlerin karar alma süreçleri incelenecektir.  
Bu tez, krizleri kıyaslayarak Türk karar alıcıların nasıl 1974’te kuvvet 
kullanmaya karar verdiğini, fakat geçmiş 1964 ve 1967 krizlerinde Kıbrıs’a 
kuvvet kullanmaktan nasıl kaçındığını araştırmaktadır. Tez, Kıbrıs krizleri 
sırasında Türk karar alıcıların bazı politika seçeneklerini ‘telafi edilemez’ olarak 
nitelediğini, bu nitelemenin ise 1964 ve 1967 krizlerinde Kıbrıs’a müdahale 
etmeme kararıyla, 1974 krizinde ise müdahale etme kararıyla neticelendiğini 
savunmaktadır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kıbrıs meselesi, Türk dış politikası, Poliheuristic teori, Dış 
politika analizi  
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CHAPTER I:  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
  
The ‘Cyprus question’ is one of the most serious issues in Turkish foreign policy, 
and there is no doubt that the Cyprus question is a continuing problem which 
affects Turkish foreign policy and Turkish relations. Although the Cyprus question 
attracts less attention today than in the 1990s, it still affects Turkish foreign policy. 
In other words, the Cyprus dispute remains as a continuing question. For instance, 
there were recent tensions between Turkey and Greek Cypriots over oil 
exploration in disputed territories surrounding the island. In order to understand 
the dynamics of such current situations, it is crucial to examine the early stages of 
the question. Toward that end, this thesis will examine Turkey’s foreign policy 
decisions during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967 and 1974.  In examining these 
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cases, this thesis will explain factors affecting Turkish decision makers’ reactions 
to the crises.  
With regard to this information, the research question of the thesis is: 
How did Turkish decision makers decide to use force during the 1974 
crisis, whereas during the 1964 and 1967 crises Turkish decision makers refrained 
from using force? 
Although there is a range of research on the Cyprus question, there is little 
focus on decision making processes of the leaders. The majority of the literature 
focuses on the why question with regard to Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus, and neglects to study how ‘the decision’ was made during the Cyprus 
crises. However, in order to examine and explain the crux of the matter, we need 
to study the foreign policy decision making process of the leadership. Only 
Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner (2004) have focused on the 1974 Cyprus 
crisis as a case for foreign policy analysis and tried to explain how these decisions 
were made. Their work studied the 1974 Cyprus crisis as a case for decision units’ 
effect on decision making processes. Recently Şirin (2012) began to explore the 
“how” of the Cyprus question with his study of the 1959 Zurich and London 
agreements and how the contracting parties reached the agreements, deciding to 
establish the Republic of Cyprus. Despite the contributions of these scholars, the 
literature has not fully examined the question of how decisions have been made 
with regards to Cyprus. This thesis will contribute to the literature by examining 
and comparing decision making processes in the aforementioned crises. 
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As stated earlier, although the core of the Cyprus question has changed 
over time, it still is alive and affects Turkish foreign policy today. The most 
important change of last fifty years was Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974. 
When intercommunity conflicts erupted in Cyprus in the early 1960s, Turkey 
considered intervention as an option to settle the dispute, but did not ultimately 
decide to intervene in during these crises. The 1974 intervention and its aftermath 
have attracted more attention in the literature, which has largely overlooked the 
connection to the decision making process of these other crises. This is why the 
thesis is interested in studying not only the 1974 crisis but also the 1964 and 1967 
crises. 
This thesis argues that researching Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus 
during 1960s may improve our understanding of Turkey’s decision to intervene in 
1974. Although there are studies focusing on the 1974 intervention and its 
aftermath, 1960s is neglected in the literature. The thesis argues that, by studying 
a neglected period of history, we will find the roots of the intervention decision. 
Focusing on how Turkish decision makers reached their final decisions during 
each Cyprus crisis, this research will contribute to the literature by examining the 
roots of intervention decision. 
To analyze the crisis the thesis will adopt Poliheuristic decision making 
model first introduced by Alex Mintz (1993). The model argues that decision 
making process consist of two processes. In the first stage leaders employ ‘non-
compensatory’ decision making strategy, which eliminates policy alternative(s) 
‘unacceptable’ on a key dimension. In the second stage of decision making 
process, leaders adopt more rational approach towards remaining policy options 
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and choose the best remaining option. According to the Poliheuristic model 
leaders generally consider ‘political’ dimension as the key dimension during the 
first stage of the decision making process since each political actor’s primary aim 
is remaining in power.  However, the model does not have a binding rule to adopt 
political dimension as the key dimension. Instead, the researcher may choose 
another dimension as the key dimension (e.g. military or economic). 
With this in mind, this thesis hypothesizes that: During each Cyprus crisis, 
Turkish decision makers framed some of the policy options as ‘non-
compensatory’ which resulted in the decision not to intervene in Cyprus during 
the 1964 and 1967 crises, and resulted in the intervention decision during the 1974 
crisis. To investigate this hypothesis, the thesis will study historical events from 
the establishment of Republic of Cyprus in 1960 to 1974.  
During the 1964 crisis Prime Minister İsmet İnönü confronted with both 
domestic and international problems. First of all, Turkey had a crisis related to 
forming a new government since the second İnönü coalition was dissolved in 
December 1963. Secondly, Turkey faced with intercommunity clashes on Cyprus 
in late December 1963. Although Turkey threatened to use force against Cyprus 
unless the conflict does not end on the island, Turkey couldn’t take such a 
decision during the 1964 crisis. The thesis argues that ‘systemic’ considerations 
were dominant on the İnönü administration decision not to intervene in Cyprus 
during this crisis. 
In 1967 the Cyprus crisis took the public attention once more time when 
bloody clashes erupted on the island in November 1967. This time Süleyman 
Demirel was the prime minister of Turkey. Although the Demirel administration –
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like its predecessor the third İnönü coalition- stated its intention to use force 
against Cyprus, did not take intervention decision in 1967. Instead the 
administration adopted a diplomatic approach towards the crisis. The thesis argues 
that Demirel’s focus was more ‘political’ in nature and the administration’s 
priority was increasing economic development in Turkey. 
The year 1974 witnessed the most dramatic change in modern history of 
the island. When the Greek National Guards achieved a successful coup against 
the Makarios administration on Cyprus, Turkey not only threatened to use force 
but also realized this threat by sending its troops to Cyprus in July 1974. During 
the 1974 crisis another coalition was in office in Turkey: Ecevit-Erbakan 
coalition. The Ecevit administration realized that different from the previous 
crises the 1974 crisis created suitable ‘systemic’ conditions for intervention. As a 
result the administration did not miss this opportunity to ‘restore the state of 
affairs’ of the island. 
The thesis is composed of five main chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the 
historical framework of the thesis. This chapter gives information on the roots of 
the ‘Cyprus question’ and discusses the events up to 1963. Chapter 3 introduces 
theoretical and methodological aspects of the thesis. It starts with introducing 
‘poliheuristic’ theory and continues with discussing its roots, its assumptions, and 
the studies adopting the method. Chapter 3 also explains the method of study 
while building a poliheuristic decision matrix for Turkish decision makers during 
the Cyprus crises. 
Chapter 4 and the following two chapters study Turkish foreign policy 
during each Cyprus crisis from 1964 to 1974. Each chapter focuses on only one 
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crisis, discussing Turkey’s internal and external relations as relevant.  These 
chapters analyze each crisis step-by-step  and give detailed accounts of the crises. 
This section applies the poliheuristic decision-making model described in the 
Chapter 2 to analyze Turkish decision makers’ approach to the Cyprus crises. 
Chapter 7, the conclusion, compares and contrasts each crisis to find which 
motives shaped Turkish decision makers’ attitude towards the Cyprus crises 
during this period. This chapter first analyzes similarities among the crises, then 
examines significant differences.  
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CHAPTER II:   
 
 
POLIHEURISTIC THEORY AND METHOD OF STUDY 
 
 
 
3.1. Poliheuristic Theory: An Introduction 
Currently there are two schools of thought in political decision making: rational 
choice school and cognitive psychology school (Mintz 2003: 1).  The well-known 
assumption of the rational choice school is that ‘nations are led by rational, 
forward-looking, expected-utility-maximizing leaders’ (Redd and Mintz 2013: 
12). However, decision makers, who do not have perfect information with which 
to make a rational choice, do not always try to maximize benefits in reality. They 
even regularly choose ‘irrational’ options, leading some scholars to turn to 
alternative theories such as the bounded rational cybernetic approach (Below 
2008: 3). An influential theory of the cognitive school, cybernetic theory assumes 
that individuals confront constraints which limit their memory and recall abilities, 
and as a result decision makers develop decision procedures to deal with cognitive 
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limitations and the decision environment (Redd and Mintz 2013: 13). However, 
these approaches may not be mutually exclusive in reality: focusing only on 
rational choice approach may explain preferences of the decision maker, or 
concentrating solely on cognitive aspects of the issue may explain processes and 
beliefs (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004: 56). The poliheuristic theory, as an 
alternative to these schools, is a bridge between rational and cognitive approaches 
(Mintz and DeRouen 2010: 78). 
The thesis will examine the Cyprus crises and the decisions made by the 
Turkish side through the ‘poliheuristic’ decision making model. Before discussing 
the core assumptions of ‘poliheuristic’ theory, it is crucial to clarify the meaning 
of the term ‘poliheuristic’. The term ‘poliheuristic’ has two components: “[1] poly 
(many) and [2] heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms 
used by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions” (Mintz et 
al. 1997: 554). The poliheuristic decision making model addresses not only the 
personality of the decision maker, but also the inter-state (system) and domestic 
variables. Domestic and inter-state variables may vary (e.g. the role of ‘Super 
Powers’, alliances, current political/economic situation, and elections). The 
poliheuristic decision making model explains both the why and the how of a 
leader’s decisions. The theory argues that decision makers adopt more than one 
decision strategy while making decisions (Mintz and DeRouen 2010: 78). 
Mintz and Geva (1997) state five characteristics of poliheuristic theory: i) 
nonholistic: decision makers use simple heuristics, and foreign policy decisions 
are based on elimination or adoption of policy alternatives on the ground of one or 
a few dimensions; ii) dimension based: if the policy alternatives do not meet a 
9 
 
certain threshold of the ‘key dimension’ (e.g. political, economic), these policies 
will be eliminated; iii) noncompensatory: the policy alternative which is 
unacceptable in the key dimension with higher scores in other dimensions cannot 
compensate low scores in the key dimension, since the alternative will be 
eliminated in the first stage of decision making; iv)  ‘satisficing’: according to 
theory decision makers try to find ‘acceptable’ decisions, thus they do not just 
focus on maximizing utilities; lastly v) order sensitive: the theory “implies that the 
choice of a particular alternative may depend on the order in which particular 
dimensions (diplomatic, political, military, economic) are invoked” (Mintz and 
Geva 1997: 87). 
The poliheuristic decision making model, although it was first introduced 
by Mintz (1993), offers an alternative to existing models (e.g. rational actor, 
cybernetic model). The poliheuristic model claims that there is a ‘two-stage’ 
process before making a decision:    
The first stage of poliheuristic theory involves a noncompensatory, 
nonholistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily 
corresponds to cognitive school of decision making. The second stage 
involves analytic processing of surviving alternatives. It corresponds 
to rational choice theory. Cognitive heuristics are more important in 
the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculations are 
more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision 
process (Mintz 2004a: 4).  
In the first stage the decision maker eliminates the options which are unacceptable 
to his/her situation; in the second stage, the decision maker selects an option from 
among the remaining options while aiming to maximize his/her utility and to 
minimize risks (Mintz 2004a: 6-7). The model posits that decision makers 
eliminate the alternative options that do not meet their conditions by using 
‘cognitive shortcuts’. Before making a decision, political leaders consider 
10 
 
(explicitly or implicitly) political factors and consequences of their actions (Mintz 
1993: 601). Since the poliheuristic decision making model assumes that domestic 
politics is the ‘essence of decision’, alternatives that have negative value on the 
domestic dimension will be eliminated in the first stage and the remaining 
alternatives will be evaluated in the second stage (Mintz 2005: 97). In other 
words, the poliheuristic theory emphasizes the ‘political’ aspect of foreign policy 
decision making. “The assumption is that the policymaker measures costs and 
benefits, risks and rewards, gains and losses, and success and failure in terms of 
political ramifications above all else” (Redd and Mintz 2013: 17). 
Thus, the model defines a key dimension that must be satisfied to adopt a 
policy alternative, and the alternatives are not evaluated according to their total 
ratings (Brule 2005: 102). In this context, every leader, regardless of his/her 
nationality or ideology, uses a non-compensatory decision process to simplify the 
decision making process (Brule 2005: 100). The non-compensatory decision 
making process implies that there is no ‘substitution effect’ between dimensions 
(Dacey and Carlson 2004: 40); thus if a policy alternative is unacceptable under 
the key dimension (such as unacceptable in military dimension), then a high score 
in another dimension (such as in economic dimension) cannot compensate for 
being unacceptable by military means, and this alternative will be eliminated by 
the decision maker. In other words, the model tries to explain the acceptable 
alternatives for the decision maker. For instance, during a foreign policy crisis, if 
the public strongly opposes doing nothing to deal with the crisis, the leader most 
probably rejects passive policy options such as ‘do nothing’. As a result, the 
leader will consider proactive policy options such as ‘apply sanctions’, or ‘use 
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force’ (Mintz 2005: 97). Although leaders consider first their own political 
survival, Mintz (2004a: 7) argues that before making decisions on war and peace, 
decision makers might consider the policy alternatives that their adversary has and 
eliminate policy alternatives infeasible for not only oneself but also for the 
adversary. 
In the poliheuristic theory, “the decision maker adopts heuristic decision 
rules that do not require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant 
alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a 
few criteria” (Mintz 1993: 599). Time pressure and complexity of the decision 
environment are other burdens on the decision maker, guiding him or her to use 
cognitive heuristics to eliminate some unacceptable policy alternatives and to 
have more simple decision matrices (James and Zhang 2005: 35). Additionally, 
during international crises, decision makers might have multiple and conflicting 
goals, and this is why – according to the poliheuristic theory – decision makers 
compare policy options in several (unevenly weighted) dimensions (Ye 2007: 
319). 
Although compensatory models do not necessarily recognize political 
motivations in use of force decisions, it is very unlikely that a decision maker 
would make the decision to use force if it would cause political losses for the 
decision maker, regardless of the use of force decision’s high rankings in other 
dimensions (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004: 58). For instance, Mintz (2004a) 
studied Turkey’s decision to veto deployment of United States (US) forces on its 
soil before the Iraq War in 2003. Mintz (2004a) argues that although military and 
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economic benefits of the deployment were huge, Turkish decision makers 
eliminated the deployment decision mainly as a result of strong public opposition.  
As noted above, domestic politics is the ‘essence of decision’ and non-
compensatory political loss aversion can be operationalized in several ways as 
listed by Mintz (2004a: 9): threat to a leader’s survival; significant drop in public 
approval for a policy; significant drop in popularity; lack of support for a 
particular policy (e.g. use of force or sanctions or peace); the prospect of electoral 
defeat; domestic opposition; threat to regime survival; intraparty rivalry and 
competition; internal or external challenge to the regime; potential collapse of 
coalition/government/regime; threat to political power, dignity, honor or 
legitimacy of a leader; demonstrations and riots; and the existence of veto players 
(e.g., pivotal parties in a parliamentary government). 
To sum up, by eliminating some of the alternatives the decision maker will 
be left with ‘acceptable alternatives’ in the second stage of the decision making 
process (Dacey and Carlson 2004: 40). In the second stage, the decision maker 
chooses the alternative policy option which maximizes benefits and minimizes 
risks. Thus, the decision will be a combination of discarding unacceptable 
alternatives in the first stage, and later choosing the best alternative from 
remaining alternatives in the second stage (Mintz 2005: 97).  
In order to examine a case, the researcher must first construct the decision 
matrix of the leader. While constructing the matrix the researcher needs to define: 
i) the policy alternatives that the leader has; ii) the dimensions in evaluating the 
matrix; iii) implications of each dimension; iv) ratings for each alternative at each 
dimension; v) the total weight of each dimension (Mintz 2005). The researcher, 
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however, may adopt assumptions of the poliheuristic theory without being bound 
to construct a decision matrix for the leader. In the poliheuristic literature, four 
general dimensions appear to be important in decision matrices: i) political; ii) 
economic; iii) military; and iv) diplomatic (James and Zhang 2005: 41). The next 
section will discuss some of the previous research which adopted the poliheuristic 
theory. 
 
3.2. Poliheuristic Literature 
The poliheuristic decision making model is quite new to academia when we 
compare it with the other foreign policy analysis models (e.g. operational code); 
however there are various studies which already adopted this model. The 
assumptions of the poliheuristic theory have been tested by multiple methods (e.g. 
case studies, experimental analysis, formal and statistical models). This section 
will review some of these works.  
As stated earlier, Mintz (1993) established the principles of poliheuristic 
theory and studied the Persian Gulf War. Mintz (1993) argues that the decision of 
the United States to attack Iraq was a result of non-compensatory characteristics 
of the decision making process. After examining related documents and written 
accounts, Mintz (1993) discusses the political dimension as the most critical 
dimension in the decision making process. Mintz (1993: 606-607) argues that the 
US President Bush had three policy alternatives: i) use of force; ii) containment; 
and iii) withdrawal; according to the non-compensatory principle, the President 
did not consider the withdrawal alternative since it would be politically damaging 
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for his presidency. Although Mintz (1993) discusses the two-stage nature of 
decision making processes, his analysis did not clearly state any distinction 
between the first stage and the second stage of decision making. However, later 
works –as discussed below- examined the cases in two stages. For instance, Mintz 
and DeRouen (2010) studied President Bush’s decision to end Operation Desert 
Storm during the Persian Gulf War. Mintz and DeRouen (2010: 85) argue that 
during the first stage of the decision making, the Bush administration eliminated 
the option to continue the war, and in the second stage of the decision making 
focused on minimizing risks and maximizing benefits.  
Brule (2005) studied President Carter’s small rescue mission decision 
during the Iran hostage crisis and argued that poliheuristic theory is a useful tool 
to predict foreign policy decisions of leaders. Brule’s (2005) argument was based 
on the core assumption of the poliheuristic theory: since leaders try to stay in the 
office, domestic politics is the essence of the decision. Brule (2005: 103-104) 
discusses that President Carter had eight different policy alternatives during the 
first stage of the decision making, ranging from continuing negotiations to mining 
Iranian ports. Brule (2005: 104-105) states that Carter’s political future was bound 
to the solution of the hostage crisis and the American public was demanding more 
‘direct action’; under these conditions Carter aimed to rescue hostages both safely 
and immediately. This is why, during the first stage of the decision making 
process, Carter eliminated alternatives that do not meet the threshold in the 
political dimension. As a result there were only two remaining alternatives on the 
table: i) large rescue mission and ii) small rescue mission. In the second stage of 
the decision making process, Carter evaluated remaining policy options in 
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military and strategic dimensions and decided to deploy a small rescue operation 
(Brule 2005: 107). Brule’s research indicates that “using the tenets of the 
poliheuristic theory in a forecasting framework, analysts can reduce the 
uncertainty of their predictions with limited information” (2005: 111). This 
argument is, again, based on the non-compensatory principle of the poliheuristic 
theory. 
It seems like leaders have the full control over foreign policy decisions. 
However, according to Redd (2005), advisers also have an undeniable impact in 
the decision making process. Redd (2005) studied the influence of advisers on the 
decision to use force in Kosovo during the presidency of Bill Clinton. During the 
Kosovo crisis President Clinton had three objectives (ending ethnic cleansing, 
preventing spread of the conflict, and preserving the credibility of NATO) and six 
policy options ranging from sending ground forces to ‘do nothing’ (Redd 2005: 
133). Redd (2005) argues that during the crisis, public support for the President 
was decreasing and in the Congress there were debates over the reluctance of the 
President to take action towards the crisis. Clinton’s sex scandal was another 
political problem. Redd’s study discusses that during the decision-making process 
Clinton’s attention was on defending himself from prosecution (as a result of the 
sex scandal), and among the Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright was the most influential adviser (2005: 140-141). According to Redd 
(2005: 139), Clinton eliminated ‘passive’ policy alternatives since they might 
damage him politically and the remaining alternatives were: i) air strikes; and ii) 
sending ground troops. Redd (2005) argues that Albright had a role shaping the 
foreign policy of the Clinton administration towards the Kosovo crisis at three 
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points: i) since Clinton was reluctant to focus on foreign crises as long as the 
public was not concerned with those crises, Albright made Clinton aware of 
public opinion on the Kosovo crisis; ii) during the first stage of the decision 
making, Albright was again effective to guide the President to eliminate ‘passive’ 
policy options; iii) since sending ground troops would be politically risky, 
Albright proposed an air strike option as the best choice. Redd’s study (2005) 
aptly points to the impact of advisers during crises. 
The majority of works adopting poliheuristic theory study foreign policy 
decision-making processes in democratic nations, yet this does not mean that the 
theory is not applicable to other regime types. For instance, Kinne (2005) applied 
poliheuristic theory to decision making processes of authoritarian regimes. It is 
important to note that there is not a definite sort of ‘autocratic regime’ in politics, 
just as we have a variety of democracies. Kinne (2005) defines three types of 
autocratic regime: i) single party autocracies; ii) personalist autocracies; and iii) 
military autocracies. Kinne’s (2005: 118) argument is that regardless of the 
political structure of the country we study, each leader tries to stay in power - 
which is actually the core assumption of the poliheuristic theory. In order to 
demonstrate his hypotheses, Kinne (2005) examines one case study for each 
autocratic regime (i.e. Saddam Hussein’s decision to remain in Kuwait during the 
Gulf crisis, Pakistan’s decision to not to send troops to Iraq as a part of the ‘war 
on terror’, and Gorbachev’s changes in Soviet foreign policy). Studying the cases, 
Kinne (2005:126-127) finds three policy implications for democratic states in 
their dealings with autocratic regimes: i) each authoritarian regime has its own 
structure, and lumping them in one category (e.g. ‘axis of evil’) might be 
17 
 
misleading; ii) while dealing with autocratic regimes, leaders of democratic 
regimes would do well to focus on the subjective characteristics of their 
counterpart (e.g. in a single party regime, the focus will be on the leader and 
his/her relations with his/her party); and iii) though some policy decisions made 
by autocratic leaders may seem ‘irrational’, however, even in autocratic regimes, 
domestic politics is the ‘essence of decision’ although ‘domestic politics’ might 
have different meanings. Kinne (2005) also supports the predicting aspect of the 
poliheuristic theory argued by Brule (2005): by knowing the structure of the 
regime, decision makers will be able to construct the opponent party’s decision 
matrix and policy priorities which in non-compensatory conditions will enable 
forecast of possible decisions. 
Although the above mentioned case studies mainly focused on ‘use of 
force’ decisions, some scholars adopted poliheuristic theory to examine decisions 
in ‘low’ politics. For instance, Below (2008: 2) studied decisions on ozone 
depletion and climate change among the US presidents. According to the study, 
the Montreal Protocol (on ozone depletion) was a success while the Kyoto 
Protocol (on climate change) was a failure, and the role of the US was 
dramatically different towards each protocol (supportive for the Montreal Protocol 
and ‘postpone’ for the Kyoto Protocol). The exact aim of Below’s (2008) study 
tests the bounds of applicability of poliheurstic theory to cases different than ‘use 
of force’ decisions or decision outside the realm of ‘high’ politics. Below (2008) 
argues that when confronted with the environmental, each president used the non-
compensatory principle of the poliheuristic theory in the first stage of the decision 
making and tried to stay in power. Additionally, the study also reinforces the 
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theory’s assumptions regarding the second stage of decision making: leaders try to 
maximize benefits and minimize risks. 
DeRouen (2003) conducted an interesting case study and examined the 
decision not to use force in Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam in 1954. When the French 
could not deal with the situation in their former colony, they requested military 
support from the US, giving the Eisenhower administration three policy 
alternatives: i) invasion involving ground troops; ii) air strike; and iii) status quo 
(continuing covert operations and supplying materials) (DeRouen 2003: 17). In 
fact, President Eisenhower listed three conditions to support the French militarily: 
i) ‘a legal right’ for support which was already met when the French requested 
assistance; ii) ‘support from free world’ which could be met, according to 
Eisenhower; and iii) ‘favorable action by the Congress,’ which was the most 
difficult condition to achieve (DeRouen 2003: 19). During the first stage of the 
decision making process, Eisenhower did not even considered sending ground 
troops as an option, thus this option was eliminated since public opinion was 
overwhelmingly against this option (DeRouen 2003: 20). According to DeRouen 
(2003: 21-22) the second stage of decision-making was lexicographic in nature, 
and in this stage the political dimension was still crucial. The air strike option did 
not get support from the President. The study indicates that although Dien Bien 
Phu was strategically important and an air strike would have changed the situation 
in favor of the French, the Eisenhower administration chose the status quo option 
since the political costs of an air strike decision would still be high. Additionally, a 
poll circulated after the decision showed that the public opinion was supporting 
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the policies of the administration even though Dien Bien Phu, the last stronghold 
that the French had in Vietnam, was lost to the Communists (DeRouen 2003: 23). 
Keller and Yang (2009) studied the role of ‘empathy’ in the decision 
making process. The primary aim of the study was to shed light on why some 
crises escalated to armed conflict while other crises were solved peacefully 
(Keller and Yang 2009: 170). Keller and Yang (2009: 173) argue that achieving 
success in international negotiations depends on negotiating parties’ 
understanding of each other’s domestic constraints and the available policy 
alternatives the other party has. Keller and Yang (2009) discuss that empathy may 
occur during both stages of poliheuristic theory; on the other hand, if empathy 
enters in the first stage of the decision making process, then the chance of easing 
the crisis will be higher.  Additionally, if a ‘symmetric empathy’ exists among the 
conflicting parties, then the leaders may be able to reach an agreement while 
discarding demands that are unacceptable to their opponent (Keller and Yang 
2009: 174).  In order to illustrate the importance of empathy Keller and Yang 
(2009) used two case studies: the first case (the US decision vis-à-vis China after 
the Tiananmen incident) showed that empathy had a role in President Bush 
choosing to form a foreign policy which would consider Chinese domestic 
politics; in the second case (the US decision vis-à-vis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) 
both Bush and Saddam Hussein were unable to have empathy and they failed to 
understand the domestic factors each leader confronted, which eventually 
prevented the leaders from easing tensions. 
By combining the social contextualist perspective with poliheuristic 
theory, Şirin (2012) examined the role of identity in negotiation decision making 
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during the 1959 Zurich-London agreements on the Cyprus dispute. As stated 
earlier,  poliheuristic theory argues that during the first stage of decision making, 
leaders may also eliminate policy options that are unacceptable to their opponent. 
Şirin (2012: 425) discusses that the poliheuristic theory did not state how leaders 
decide to make this decision to eliminate options unfeasible to their adversaries. 
According to Şirin (2012) during the negotiations of 1959 Zurich-London 
agreements, Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom shared a common identity 
(affiliation to the West) which enabled the leaders of these three countries to 
eliminate policy options (with high rankings in political dimension) in favor of 
reaching an agreement on the Cyprus dispute. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots 
and Greek Cypriots did not have any common identity and they were reluctant to 
sign the agreements until the mainland countries presented the situation as a ‘take-
it-or-leave-it option’ (Şirin 2012: 431). 
James and Zhang (2005) studied Chinese foreign policy decision during 
crises in the period from 1950 to 1996. Differing from above mentioned studies, 
they collected data from International Crisis Behavior Project and found nine 
cases (with available and sufficient data) out of fourteen crises concerning China. 
James and Zhang (2005) examine the core assumptions of the poliheuristic theory 
(decision are taken after a non-compensatory search and decision making process 
consists of two stages) with a comparative analysis of Chinese decision-making 
during international crises. James and Zhang (2005: 39) argue that each case had 
different characteristics and state the primary aim of their study as examining 
whether China decides to use force during these crises. The findings of the study 
confirm that Chinese decision makers are loss averse in political terms during the 
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first stage of the decision making (eight out of the nine crises) and that the 
decision process consists of two stages (five out of the nine crises). Additionally 
James and Zhang (2005: 45) argue that during the second stage of decision 
making, the political dimension is not always the most salient dimension and the 
decision may be based on either utility calculations or lexicographic evaluations. 
The assumptions of poliheuristic theory were tested by a large-N 
quantitative study conducted by DeRouen and Sprecher (2004). The study was 
based on data from International Crisis Behavior with a sample size of 710. 
DeRouen and Sprecher (2004: 59) argue that the poliheuristic theory can explain 
the initial decision to use violence during a crisis and the rate of response to a 
crisis trigger will be affected by the impact of the crisis trigger on the leader’s 
survival in political terms. The findings suggest that domestic political losses have 
a negative effect on use of force; “in other words, potential political loss, 
measured as a potential threat to a regime, is initially a constraint on the use of 
violence” (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004: 64). Another assumption of the 
poliheuristic theory (decisions based on rational calculations in the second stage) 
is also supported by the research. DeRouen and Sprecher (2004: 65) discuss that 
enduring rivalries do not result in violence automatically: there might be some 
sort of mechanism (e.g. mediation efforts) that works to prevent violence. 
The assumptions of poliheuristic theory have also been tested by 
experimental studies. For instance, Chiristensen and Redd (2004) conducted such 
a study by comparing bureaucratic politics model and the poliheuristic theory. The 
study examined how the existence of advisers may influence foreign policy 
choices during decision making processes. Chiristensen and Redd (2004: 71) 
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considered a president (leader) as an autonomous unit in the process who is able 
to take the final decision.  The experiment tested the impact of political advice on 
the decision maker during a crisis in which the leader had three policy 
alternatives: i) do nothing; ii) sanctions; and iii) use of force. Thus, the aim of the 
experiment was testing the non-compensatory assumption of the poliheuristic 
theory (Chiristensen and Redd 2004: 75). The results of the study supported the 
non-compensatory principle of the decision making process: negative political 
advice concerning the use of force had an undeniable impact on the decision 
maker’s choice not to select that policy option (Chiristensen and Redd 2004: 82).  
Mintz (2004b) conducted an experimental study among high-ranking 
officers of the US Air Force and the sensitivity of these officers to political advice 
under familiar and unfamiliar decision tasks. Mintz (2004b: 93) states that when 
confronting an unfamiliar decision task, decision makers tend to have a two stage 
decision making process (first dimension based, and then alternative based), 
whereas under familiar decision tasks, decision makers rely more on their own 
experience and less on new information. Mintz (2004b: 98) defines ‘alternative 
based’ strategy as “whereby the decision maker reviews sequentially all items for 
a given alternative across different dimensions” and ‘dimension based’ strategy as 
“a process whereby the decision maker focuses on a given dimension and reviews 
all the alternatives along this dimension and repeats the process for another 
dimension”. The study had two different scenarios. The ‘familiar’ scenario was a 
military dispute between two small islands over a uranium field, and there are four 
available policy alternatives (i.e. use of force, containment, sanctions, and do 
nothing); the ‘unfamiliar’ scenario is establishing a new naval base in the Pacific, 
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and the alternatives are four fictitious islands (i.e. Alpha, Beta, Charlie, and 
Delta). Mintz (2004b: 100-101) argues that the results of the study support the 
assumptions of the poliheuristic theory (decision making process consist of two 
stages and non-compensatory principle has a definite impact on the final decision) 
and the Air Force commanders tend to use more dimension-based strategy when 
confronted with an unfamiliar decision task. 
 
3.3. The Method of the Study 
This thesis will study the Cyprus crisis during the 1960s and 1970s using the 
poliheuristic model. As discussed in the previous pages, the poliheuristic model 
consists of two stages. During the first stage the decision maker analyzes the 
situation and uses decision heuristics; as a result of this process the decision 
maker eliminates some 'unfavorable' options in this stage. In the second stage the 
decision maker weights the remaining options and chooses the option maximizing 
utility at the same time as minimizing risks.  
 The five characteristics of the poliheuristic model demonstrate that the 
model presupposes that the decision makers use some dimensions to shape their 
final decision. As a result, it is crucial to build a poliheuristic decision model 
before studying a decision. Mintz (2005: 95) stated that building a poliheuristic 
model consists of two steps: 
1. Identify the decision matrix of the leader (e.g., the alternative set, 
dimension set, and implications of each alternative on each 
dimension). 
2. Apply PH [poliheuristic] calculations to the decision matrix to 
explain or predict the ultimate choice.  
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While constructing the matrix the researcher needs to define: i) the policy 
alternatives that the leader has; ii) the dimensions in evaluating the matrix; iii) 
implications on each dimension; iv) ratings for each alternative at each dimension; 
and v) the total weight of each dimension (Mintz 2005). The researcher may, 
however, do the research adopting assumptions of the poliheuristic theory without 
being bound to construct a decision matrix for the leader. In the poliheuristic 
literature, generally four dimensions appear to be important in decision matrices: 
i) political; ii) economic; iii) military; and iv) diplomatic (James and Zhang 2005: 
41). It is important to note that the decision matrix may consist of as many 
dimensions as the case requires. Alternatively, the researcher may choose not to 
weight each dimension numerically, as DeRouen (2003) did in his study of 
Eisenhower's decision not to use force in Dien Bien Phu in 1954. 
 Accordingly, for constructing the decision matrix the researcher should 
answer a question similar to this: “What are the possible policy options that the 
decision maker has on the table?” For instance, the policy options may vary from 
using sanctions to doing nothing. As a result, there aren't any certain types of 
policy options specified by the poliheuristic model. After deciding the policy 
options, the researcher should define dimensions to evaluate each policy option. 
Defining the dimensions the researcher confronts a question similar to this: “What 
are the dimensions that affect the decision maker’s decision?”. As stated earlier, 
although the dimensions are not specified by the model, in the poliheuristic 
literature, generally four dimensions appear to be more common in decision 
matrices, and these are: i) political; ii) economic; iii) military; and iv) diplomatic.  
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 In this chapter the thesis will construct the decision matrix to study Cyprus 
crises. At this stage it is important to note that this thesis will utilize Brule’s 
(2005) research design with modifications required by the Cyprus case. In other 
words, the thesis will use Brule’s (2005) methodology to analyze the Cyprus case. 
Brule (2005), while studying President Carter’s small rescue mission decision 
during the Iran hostage crisis, first discussed the available policy options before 
the president. Secondly, he evaluated these options under three dimensions: i) 
domestic political; ii) military; and iii) strategic. Brule’s study considered 
‘domestic political’ dimension to be the ‘key dimension’ for President Carter and 
as a result, during the first stage of the poliheuristic model the President 
eliminated six options out of eight that were threatening continuation of Carter’s 
presidency. To illustrate the noncompensatory character of the President’s 
decision, Brule rated each policy option under three dimensions. 
This thesis argues that during each crisis Turkish decision makers had four 
policy alternatives on the table: i) military intervention; ii) air strike; iii) 
diplomatic efforts; and iv) do nothing. Before discussing the dimensions for 
evaluating these policy options it might be helpful to elaborate on these policy 
alternatives. First of all, ‘military intervention’ refers to full scale military 
intervention involving ground forces and results in occupation of territory. ‘Air 
strike’, on the other hand, refers to a limited military operation performed by air 
forces. An ‘air strike’ decision aims to cease intercommunity clashes on the island 
by attacking some strategic targets on Cyprus. The third policy option, ‘diplomatic 
efforts’, refers to using peaceful methods to calm the situation on the island. 
‘Diplomatic efforts’ include engaging with other ‘guarantor states’ by organizing 
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bilateral talks or conferences, requesting mediation from a third party (e.g. the 
US) or an organization (e.g. NATO, the UN). Lastly a ‘do nothing’ policy 
alternative refers to allowing Turkish and Greek Cypriots to settle the dispute 
among themselves without the participation of Turkey. In other words, by 
choosing the ‘do nothing’ option leaders expect that the intercommunity conflict 
would calm down as a result of negotiations between the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot communities. 
 This thesis argues that Turkish decision makers checked these policy 
options under three dimensions: i) systemic; ii) domestic politics; and iii) military. 
It is important to discuss the dimensions in more detail before analyzing the 
Cyprus crises. One of the dimensions is systemic since the Cyprus crisis erupted 
during the high tension years of the Cold War, and there were other influential 
actors (i.e. the US, the Soviet Union). Additionally, during the Cyprus crises 
Turkey take into consideration reactions of ‘Super Powers’ and other actors (e.g. 
the UK, the UN, NATO). As Turkish decision makers prioritized maintaining 
Turkey’s relations with its allies, during the Cyprus crises Turkish leaders 
assessed the approaches of third-party countries before making a decision 
regarding Cyprus. The other dimension is domestic politics. As stated earlier, 
poliheuristic theory argues that domestic politics is the ‘essence of the decision’. 
Furthermore, since political leaders try to stay in power, leaders consider policy 
alternatives as a means for securing their office. Additionally, during the Cyprus 
case (which will be discussed in more detail in following chapters) Turkey had an 
unstable political situation which increased the importance of this dimension in 
the eyes of Turkish leaders. The last dimension is military. Turkey’s capacity to 
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intervene in Cyprus was another crucial dimension, because if Turkey had decided 
to send ground forces to Cyprus it would be Turkey’s first unilateral use of force 
(except from joining the coalition of Korea War). Additionally, Turkey’s military 
capability and readiness was a question for Turkish decision makers to consider. 
 After defining policy options and the dimensions to evaluate these options, 
the decision matrix appears as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Decision matrix of Turkish Decision Makers 
 Dimensions  
Policy options Systemic Domestic 
Politics 
Military Total (Average) 
Military Intervention     
Air strike     
Diplomatic efforts     
Do nothing     
 
By constructing the decision matrix of Turkey, the thesis deems that during 
each crisis Turkish decision makers (İnönü, Demirel, and Ecevit) had the same 
policy options and dimensions to evaluate these policy options. Using the same 
decision matrix for each crisis will equip the thesis to compare and contrast 
Cyprus crises during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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3.4. Studying the Cyprus Crises 
Before examining the Cyprus crises, the thesis gave some relevant historical 
information on the issue in Chapter II. The aim of that chapter was to enable the 
reader to understand the context of the thesis more clearly. In the following 
chapters the thesis will apply the poliheuristic decision model on each case in 
chronological order, discuss the policy alternatives, and analyze dimensions 
affecting these policies.  
 As we already know, the term ‘poliheuristic’ has two components: “[1] 
poly (many) and [2] heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive 
mechanisms used by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy 
decisions” (Mintz et al. 1997: 554).  As the components of the term demonstrate, 
studying the cognitive mechanisms used by Turkish decision makers during the 
Cyprus crises is a crucial aspect of this thesis. This purpose in mind, the thesis 
will try to understand the heuristics used by decision makers by studying their 
speeches about the Cyprus crises during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 Additionally, the poliheuristic decision making model addresses not only 
the personal attitudes of decision makers, but also the inter-state (system) and 
domestic variables. Domestic and inter-state variables may vary (e.g. the role of 
‘Super Powers’, alliances, current political/economic situation, and elections). As 
a result, in order to understand the domestic and global variables the thesis will 
study the 'behind the scenes' situation of the Cyprus crises. 
In order to frame the context and analyze the cases, the thesis will refer to 
i) the speeches and memoirs of Turkish decision makers on the Cyprus crisis 
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during the 1960s and 1970s; ii) session records of Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey (in order to study the discourses of politicians and any relevant actors on 
Cyprus) iii) the periodical daily Milliyet newspaper; iv) books/chapters/articles on 
the Cyprus crises.  
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CHAPTER III:  
 
 
THE CYPRUS QUESTION 
 
 
 
This chapter of the thesis will conceptualize the Cyprus question while giving 
some historical background information on the subject. This thesis discusses 
demands for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, as one of the key causes of 
Cyprus question. However, enosis is not an issue of the 20
th 
century; it has roots in 
the 19
th
 century. After independence from the Ottoman Empire, modern Greece’s 
first president, Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, called for the union of Cyprus with 
Greece in 1828. Kapodistria’s call triggered a minor uprising in Cyprus 
demanding enosis among Greek Cypriots (Mallinson 2005: 10). In 1878 British 
rule was established on Cyprus. Although the Ottomans allowed the British to rule 
the island ‘temporarily’ on their behalf, the United Kingdom considered Cyprus as 
a base for the defense of the Mediterranean route to the Near East and Far East. 
However, the British soon realized that the island lacked the capacity to be a naval 
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base and the British authorities compensated for this with the occupation of Egypt 
in 1882 (Dodd 2010: 3). When World War I erupted and the Ottoman Empire 
sided with Germany, Britain offered Cyprus to Greece if the latter would join the 
alliance against the Central Powers; however Greece did not declare war until 
1917 and the offer was withdrawn (Mallinson 2005: 11). Actually, when the 
British offered Cyprus to Greece, the Greek Government was influenced by King 
Constantine, a pro-German, and was affected by Greece's unpreparedness for 
waging a war (Dodd 2010: 4-5). Thus, post-war Cyprus remained in British 
control despite Greek and Ottoman claims to rule the island. 
 In 1931, the British colonial administration proposed a temporary levy 
which caused tension on the island; the bishop of Kition even declared union with 
Greece, and the Government House was burned down during riots on 21 
November. In response to these events, British authorities introduced repressive 
measures, deported two bishops and two communist party leaders, and eventually 
banned the Communist Party in 1933 (Mallinson 2005: 11). While there were 
demands for enosis in Cyprus, the island was not on the agenda of Turkey (Çufalı 
2009). On the contrary, Turkey during this period wanted to maintain good 
relations with both Greece and the United Kingdom. Turkey was aware of the 
Italian threat in the Mediterranean and considered British presence on the island a 
guarantee for the stability in the region (Dodd 2010: 9). 
 Up until World War II, Cyprus remained calm, and during the war British 
authorities recruited 37,000 Cypriots (one third of them Turkish Cypriots), even 
using the slogan ‘for Greece, for freedom’. At the end of the war demands for 
enosis increased, and there were arguments both for and against enosis in London 
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(Mallinson 2005: 11-12). After World War II, Greece criticized Turkey for not 
carrying out its contractual obligations during the war; it was then that the 
friendship between Turkey and Greece began to weaken (Fırat 2008a).  
 During the 1950s the destiny of the island changed dramatically with 
growing demand for enosis among Greek Cypriots. In January 1950, for instance, 
the Church of Cyprus arranged a referendum during a Sunday Church service; 
because of insufficient participation, the referendum continued to the next Sunday. 
The result showed that 96% of the participants were in favor of enosis; however 
Turkish Cypriots did not participate in this referendum, thus their votes were 
missing (Fırat 2008a: 596).  In October 1950, Michael Mouskos, elected as 
Makarios III, became the archbishop of Cyprus. Makarios, empowered with the 
referendum results, pressured the government in Greece to take a more active role 
for enosis (Mallinson 2005: 20). 
 While efforts were underway in both Cyprus and Greece  to achieve 
enosis, 1950 was an election year for Turkey. Although the Cyprus issue was one 
of the prior matters among Greeks, in the election campaign of 1950, there were 
no references to Cyprus in the election manifestos of either the Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi (CHP – Republican People’s Party) or the Demokrat Parti (DP – Democrat 
Party); in June of 1950 the foreign minister of newly founded DP government, 
Fuat Köprülü, even declared that there was no Cyprus question at all (Fırat 2008a: 
598). 
 When the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos visited Ankara in 1951 and 
mentioned the Cyprus issue, the Menderes government declared that a solution 
would be found within the framework of Turkish-Greek friendship. In actuality, 
33 
 
during the 1950s Turkey did not have the capacity to formulate policy without 
NATO approval; its priority was maintaining the friendship of Britain and Greece 
within the Western Alliance (Fırat 2008a: 598). Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus 
was based on supporting the continuation of the Western Alliance. At this point, it 
is important to discuss the attitude of the United States towards the Cyprus 
dispute, since the US had the leading role within the Alliance. On the one hand, 
many in the United States were skeptical of one of the most influential political 
organization AKEL, and its relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR). On the other hand, American attitudes were, in general, supportive of 
anti-colonial movements and there were a Greek lobby promoting sympathy for 
Greek Cypriots and their struggle for enosis (Dodd 2010: 13). Turkey became 
involved in the Cyprus question after the pro-enosis movements began to gain 
momentum among Greeks in the mid-1950s (Hale 2002: 130). 
 In 1954, Greece attempted to place the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the 
United Nations, but this attempt failed. Despite the sympathy for Greek Cypriots 
the United States ceased its support for enosis—mainly for strategic reasons—and 
informed Athens that it could not assist Greece in the United Nations (Dodd 2010: 
17).  
 In 1955, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) began 
armed attacks against British authorities on the island. EOKA was established by 
George Grivas, who had been born in Cyprus and later joined the Greek Army. 
Grivas' career began to shine during the Greek Civil War (1945-1949) when he 
formed a unit (called as 'Khi') for hunting down Greek Communists (Holland 
1998: 29). Differing from most  anticolonial uprisings of the 1950s, the struggle 
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against British rule on Cyprus was intended to achieve enosis, not independence 
(Adams 1972: 96).   
 Britain organized a tri-partite conference in London (consisting of Britain, 
Turkey and Greece) to discuss the question. In August 1955, Turkish Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes stated that to shape the destiny of the island, focusing 
only on the ethnic factor was insufficient. He insisted on considering geographic, 
economic, political and historical facts; Menderes also declared the status quo, 
British rule, the most favorable option. According to Menderes the other options 
were: i) if Britain would evacuate the island, then the island should revert to 
Turkey (which was the former ruler of the island), ii) taksim, the partition of the 
island between Turkey and Greece, or iii) self-determination of the island under 
British rule (Göktepe 2009: 379).  
 The Conference failed to solve the Cyprus question and talks quickly 
broke down after the events of 6-7 September (1955) that took place in Turkey. 
Fırat (2008a: 602) discusses that the events of 6-7 September had two important 
connections to the Cyrpus question: i) when Turkey felt under pressure on the 
Cyprus issue, it began responding by exerting pressures on the minorities living in 
Turkey; and ii) the events greatly damaged the Turkish-Greek friendship. 
Mallinson (2005: 5) argues that Britain’s motive during the conference was to 
divide Turkey from Greece, and Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots to 
maintain its authority on the island. According to Mallinson (2005: 25) Turkey 
should not have been invited by the British to the conference since Turkey clearly 
had no claim to Cyprus because it handed the island over to the United Kingdom 
in the Lausanne Treaty. 
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Also in 1955, Greece’s second attempt to place the Cyprus issue on the 
agenda of the United Nations was rejected. In Cyprus, Makarios insisted that 
Britain had to accept the principle of self-determination unconditionally; he was 
also against Turkey’s participation in the negotiations, and he wanted an amnesty 
for EOKA activists. British authorities started to perceive Makarios as an obstacle 
to reform on the island and decided to exile him to the Seychelles Islands in 
March 1956 (Fırat 2008a: 603). Makarios was accompanied by three church 
representatives (Göktepe 2009: 380). In July 1956, Lord Radcliffe, a 
constitutional expert, went to Cyprus to prepare a new constitution but he could 
not find any Greek Cypriot counterpart to discuss the issue (Fırat 2008a: 603). 
Radcliffe’s plan was based on the principle of self-determination, but it was 
rebuffed by Greeks who stated that the plan did not specify a final date to 
implement the principle of self-determination; on the other hand, Turks supported 
the plan, assuming that it would prepare the groundwork for future negotiations 
(Göktepe 2009: 381). 
In December 1956, Menderes declared that taksim was Turkey’s official 
policy, and İsmet İnönü, opposition party leader since 1950, supported this stance; 
there were demonstrations using ‘Partition or death’ as battle cry (Fırat 2008a: 
604). In the same year, Greece applied once more to the UN, and that year Britain 
also applied to the UN by accusing Greece of supporting terrorism on Cyprus; the 
two applications were merged into one agenda item in February 1957; the UN 
General Assembly called for a peaceful, democratic and just solution (Fırat 2008a: 
605).   
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The 1956-1957 Suez operation had profound effects on Britain’s attitude 
towards Cyprus: after this operation the US became the guardian of the Western 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean through the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, 
and the strategic importance of Cyprus for Britain had diminished since Britain 
could manage with just military bases on the island (Fırat 2008a: 6003-4). Before 
1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden stated that Cyprus was of strategic 
importance to protect oil supplies to Britain and thereby avoid unemployment and 
hunger; however, the Suez crisis caused a sharp decline in Britain’s influence in 
the Middle East region and it was forced to adopt a more realistic role (Hakkı 
2007: 11).  This change directed Britain to find a different answer to the Cyprus 
question since there were growing numbers of sabotages and attacks against 
British authorities. 
After the Suez crisis, British Prime Minister Eden resigned and was 
replaced by Harold Macmillan. The new British government followed a more 
liberal policy towards the Cyprus issue: Hugh Foot was appointed as governor to 
the island and Makarios was allowed to go to Athens (Göktepe, 2009: 381). It is 
important to note that, above mentioned Radcliffe Plan was not the only plan 
tailored by Britain: there were two more plans, the Foot Plan of 1957 and the 
Macmillan Plan of 1958. Both plans were in favor of the continuation of British 
rule on the island. The Foot Plan proposed a transitional period of 5-7 years before 
the final solution and during this period the British rule on Cyprus would 
continue. Additionally, the Foot Plan assured that there would be no solution until 
both parties agreed on a solution. The state of emergency would be lifted and 
Makarios could return from exile (Fırat 2008a: 606). The Macmillan Plan, just 
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like the Foot Plan, proposed a transitional period and did not indicate the 
possibility of enosis (Mallinson 2005: 32). During the NATO meetings of 1958, 
allies also discussed the Cyprus dispute and offered a conference to discuss the 
issue with the participation of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and another NATO 
member. However, the offer was rejected by Greek authorities, who accused the 
United Kingdom of taking the side of Turkey (Göktepe 2009: 383). In sum, no 
plan tailored by Britain solved the Cyprus question. 
Behind the scenes another important event took place in Cyprus in 1958. 
Turkish Cypriots founded Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT – Turkish Resistance 
Organization) to defend Turkish Cypriots against further EOKA attacks which 
started to take place in the summer of 1958. Yet TMT had another function: laying 
the basis for taksim of the island (Fırat 2008a: 606). 
By the end of 1958, the atmosphere was suitable for an agreement because 
the governments and the public opinion of both Turkey and Greece were 
exhausted from the question; secondly, NATO and UN members supported efforts 
to resolve the dispute; and lastly, British authorities hoped that successful 
negotiations would improve British-Turkish and British-Greek relations (Göktepe 
2009: 385). At the NATO meeting of December 1958, Greece and Turkey 
declared that they abandoned their former positions (enosis and taksim, 
respectively); this change of stance was a consequence of events that took place in 
Cyprus in 1958: i) the armed struggle between Turks and Greeks, which lasted 
throughout the summer of 1958, was threatening to cause a war between Turkey 
and Greece; ii) such a war in the southern flank of NATO may have served the 
interest of Moscow, which was supporting AKEL (a left-wing party on Cyprus) 
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and Makarios; iii) at this point, the United States was applying pressure to find a 
solution; iv) Turkey and Greece, which were still dependent on the West 
economically and militarily, did not have many options other than agreeing to the 
independence formula (Fırat 2008a: 607-8). 
The year 1959 began with negotiations on the Cyprus dispute, and when 
the preparations were completed, the delegations of Turkey and Greece, headed 
by their prime ministers, met in Zurich in February 1959. During the negotiations 
there was a deadlock on military issues, but the parties could reach an agreement 
on the future of the island, and Menderes and Karamanlis, the prime ministers of 
Turkey and Greece respectively, signed the documents which would establish the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
 Later, Makarios declared that he failed to persuade other Greek Cypriot 
leaders, and if the documents were not renegotiated he would not sign the 
documents. However, this negative development was solved by the efforts of 
Greek prime minister, Karamanlis, who informed Makarios that Greece would 
sign the current documents, and that if Makarios would not sign, then Greek 
Cypriots would not have the backing of Greece (Fırat 2008a: 609-10). In mid-
February 1959 the London Treaties were signed by the prime ministers of Britain, 
Turkey and Greece and by Makarios and Fazıl Küçük on behalf of the two 
communities of Cyprus.  
 The significance of the treaties were that: i) an independent republic was 
founded on Cyprus, and it was a mid-way solution with regard to enosis and 
taksim theses; ii) the president of the republic would be a Greek Cypriot, and the 
vice-president would be a Turkish Cypriot; iii) the president and vice-president 
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could singly or conjointly veto any decision or legislation regarding foreign 
affairs, defense, or security; iv) a proportion of 70-30 is defined and at all levels of 
public administration (and in the Council of Ministers), all positions would be 
allotted to Greeks and Turks according to this proportion; v) one of the cabinet 
posts responsible for foreign affairs, defense, or finance would be assigned to a 
Turk; vi) Turks would have separate municipalities in the five largest towns, and 
in four years’ time the president and vice-president would decide whether to 
continue this practice; vii) signatory parties provided their guarantee to  the state 
of affairs created by these treaties. 
 According to McCaskill (1991: 23), after the London-Zurich Agreements 
the United Kingdom, the United States and other NATO members considered the 
Cyprus dispute to be ‘settled’. As a result the allies underestimated the impact of 
intercommunity clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Putting the 
Cyprus dispute aside, the allies turned their attention to other international 
disputes. Actually, the United States hoped that the republic would survive despite 
having internal disputes (McCaskill 1991: 24). 
On 27 May 1960, Turkish armed forces took over the Menderes 
administration. The military administration of 27 May issued a statement that it 
stood by the London Treaties; the new government’s program, released in July 
1960, declared that Turkish-Greek relations were expected to develop since the 
Cyprus question was solved by the treaties (Fırat 2008b: 719). The new regime 
restored power to civilians in 1961. From 1961 to 1965 Turkey was ruled by 
coalition governments formed by İsmet İnönü. 
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After its formal establishment in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus began to 
have internal disputes. Although the London Treaties established an independent 
Cypriot state, the constitutional mechanism of the island did not work properly 
and it caused disputes between Turks and Greeks. For instance, there were a 
number of disagreements over issues such as the collecting of taxes, municipality 
borders,  and the proportion of involvement in governmental services at the very 
beginning of the newly established Republic of Cyprus (Fırat 2008b: 720). 
When the governmental problems caused ineffectiveness, the Greek 
Cypriot side proposed changes in the constitution which perpetuated the  
conflictual situation. Although there was tension between Turks and Greeks on 
almost every issue, armed attacks against Turkish Cypriots in late December of 
1963 triggered intercommunity conflicts on the island, resulting in casualties on 
both sides. 
Turkey’s first reaction to the crisis was designed to alleviate the situation 
on the island. However, the conflict did not cease and continued to cost lives on 
both sides. As a result, Turkey stated its intention to intervene in Cyprus. 
Accordingly, the United States’ President Lyndon Johnson sent a harsh diplomatic 
message to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü,  known as the ‘Johnson Letter’.  In this 
letter the United States called into question its commitments under the NATO 
charter to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union. With this letter, while trying to 
prevent the war, the United States made Turkish decision makers realize the limits 
of the alliance between Turkey and the United States. The Johnson Letter 
undoubtedly damaged the relationship between these two NATO allies. The 
Johnson Letter was taken as a serious intervention in Turkey's sovereign affairs 
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and caused a worsening of relations between the two countries (Adams 1972: 
101). Dean Rusk, then the United States’ Secretary of State, declared that the 
United States understood that the letter caused a shock in Turkey; however, the 
exact aim of the letter was preventing the war between Turkey and Greece (Şahin 
2002: 62-3). According to this view, the American authorities’ aim was preserving 
status quo on the island. Additionally, 1964 was a presidential election year in the 
United States. President Johnson was worried about international disputes taking 
place in locations such as Congo, Cyprus, and the Dominican Republic, and in 
each crisis Johnson was calling his advisers to ‘stop’ these disputes (Şahin 2002: 
20). Thus, in this context, the United States was viewing the Cyprus crisis not 
only as an international issue but as a domestic one, which may have also affected 
American attitudes.  
After receiving the letter, Turkish politicians recognized the importance of 
having communication with the other countries outside the Western Bloc. Aydın 
(2000: 119) argues that events surrounding the Cyprus crisis forced Turkey's 
leaders to recognize that their strict commitment to a pro-Western alignment in 
changing international system had left Turkey isolated from the rest of the World. 
The Cyprus question then forced Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy. Although 
during Khrushchev started the process of rapprochement between the Soviet 
Union and Turkey, this process gained a faster pace when Khrushchev was ousted 
from power in 1964. The new leadership in Moscow decided to improve its 
relationship with Turkey while hoping to divide the Western Alliance, and Turkey 
responded to this proposal eagerly (Harris 1972: 126). According to Constandinos 
(2011: 24) soon after the Johnson Letter, Soviet support began to drift from 
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Cyprus towards Turkey as the Soviet Union sought to exploit the troubles caused 
within the American-Turkish relationship. Actually, in October 1964 Turkish 
Foreign Minister, F. Cemal Erkin, stated that Turkey would enhance its relations 
with the non-aligned countries (Milliyet 15 Oct. 1964). Additionally, Erkin visited 
Moscow in late October 1964 and the duration of the visit extended (Milliyet 1 
Nov. 1964) and during the meetings Soviet Foreign Minister Kosigin stated that 
being members of different blocs was not an obstacle for developing cooperation 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union (Milliyet 4 Nov. 1964). During the same 
visit, the head of the Soviet Journalist Association declared that the current Soviet 
government make did not any ‘territorial demand’ from Turkey (Milliyet 3 Nov. 
1964) which was a definite sign of the Soviet attempt to enhance relations with 
Turkey. 
The 1964 crisis entered a period of calmness after reaching its peak in 
August 1964. Although Turkey revised its intervention decision after receiving the 
Johnson Letter, it used its air forces to settle intercommunity conflict on the island 
in August 1964.  
In 1967 a military coup took place in Greece and as the Greek junta 
controlled the military forces on Cyprus, Makarios had no other option but to put 
a certain amount of confidence in the junta (Constandinos 2011: 26). The Greek 
military junta, with its lack of domestic support, wanted to show some external 
success to Greek public in order to hide domestic problems. In this case, Cyprus 
was considered an example of external success; however, Greek forces in Cyprus 
caused a crisis by attacking Turkish-Cypriot villages and the two countries were 
again on the brink of war (Fırat 1997). 
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President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of the 
Army, to ease the tension and prevent the war from erupting. Actually, at this time 
the United States’ focus was on Greece rather than Turkey. During the 1967 crisis 
Turkey warned Vance that if he were to deliver another Johnson Letter to Turkey, 
Turkish authorities would not accept him as a mediator (Bölükbaşı 2001: 183). 
Vance, recognizing Turkey’s stand on the issue, pressured the Greek junta and 
Makarios. Vance’s mission to persuade the Greek junta to withdraw Greek forces 
from the island was successful. On the other hand, it could be argued that if a 
democratically elected government was in power in Greece during the 1967 
Cyprus crisis, the Cyrus Vance mission could not have been successful and a war 
would have broken out between Turkey and Greece (Hart 1972: 141). In other 
words, if the Greek junta had external support for its policies, then the 1967 crisis 
may have led to war. 
In early 1968, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and his Greek counterpart, 
Panagiotis Pipinelis, met secretly in Switzerland and reached an agreement on 
starting bi-communal talks to settle the Cyprus dispute (Gürün 1983: 420). The 
talks between the two communities of the island started in June 1968 in Nicosia 
(Lefkoşa). However, the negotiations between representatives of Turkish Cypriots 
(Rauf Denktaş) and Greek Cypriots (Glafcos Clerides) continued until Septermber 
1971 without finding a solution. Instead, the talks reached a stalemate in 1971. 
Although the talks were going nowhere, they resumed in June 1972 and continued 
until June 1974, just before the coup against the Makarios administration (Ertekün 
1984: 25-26). 
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In reality, the island was de facto partitioned after the 1967 crisis. In 
December 1967, Turkish Cypriots claimed their own rule under the title of 
‘Provisional Turkish Administration’ (PTA) to manage daily affairs of their 
community (Bilge 1975: 177). Although Turkish Cypriots founded their own 
‘provisional’ administration on the island, the world continued to recognize the 
Greek Cypriots as the legal government of Cyprus, though no Turkish Cypriots 
were present in the government. In fact, Greek Cypriots argued that they had the 
right to govern both communities on the island (Borowiec 2000: 60). 
Following the 1967 crisis, the Cyprus question entered a period of 
calmness. However, the status quo changed ‘once and for all’ in 1974. In June 
1974 Makarios sent a letter to the Greek Junta and demanded the withdrawal of 
Greek officers from the National Guards, since these personnel were committing 
acts that undermined the authority of the Makarios administration. Additionally, 
Makarios argued that the EOKA-B organization opposed his rule and their 
activities were funded by the Greek Junta (Gürün 1983: 421-422). 
In July 1974 Greek National Guards organized a coup against the 
Makarios administration. There were claims that Makarios was death. However, 
later the World learned that Makarios was still alive and in the UK. 
In response to the coup against the Makarios administration, Turkey first 
proposed joint intervention with the British. However, when the British authorities 
refused to intervene, Turkey decided to act alone and intervened in Cyprus to 
restore the ‘state of affairs’ of the Cyprus Republic (Dodd 2004: 4). The US 
administration tried to pursue Turkey not to use force against Cyprus. However, 
the Ecevit administration considered intervening in Cyprus a solution to the 
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dispute. Turkey’s military intervention had two phases. While the first phase 
ended the coup, the second phase resulted in changes in the demographic structure 
of the island. Turkey’s intervention divided the island into two creating a Turkish 
Cypriot zone in the north of the island. 
In 1975, the Turkish Cypriots established a ‘federated state’ in the north of 
the island. The primary aim of this move was facilitating a bi-communal and bi-
zonal federal state on Cyprus. However, the initiative did not reach this outcome 
during the U.N.-sponsored talks in Vienna. The only positive result of the Vienna 
talks was a voluntary ‘regrouping of populations’. 
Although the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities continued to 
negotiate a de facto solution to the Cyprus dispute, the international community 
sustained its recognition of Greek Cypriot authorities as legal representatives of 
the whole island. It was under these conditions that, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots 
proclaimed the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 
Following this declaration, negotiations continued with the help of De 
Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General. In 1986 a framework agreement was drafted 
which proposed a federal, bi-communal, bi-zonal state. TNRC responded 
positively to the proposal while still demanding much stronger federative rights 
for both communities. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, refused the proposal by 
demanding some preconditions: withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus, 
repatriation of Turkish settlers, and replacement of the Guarantee Agreement with 
international guarantees. 
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During the 1990s another important actor entered the negotiations for 
settlement on the island: the European Union (EU). Prior to the Greek Cypriot 
application for membership, the EU took a more passive role towards the Cyprus 
dispute. However, during the 1990s the EU emerged as a crucial factor for 
shaping Turkey’s attitude towards the Cyprus dispute. The rationale behind this 
‘European impact’ was related to Turkey’s foreign policy objective to become a 
member of the EU after the Cold War (Uslu 2001). 
The early 2000s saw another initiative by the UN. The secretary-general of 
the UN, Kofi Annan, proposed a plan for reunification of the island. Although 
both communities of the island had nationalist governments during that period, the 
attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots had changed after the landslide victory of Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development party) in Turkey in 2002. 
The Annan Plan was voted upon by the two communities in simultaneous twin 
referenda in 2004. The results were: a Greek Cypriot ‘no,’ and a Turkish Cypriot 
‘yes’. Although the Annan Plan could not reunite the island, Cyprus became a full 
member of the European Union in 2004 (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 157-160).  
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CHAPTER IV:   
 
 
THE 1964 CYPRUS CRISIS 
 
 
 
Although the Republic of Cyprus had internal disputes following its establishment 
in 1960, public opinion in Turkey was not focused on Cyprus during this period. 
Following the 27 May coup Turkey had its own internal problems and the political 
atmosphere was unstable. Following the coup, Turkey was ruled by coalition 
governments under the premiership of İnönü, each coalition dissolving within a 
year.  
When the governmental problems caused more ineffectiveness on Cyprus, 
the Greek Cypriot side proposed changes in the constitution which perpetuated the 
situation on the island. Although there was preexisting tension between Turks and 
Greeks on almost every issue, in late December 1963 an incident triggered 
intercommunity conflicts on the island, and there were casualties on both sides. 
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Turkey did not make its first response until January 1964 since the second İnönü 
coalition was just dissolved in December 1963.   
During the early stages of the 1964 crisis, Turkey responded with a ‘show 
of force’. Although this reaction resulted in an end of ethnic conflict on the island 
in January, the situation got worse the following months. As a result, Turkey 
announced its intention to intervene in Cyprus to restore order and establish status 
quo by the treaties. At this stage, the US administration took the initiative and 
prevented Turkey from intervening in Cyprus by sending the famous Johnson 
Letter. The letter definitely had an impact on Turkey’s decision-making though it 
did not stop Turkey from bombing some targets on Cyprus in August 1964. 
Following Turkey’s ‘air strike’ decision the parties returned to the negotiation 
table to settle the Cyprus dispute. In this chapter, the thesis will study Turkey’s 
decision making process during the 1964 Cyprus crisis from December 1963 to 
August 1964. 
 
4.1. The 1964 Cyprus Crisis 
When İnönü traveled to the United States in order to attend the funeral of 
Kennedy in late November 1963, the second İnönü coalition government was 
dissolved. The dissolution of the coalition happened after the local elections 
which took place in mid-November 1963. The main opposition party, Adalet 
Partisi (AP – Justice Party), achieved a landslide victory against İnönü’s 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) and Ragıp Gümüşpala, leader of the AP, stated 
that he was ready for the post (Milliyet 20
th
 Nov. 1963). 
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At the beginning, İnönü tried to find a solution and sustain the coalition. 
However, İnönü’s attempts to save the coalition failed, and İnönü resigned on 2 
December 1963, declaring that he would not form a coalition again. At this point 
President Cemal Gürsel intervened and had several meetings with the leaders of 
political parties those had representatives in Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM 
– Grand National Assembly of Turkey) to solve the political crisis the country 
faces.  Gürsel first proposed forming a coalition under the leadership of AP. 
Although Gümüşpala accepted this post, he later refused to form the government 
(Milliyet 15
th
 Dec. 1963). Then, İnönü was again assigned to form the third İnönü 
coalition on 14
th
 December. During the rest of December of 1963 İnönü was 
trying to form a government. On 18
th
 December 1963, CHP offered Cumhuriyetçi 
Köylü Millet Partisi (CKMP) to join in forming a coalition government; however, 
CKMP did not accept this offer. İnönü finally could form the third coalition 
government under his premiership in January 1964 with the participation of 
nonpartisan politicians, and he secured the vote of confidence in the Turkish 
parliament (Milliyet 5
th
 Jan. 1964).  
 While Turkey had a domestic political crisis and the efforts to save the 
second İnönü coalition were proving fruitless, Makarios proposed a plan to 
implement some changes in the Cyprus constitution on 5
th
 December 1963.  This 
proposal was immediately refused by Turkey in an official response. Foreign 
Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin gave Turkey’s official response to Malarias’ plan 
on 16
th
 December, consigned to Makarios by the ambassador of Turkey to Cyprus 
(MMTD 1963: 510). While İnönü was assigned to form the government, bloody 
incidents between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots took place on Cyprus on 
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21
st
 December. The event triggered tension between communities and clashes 
spread through the island. There were even attacks on the residence of Fazıl 
Küçük, the Vice President of Republic of Cyprus (Milliyet 24th Dec. 1963).  
 When the situation in Cyprus was not calming down, Turkish Air Forces 
(TAF) flew over Cyprus in a warning mission; the Turkish fighter jets did not 
bomb any targets. This flight mission did, however, cease the clashes on the 
island. The same day Turkish Naval Forces (TNF) sailed to Mersin, the city in the 
south-eastern coast of Turkey (Milliyet 26
th
 Dec. 1963). On this issue, İnönü 
(MMTD 1964c) stated in the Turkish Parliament that Turkey wanted to intervene 
in Cyprus according to the Guarantee Agreement, and when the other parties 
(Britain and Greece) realized this initiative they decided to cooperate to 
reconstitute the public order on Cyprus.  According to İnönü, this air mission was 
designed to warn the Greek Cypriots. After consulting with President Gürsel, 
İnönü stated that there was no attempt to send military forces to Cyprus. Instead 
he counseled the audience to be patient (İnönü 2004: 467). Additionally, İnönü 
accused supporters of intervention of not knowing the full meaning of war (İnönü 
2004: 468).  
 January 1964, Makarios declared that he wanted to abrogate the Guarantee 
Agreement. After forming the government and receiving the vote of confidence, 
İnönü sent a letter to foreign premiers and discussed Turkey’s actions and position 
with regard to Cyprus. In this letter İnönü emphasized Turkey’s commitment to 
international law (İnönü 2004: 472-4). It is important to note that İnönü sent this 
message after formally convening the coalition, since before that time he was an 
inverted prime minister. Britain proposed a meeting of foreign ministers of the 
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guarantor states, and the meeting started on 15
th
 January 1964 in London. During 
this conference, known as the London Conference, Rauf Denktaş, speaking on 
behalf of Turkish Cypriots, declared that the 1960 agreements failed to provide 
security to Turkish Cypriots and the only solution would be establishing a federal 
state consisting of two communities (Milliyet 17
th
 Jan. 1964). During the 
conference, a plan to station a NATO force under the British command was 
discussed, and Britain requested the US to take a more active stand (Milliyet 28
th
 
Jan. 1964a). However, Greek Cypriots opposed this plan (Milliyet 28
th
 Jan. 
1964b). Thus, in October the efforts to station an international peace keeping force 
failed. İnönü made a statement to International Press Institute stating that Turkey 
has some rights and responsibilities according to 1960 treaties, and that he could 
not foresee what Turkey would do if the bloody situation did not end on the island 
(İnönü 2004: 491-2). 
 February 1964, the London conference ended without any concrete 
solution for the Cyprus dispute. During an interview with a foreign journalist 
İnönü stated that the most practical solution was dividing the island between 
Turkey and Greece, but the international and intra-alliance relations had forced 
leaders to establish an independent republic in 1959 (İnönü 2004: 497-9). İnönü 
made a statement to New York Times in which he declared that Turkey’s aim was 
providing security to Turkish Cypriots and that he considered establishing a 
federative state on the island to be a solution (İnönü 2004: 499-501). On 7th 
February, Denktaş came to Turkey and insisted that Turkey should intervene in 
Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots (Milliyet 8
th
 Feb. 1964). The US 
undersecretary of state, George Ball, visited Ankara and had meetings with both 
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İnönü and Erkin. Ball later went to Cyprus and tried to find a way to end the 
dispute. While Makarios did not accept Ball’s proposal, Turkey continued its 
preparations: in İskenderun port, Turkish platoons stepped aboard landing crafts, 
and Turkish battleships harbored in Karataş (Milliyet 15th Feb. 1964). The UN 
Security Council met to discuss the current events taking place in Cyprus. 
However, these meetings were abortive actions since any offer or opinion was 
rejected by the Greek Cypriot delegation (Milliyet 28
th
 Feb 1964). On 21
st
 
February there was an attempt to assassinate İnönü, and the assailant was caught 
immediately.     
 March 1964, the UN Security Council approved resolution 186 on 4
th
 
March and recommended creation of a UN peace keeping force on Cyprus. İnönü 
made a statement to Der Spiegel and stated that the situation will deteriorate in 
Cyprus (Milliyet 5
th
 Mar. 1964; İnönü 2004: 525-8). Although İnönü was sanguine 
about the future of the Cyprus question, he called the current situation on the 
island a civil war while answering a question (İnönü 2004: 532). Turkey delivered 
a note to Makarios and declared that if the security of Turkish Cypriots was not 
provided for, Turkey was preserving its right to intervene in Cyprus (İnönü 2004: 
533-4). On 16
th
 March, TBMM delegated authority to the İnönü administration to 
use force towards Cyprus if it is needed
1
. In domestics politics Adalet Partisi 
abandoned calling for an early election (Milliyet 23
rd 
Mar. 1964). In Cyprus, 
Makarios terminated the posts of two Turkish Cypriot ministers (Milliyet 29
th
 
Mar. 1964). The partial election for the Senate was announced: elections would be 
held in 24 provinces of Turkey in June 1964 (Milliyet 31
st
 Mar. 1964).  
                                            
1
 This was a closed session. However, after 50 years we still do not have the records of this 
session. 
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 April 1964, Makarios wanted Turkey to remove its troops from Cyprus 
which was stationed according to the 1960 treaties (Milliyet 2
nd
 Apr. 1964). İnönü 
stated that relations between Turkey and Greece were moving in the direction of 
degradation (Milliyet 14
th
 Apr. 1964). İnönü made a statement to Time that the 
Cyprus crisis may cause to the dissolution of the Western Alliance (Milliyet 16
th
 
Apr. 1964). The vice-patriarch was denaturalized and expelled from Turkey 
(Milliyet 22
nd
 Apr. 1964). İnönü had a meeting with the secretary-general of the 
NATO, Dirk Stikker, and declared that Turkey was discontent with the Western 
Alliance (Milliyet 29
th
 Apr. 1964). 
   May 1964, 30 battleships gathered in İskenderun port to hold a landing 
drill, and this drill was the largest military drill that Turkish armed forces have 
held until 1964 (Milliyet 6
th
 May 1964). Johnson assigned Senator Fulbright to 
gather information on the Cyprus issue, and Fulbright visited Turkey (Milliyet 8
th
 
May 1964). The vice-prime minister of Turkey, Kemal Satır, stated that Turkey 
had the capability to occupy Cyprus within six hours (Milliyet 11
th
 May 1964). At 
the NATO council, Erkin stated that Turkey may accept the mediation of NATO 
(Milliyet 14
th
 May 1964). The main opposition party leader, Gümüşpala, attacked 
the İnönü administration on the grounds of the Cyprus question (Milliyet 18th May 
1964). Makarios declared that Turkish Cypriot hostages were killed by some 
irresponsible Greeks (Milliyet 30
th
 May 1964). 
 June 1964, the UN Secretary-General stated that the situation on the island 
was not moving in the direction of settling (Milliyet 5
th
 Jun. 1964). The US 
President Johnson sent a letter to İnönü inviting İnönü to Washington in order to 
discuss the Cyprus issue; as a result Turkey revised its intervention decision 
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(Milliyet 6
th
 Jun. 1964). İnönü asked TBMM for a vote of confidence on the 
Cyprus question (Milliyet 19
th
 Jun. 1964) and despite the small margin of victory, 
the vote of confidence passed (Milliyet 20
th
 Jun. 1964). İnönü went to the US and 
declared that a solution was possible although the current situation was tough 
(Milliyet 22
nd
 Jun. 1964). İnönü requested the US to pursue a more active policy 
on the Cyprus issue and declared that Turkey was ready to accept a ‘double-
enosis’ formula which will divide the island between Turkey and Greece (Milliyet 
26
th
 June 1964).  Johnson had also invited Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to 
Washington, but bilateral negotiations could not take place between Turkish and 
Greek delegations. İnönü visited London and Paris (Milliyet 27th June 1964).  
 July 1964: While in Paris, İnönü mentioned his last contacts both in 
Washington and in London and stated that Turkey gained strength from a point of 
law (Milliyet 1
st
 Jul. 1964). On the other hand, there were claims that Greece 
deployed 3,000 soldiers on the island (Milliyet 13
th
 Jul. 1964). The Commander of 
Turkish Air Forces, İrfan Tansel, declared that Turkey would send airborne troops 
(Milliyet 15
th
 Jul. 1964). The Greek government admitted to the claims of having 
landed Greek forces on Cyprus (16
th
 Jul. 1964). While deployment of troops 
continued on the island, Makarios declared that Greeks would achieve their aims 
(Milliyet 26
th
 Jul. 1964). Throughout July 1964, parties met in Geneva under the 
auspices of the UN to find a peaceful and lasting solution for the Cyprus dispute. 
 August 1964, Turkey asked Greece its reason for deploying military 
buildup along the Turkish Border, declaring that Turkey was not threatening 
Greece (Milliyet 2
nd
 Aug. 1964). All these efforts did not end the strife on the 
island and the clashes expanded (Milliyet 7
th
 Aug. 1964). TAF executed a mission 
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to patrol Cyprus (Milliyet 8
th
 Aug. 1964) and bombed some military targets 
(Milliyet 9
th
 Aug. 1964). These air strikes ceased fire on the island between 
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (Milliyet 10
th
 Aug. 1964). İnönü informed 
the UN Security Council that Turkey stopped the mission of TAF (Milliyet 12
th
 
Aug. 1964). 
 
4.2. Analyzing events  
The above chronology points out that on 21
st
 December 1963, Turkey had both a 
domestic crisis and an international crisis. In domestic politics the second İnönü 
coalition government was dissolved, and in international relations there were 
demands from Makarios to implement changes in the constitution of the Cyprus 
Republic at the expense of Turkish Cypriots’ rights granted by the agreements. 
Intercommunity clashes were occurring on the island. Turkey had to decide 
whether or not to intervene in Cyprus in order to provide security to Turkish 
Cypriots. At this point the poliheuristic decision model may contribute to an 
understanding of Turkey’s decision. As discussed above, the poliheuristic decision 
model consists of two stages; here the thesis will evaluate Turkey’s air strike 
decision, and how Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus with the 
poliheuristic decision making model. 
 
4.2.1. First stage of decision making 
In the first stage of poliheuristic decision model, decision makers eliminate the 
policy alternatives which have a low value in the key dimension. The thesis argues 
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that in this stage ‘systemic dimension’ was considered the key dimension by the 
İnönü administration. Before applying the first stage of poliheuristic decision 
model to the 1964 Cyprus crisis, it might be helpful to discuss CHP’s and İnönü’s 
approaches to foreign policy. 
 Long before the eruption of the Cyprus crisis in 1963, Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi released its official foreign policy views in 1961. The document’s front 
cover states a proverb from İnönü: “Turks are faithful to their friendship, loyal to 
their engagements”. The document states that CHP adopted the motto “peace at 
home, peace in the world” as a principle which was also an article of the 1961 
Constitution (CHP 1961: 3). The document considered NATO as a crucial part of 
Turkey’s security by indicating the current balance of power between the Western 
Bloc and the Soviet Bloc (CHP 1961: 11). As a result, CHP declared that it is 
impossible to envisage Turkey acting neutral (CHP 1961: 12). Turkey’s 
commitments to the West is not limited to the NATO, the document argues and 
states that CHP wants Turkey to be a part of the European Economic Community 
(CHP 1961: 14-15). On the Cyprus issue the document argues that although the 
Zurich-London agreements have some deficiencies, Turkey is fully committed to 
“practice the agreements and has ambition to defend the rights of Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey’s interests on Cyprus” and declared that CHP will not tolerate 
destruction of established status quo on Cyprus (CHP 1961: 22). 
 It is important to note that Adalet Partisi also emphasized and adopted the 
motto “peace at home, peace in the world” as a principle for foreign policy 
(Tevetoğlu 1963: 1). Fethi Tevetoğlu, Senator from AP and president of the 
Turkish NATO Parliamentarians Group, after defining Greece as friend and ally, 
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on the Cyprus issue stated that the roots and continuity of Turkish Greek 
friendship is bound by the continuation of established status quo on Cyprus 
(Tevetoğlu 1963: 7). Accordingly, both CHP and AP, before the eruption of 
conflict on Cyprus considered status quo as the basis for continuity of peace.  
In accordance with these policies, as the thesis will discuss in more detail, 
from the very beginning of the Cyprus crisis, İnönü insisted on solving the 
question within the framework of 1960 treaties and when a party offered 
negotiation İnönü accepted the offer. Actually, İnönü’s commitment to 
international agreements was quite related to his attitudes towards foreign policy. 
In general İnönü was in favor of cautiousness in foreign policy. For instance, 
during late 1930s –according to İnönü- Atatürk was planning to use military to 
solve the “Sancak (Hatay) question”, and İnönü opposed this plan, there were 
discussions among them. While being against Atatürk’s plan İnönü was 
considering the latest issues taking place in Europe, according to İnönü declaring 
a war may have some negative impacts on Turkey’s foreign relations (İnönü 1985: 
283-5).  
Furthermore, İnönü had intentions to solve the Cyprus dispute by peaceful 
methods and according to İnönü (1961: 45) solving disputes through negotiations 
requires two conditions: an agreement on i) the existence of the dispute and ii) the 
decision to solve the problem by the parties. In this context, İnönü argues, the 
success of the Lausanne Treaty was due to Turkey’s realist approach and its policy 
to delay some issues for the sake of the peace agreement. Those delayed issues, 
such as Turkish straits and Hatay, later solved through negotiations (İnönü 1961: 
50-51). Additionally, although there were some opportunities to solve the Hatay 
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question by using force, Turkey did not take this decision. Turkey as a successor 
of an empire refused every opportunity to acquire territory during the Second 
World War (İnönü 1961: 51-51). These views demonstrate that İnönü had an 
approach to prioritize negotiation over using force as a means of solving disputes. 
When 1964 crisis emerged and authorities could not stop the violence 
among Turks and Greeks, Turkey considered intervening in Cyprus as an option. 
The chronology also supports this argument. Nonetheless, intervention remained 
as ‘last resort’ in İnönü’s agenda and he decided to exhaust other alternatives 
(Bölükbaşı 1993: 512). According to Toker (1992: 195-196) İnönü was reluctant 
to take the intervention decision and he was describing intervening as “putting a 
spoke in a hive” and if Turkey could pursue the United States to accompany itself, 
Turkey might solve the Cyprus question in favor of itself.  
In order to settle the dispute by negotiation Turkey first consulted with 
guarantor states (Greece and the United Kingdom). However, when attempts to 
solve the crisis during the London conference failed and when the Soviet Union 
sent two diplomatic letters and warned Western powers not to interrupt domestic 
politics of Cyprus, it became less possible to solve the dispute among Western 
countries. On this subject İnönü stated that: 
As long as the negotiations were continuing the problem was 
lasting and since there wasn’t any public order on the island the 
incidents were repeating. This is why the United States and 
guarantor states agreed recently on appealing the United Nations. 
We decided to settle the dispute through negotiations (MMTD 
1964c: 11).    
Additionally, İnönü realized that the Cyprus dispute already became an 
international issue which almost every nation follows carefully. İnönü argued that 
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establishing security and public order on Cyprus was requiring commitment of 
great powers. He declared that only after this commitment it would be possible to 
find a solution to reorganize the lives of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots 
(MMTD 1964c: 12). In other words, İnönü considered internationalization of the 
dispute as a step towards settlement. 
However, internationalization of the dispute and establishing a UN peace 
force in Cyprus did not end the conflict on the island. As a result, Turkey 
informed Makarios that “they would move if attacks on Turkish Cypriots did not 
stop”2 (FRUS 2000: 51). During these tough days TBMM granted the İnönü 
administration the right to intervene in Cyprus whenever it was required. 
Although İnönü claimed that if the intercommunity strife did not end on 
the island the Western Alliance would be dissolved (Milliyet 16
th
 Apr. 1964), 
İnönü continued informing NATO from his policies with regard to Cyprus. Thus, 
if İnönü was supporting a military intervention then he probably would not 
discuss it with other NATO members, especially with the US. 
On the contrary, on 4
th
 June 1964 Turkey informed the US Ambassador to 
Turkey, Raymond Hare, that Turkey would intervene in Cyprus, and Hare - on 
behalf of his country - asked for a 24 hour delay for the decision
3
. Actually, a 
close look at published documents reveals an interesting story. When Turkey 
informed the US ambassador Hare about the possibility of Turkish intervention, 
Hare asked for an ‘urgent’ meeting with Erkin. During this meeting Erkin stated 
that since Makarios still was intent on pursuing his objectives without considering 
                                            
2
 Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts, March 12, 1964 
3
 According to Bölükbaşı (1993: 516) Foreign Minister Erkin “opposed to leaking of the 
government decision to the Americans” but İnönü decided to inform the US administration. 
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their consequences, the Cabinet would meet at 8:30 pm. to discuss the current 
situation, and there was a possibility they could decide to intervene. When Hare 
asked Erkin whether Turkey would revise its decision if Greece proposed a 
formula which meets Turkey’s needs, Erkin declared that Turkey could accept 
only federation or a ‘double enosis’ formula4 (FRUS 2000: 103-4).  
This telegram was also sent to the US embassy in Greece and the US 
Ambassador Labouisse wrote that the Greek government was “still holding a line 
of enosis. We continue to believe there is no chance of Greek support partition or 
federation of Cyprus, as apparently demanded by Erkin”5 (FRUS 2000: 106). In 
other words there was almost nothing to negotiate between Turkey and Greece on 
the Cyprus dispute since both parties were holding their position as the last 
stronghold. 
Before the Cabinet meeting Ambassador Hare had a three hour 
conversation with İnönü. In Hare’s words: 
Argument was tough and sometimes got on very sensitive ground 
with Inonu holding ground firmly and saying not only Cyprus but 
also our relationship could hinge on agreement with Turkish 
decision. When Inonu made another move to join Cabinet I said 
was certain what I had been told would be great disappointment to 
President who has stressed importance of consultation and was 
only being given opportunity to agree or disagree on single 
proposition. This could hardly be called consultation
6
 (FRUS 2000: 
106). 
After this conversation, as already known, Hare asked for 24 hours delay 
to make US views known on the issue. As a result the US President Johnson 
delivered a letter to İnönü on 5th June 1964. This letter, called the “Johnson 
                                            
4 
Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, June 4, 1964 
5 
Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Embassy in Turkey, June 4, 1964 
6
 Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, June 5, 1964. 
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Letter” had important effects on Turkish foreign policy. The letter, basically stated 
that i) Turkey did not fulfill its responsibilities (negotiating multilateral action 
with other guarantor states) to intervene unilaterally; ii) if Turkey faced a Soviet 
attack as a result of its intervention, then the NATO and the US may not protect 
Turkey; iii) Turkey could not use American military aids to intervene in Cyprus 
since this equipment was given to Turkey to defend itself; and iv) Johnson invited 
İnönü to Washington to discuss the situation (Şahin 2002: 13, for the letter see 
FRUS 2000: 107-110
7
). The tone of the letter was considered a bit harsh. 
According to an American diplomat, Johnson did not like foreign policy issues 
and since 1964 was an election year in the US, that was presumably why Johnson 
wanted to stop a conflict within the Western Alliance (Şahin 2002: 20).  
Turkey replied to the Johnson Letter, and in general the content of the 
letter was: i) the Johnson Letter frustrated Turkey; ii) Turkey informed the US 
about its actions towards Cyprus regularly; iii) the US did not try to prevent 
Greeks from attacking Turks on the island; iv) the Johnson Letter called into 
question the effectiveness of the alliance between Turkey and the US; v) if NATO 
operated in this way, then it needed a treatment since deserting  a member state 
after a military attack is against the essence of NATO; and vi) İnönü accepted 
Johnson’s invitation (Şahin 2002: 78-9). This response indicated that Turkey 
decided not to intervene in Cyprus. 
Bölükbaşı (2001: 123) argues that İnönü’s requesting consultation from the 
US was a sign of his unwillingness to intervene. Actually, Bölükbaşı’s argument 
makes great sense when considering the documents discussed above as testament 
                                            
7
 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1964 
62 
 
to İnönü’s reluctance to use force. Another document sent from Ball to Johnson 
states that the Greek government realized the danger of Greek-Turkish warfare 
and the communist influence that was gaining strength on Cyprus. The document 
continued: 
There were strong indications that Papandreou would like to have 
the USG [the United States government] force a settlement on the 
GOG [Government of Greece] that it could accept only with the 
excuse of outside pressure. 
Ankara 
On the Turkish side, Inonu is doing everything possible to 
maneuver us into taking responsibility for bringing about a 
settlement. The Turks are clearly frightened of the Cyprus situation. 
They are perplexed and sad. They also want us to force a settlement 
on them – provided adequate face-saving aspects can be devised8 
(FRUS 2000: 132). 
Apart from the İnönü administration’s approach towards the crisis, the 
Western states, especially the US, were trying to prevent any military action 
which could cause war in the southern flank of the NATO. Additionally, the US 
was afraid that a possible war between Turkey and Greece which would result in 
the Soviet involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean through Cyprus (Göktepe 
2005: 432). The US administration under these conditions had to act and prevent 
any possible war among its two NATO allies. This was the reason why, from the 
very beginning, the US undersecretary of state, the secretary-general of the 
NATO, and other high ranking officers and politicians visited Turkey, Greece and 
Cyprus. This pressure also resulted in organizing a couple of international 
conferences, the UN Security Council, and NATO council meetings.  
Each attempt to solve the problem by any of these actors caused more 
internationalization of the Cyprus problem day by day. For instance, during the 
                                            
8 
Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson, June 11, 1964 
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last days of the London conference Britain tried to include the US in efforts to 
solve the dispute. However, this action paved the way for the Soviet Union’s 
involvement in the Cyprus question (Aziz 1969: 173).  As a result, the Soviet 
Union became another factor in the systemic dimension either when Turkey 
attempted to intervene in Cyprus or when the NATO powers tried to solve the 
problem within the NATO framework. As an example of Soviet involvement, 
during a United Nation Security Council meeting in February 1964, the Soviets’ 
delegate accused NATO of forcing Cypriots to accept their solution on the crisis 
and argued that the intervention of foreign powers in domestic problems of 
Cyprus was the real cause of the crisis (Aziz 1969: 177-178). 
Although the London conference encouraged the Soviet Union to have a 
more active role in the Cyprus crisis, it was not the root of the relationship 
between the Soviets and the Cyprus. During the 1960s the Soviets formed ties 
with Cyprus on economic and cultural basis. For instance, students from Cyprus 
went to the Soviet Union for education and many of them became supporters of 
Communist ideology, although some might have had ties with Europe’s strongest 
Communist party, AKEL, before going to the Soviet Union (Michael 2011: 102). 
Throughout the 1964 crisis the Soviets supported Cyprus against ‘foreign 
invasion’ both by sending letters to leaders of the US and Turkey, and by 
supplying arms to Cyprus (Michael 2011: 106). 
 After the London conference the United States became gradually involved 
in the Cyprus crisis. The Johnson Letter was definitely the most vivid example of 
US involvement. However it was not the only or the last attempt made by the 
United States to prevent war between its allies. For instance, the US 
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undersecretary of state, George Ball, visited Ankara on 10
th
 June 1964 after 
visiting Athens a day earlier (Milliyet 11
th
 Jun. 1964). Ball’s visit was designed to 
prevent a war between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, as was the case with other 
US actions. 
It is important to note that the 1964 Cyprus crisis took place when the 
tension between Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc was high and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (1962) still was a new issue. Both crises (Cuban Missile and Cyprus) had a 
definite impact on Turkey and led Turkey to reconsider its commitment to the 
Western Alliance. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Jupiter Affair reminded 
Turkey that it could easily become a theater of war between ‘Super Powers’ and 
the US might make a decision without consulting Turkey (Benli-Altunışık and Tür 
2005: 106). The second crisis, however, showed Turkey that its ally may call into 
question the NATO commitments in case of an attack which was actually the 
fundamental aim of the NATO treaty (Benli-Altunışık and Tür 2005: 107). Thus, 
Cold War conditions had an effect on Turkey’s decision. 
Nihat Erim, who gave a first-hand account of Turkey’s policy towards 
Cyprus, argues that although there were some signs of US approval of Turkey’s 
intervention, İnönü wanted official assent before making an intervention decision 
(Erim n.d.: 243). Additionally, İnönü was considering the consequences of an 
intervention decision which may cause unexpected results for Turkey. On the 
Cyprus issue, Erim argues, İnönü did not want to put Turkey in danger while 
trying to save the lives of 120,000 Turkish Cypriots (Erim n.d.: 383). In case of an 
armed intervention the possibility of Greek retaliation was unknown, because the 
Soviets’ response was unknown to Turkish decision makers (Erim n.d.: 382). In 
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other words, although the situation on Cyprus was against Turkish Cypriots, since 
armed conflict was still continuing Turkey could not act without considering the 
consequences of intervention decision. 
As a sign of İnönü’s reluctance to use force, although the US did not 
propose any concrete plan for settlement on Cyprus İnönü discussed the situation 
with the US President Johnson and:  
Prime Minister Inonu again expressed his thanks for the President’s 
help, but added that every time during recent months when there 
seemed to be hope for a peaceful settlement, something had 
developed to block it. […] He agreed with the President that there 
are no gainers in war, but pointed out that Greece appears to be 
acting under the impression that it can win an easy victory on 
Cyprus
9
 (FRUS 2000: 147). 
The thesis argues that international relations had an impact on İnönü’s 
decision during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. According to poliheuristic theory İnönü 
eliminated a ‘military intervention’ option in the first stage of decision making 
since this option failed to satisfy the ‘key dimension’ (i.e. systemic dimension). As 
İnönü considered the 1959 agreements as a result of international and intra-
alliance pressure, during the 1964 Cyprus crisis international pressure (especially 
the US opposition to any kind of military intervention) prevented İnönü from 
making a decision to intervene in Cyprus. 
 
4.2.2. Second stage of decision making 
In the second stage of poliheuristic decision model, a decision maker uses analytic 
evaluations and tries to maximize gains by minimizing losses. Since the ‘military 
intervention’ alternative was eliminated in the first stage, İnönü had three 
                                            
9 
Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 22, 1964 
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remaining policy options: i) air strike; ii) diplomatic efforts; and iii) do nothing. 
This thesis will evaluate each policy alternative according to remaining 
dimensions: domestic politics and military. 
Domestic Politics dimension: İnönü was a leader who characterized 
himself as responsible statesman for the Republic of Turkey. After the 1960 coup, 
for instance, general elections took place in 1961 and the CHP couldn’t have the 
majority to form a government. Actually, İnönü was expecting that the CHP would 
win the election, he would become President, and the Secretary-General of CHP, 
İsmail Rüştü Aksal, would form the government. İnönü’s aim was, according to 
Toker (1992: 25), “to get the train back on the tracks” and after that resuming his 
political career in the Senate and supervising national issues. Nevertheless, this 
expectation never came true and everybody expected that the CHP would remain 
as opposition party in the TBMM. However, according to Heper (1998: 221): 
İnönü was willing to form a coalition with AP so as to maintain 
cordial relations with the military and not to tempt them to stay in 
power indefinitely. İnönü was again making an important political 
sacrifice in order to save the regime. 
Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, who once served as minister of Inönü coalition governments, 
also supports Heper’s arguments and states that during tough times of the first 
İnönü coalition between CHP and AP, he suggested İnönü resign from 
premiership. İnönü responded by emphasizing his role for the republic and 
implied that he would not be able to resign (Bekata 1992: 10). Accordingly, 
during the 1964 crisis İnönü refrained from endangering Turkey while trying to 
settle the Cyprus dispute. 
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From the very beginning of the crisis there were demonstrations in favor of 
Turkish Cypriots and military intervention. Among Turkish youth there were 
several demonstrations, one including 5000 university students gathered to protest 
Makarios and the latest events on Cyprus (Millliyet 25
th
 Dec. 1963). There were 
also charity campaigns for Cyprus. For instance, Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent) 
organized one such campaign (Milliyet 2
nd
 Jan. 1964).  
Although during the parliamentary session on 24
th
 December 1963 the 
main opposition party claimed that they would not use the Cyprus crisis against 
the İnönü administration, this promise did not last long. For instance, during the 
TBMM session of February 3, 1964, Zeyyat Kocamemi from Yeni Türkiye Partisi, 
discussed his and other MPs’ Cyprus visit and his first-hand knowledge of the 
situation on Cyprus. Kocamemi argued that Turkish Cypriots were encircled by 
Greek Cypriots and they lived under the threat of death. He also stated that since 
Greek Cypriots held all the communication instruments on the island, the 
international community heard only the views of Greek Cypriots and did not 
notice the condition under which Turks suffer. He told the Parliament that during 
his visit, Turkish Cypriots asked him whether a difference exits on Cyprus policy 
among political parties of Turkey and he replied negatively (CSTD 1964: 214-
217). 
Contrary to Kocamemi’s views, there was strong opposition to the İnönü 
administration from the very beginning. For instance, even before the İnönü 
coalition got the vote of confidence, in the Senate on 3 January 1964 Millet 
Partisi and Adalet Partisi charged that İnönü wasted the opportunity to intervene 
in Cyprus which was granted by London and Zurich agreements. Moving one step 
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further, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil argued on behalf of AP that the İnönü 
administration had a lack of power to handle both the domestic and foreign 
policies which Turkey needed (CSTD 1964: 185).  
On the Cyprus issue, Çağlayangil argued that during parliamentary 
sessions İnönü previously blamed Demokrat Parti (DP – Democrat Party) for 
signing the London and Zurich agreements, which İnönü considered against the 
interest of Turkey. Çağlayangil added that during these sessions İnönü declared 
that the only possible mechanism in case of an attempt for enosis was intervention 
together with the UK. By analyzing these session records, Çağlayangil stated that 
“… İnönü illustrated the current situation during those days. Though he both 
identified the problem and expressed the solution I could not explain why Mr. 
Prime Minister does not take the decision when his predictions come true” (CSTD 
1964: 188-189)  
 To reply to those criticisms, İnönü stated that Turkey would not have the 
right to intervene whenever it wished. Under current conditions, an event should 
take place first, and then the guarantor states had to negotiate, organize a 
conference, and reach an agreement. If this negotiation mechanism did not work 
then Turkey would be able to intervene unilaterally. He continued:  
So did us. Additionally, raid, occupation, sudden actions are the 
military moves that will be taken by someone who attacks or intend 
to attack. […] You mention sudden actions and say that ‘sudden 
action is required’. This agreement [the Guarantee agreement] 
doesn’t allow this kind of action. Even if the agreement allows this 
kind of action, international law and […] developed international 
affairs will not allow sudden actions (CSTD 1964: 197) 
However, opposition parties gradually started to criticize the government 
for its policy towards Cyprus During the TBMM session of February 5, 1964, 
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Adalet Partisi accused the government for not informing the Parliament on its 
policies and backed the proposal for discussing the Cyprus issue in the 
Parliament. However, Kemal Satır stated -on behalf of the government- that 
discussing the Cyprus issue in a public session was against national interest of 
Turkey (see MMTD 1964d). During a meeting in February 1964 with US 
Ambassador Hare, Foreign Minister Erkin “commented some Greek moves had 
been displeasing to Turkey, but government exercised restraint despite heavy 
pressure on it to act, including severe criticism by Parliamentary opposition”. 
Hare said that the US administration has appreciated this effort
10
 (FRUS 2000: 
20).  
It is important to note that 1964 was an election year for the Senate; the 
election results indicate that there was discontent over the İnönü administration: 
Adalet Partisi could win the majority of seats (Milliyet 9
th
 Jun. 1964). Actually, 
the elections took place when the İnönü government was busy with the Cyprus 
dispute. As a result, while the main opposition party leader, Ragıp Gümüşpala, 
was able to carry on a successful election campaign, İnönü could not support the 
CHP’s election campaign. Actually, AP’s victory was not a surprise since this 
party also dominated the last local elections that took place in mid-November 
1963. 
Since the dissolution of the second İnönü coalition happened during 
Kennedy’s funeral ceremony, before visiting to Washington to discuss the Cyprus 
issue İnönü asked for vote of confidence and explained the Cyprus problem to 
MPs during a closed session of the TBMM (Milliyet 16
th
 Jun. 1964). The days 
                                            
10 
Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, February 11, 1964 
70 
 
before the vote of confidence witnessed one of the tough days of İnönü coalitions 
and İnönü only narrowly got the vote (Milliyet 20th Jun. 1964). In other words, the 
future of the government was hung by a thread. 
Military dimension: If Turkey decided to intervene in Cyprus, did Turkey 
have the capability to carry out this military operation?  Although it would not be 
an easy task for Turkey since Greek platoons stationed on Cyprus clandestinely, 
Turkey gave the impression that it might carry out this operation. At least the US 
had the impression that Turkey might be able to create a ‘safe zone’ for Turkish 
Cypriots on the island. However, since the ‘military intervention’ option was 
already eliminated, the question of Turkey’s capability becomes less pertinent at 
this stage. 
At this point how the Turkish army viewed Cyprus strategically is worth 
discussing. Writing in 1964, Necati Irmak studied the geostrategic position of the 
island. First and foremost, according to Irmak (1964: 19-20), Turkey is the closest 
country to the island and this is why Turkey becomes the most vulnerable country 
in case the island was occupied by an aggressor state (in this scenario Cyprus 
becomes ‘what Cuba means to security of the US’)11. Additionally, since Makarios 
expressed his intent to pursue his objectives by any means, the Soviet Union 
might use this opportunity to get military bases on the island and pose a threat to 
NATO and CENTO members (Irmak 1964: 21).  Furthermore, NATO members 
get nearly 75% of their oil needs supplied from the Middle East, and Cyprus is 
located between these oil suppliers and NATO consumers (Irmak 1964: 21). In 
                                            
11 
It is interesting to note that not only Irmak as Turkish security personnel foresaw the possibility 
of ‘Cubanization’ of Cyprus, but also the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou thought the same 
consequence for Cyprus if Turkey intervenes in Cyprus and the Soviets comes to help Cyprus 
(see FRUS 2000: 122-123). 
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other words, according to Irmak, Cyprus has a critical location not only for 
Turkey but also for other members of the Western Bloc. This is why ignoring the 
events taking place on Cyprus might have serious consequences for all parties. 
In this dimension, a ‘do nothing’ alternative had no effect. Also 
‘diplomatic efforts’ did not have any contribution to maximizing utility. As a 
result, the only relevant alternative was ‘air strike’ since the other military policy 
option (‘military intervention’) was eliminated in the first stage of decision 
making. In this context, an air strike might cease the strife on the island and 
increase the credibility of the government as had happened earlier in December 
1963, though the first one was a limited operation without any targeted attack.  
 
4.2.3. The Decision 
İnönü stated during a TBMM session on 4th Septepmber 1964 that the Members of 
the Parliament (MPs) knew ‘why’ Turkey did not intervene in Cyprus. İnönü 
declared this during a closed session; MPs were informed about the ‘reasons’. 
However, we still do not know the context of these sessions
12
. 
Table 2 shows the decision matrix of İnönü. 
  
                                            
12
 It might worth stating that every closed session taking place in 1964 are still unpublished by 
Turkish parliament though decades passed. 
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Table 2: Decision matrix of İnönü 
 Dimensions  
Policy options Systemic Domestic 
Politics 
Military Total (Average) 
Military Intervention 1 4 1 6 (2) 
Air strike 2 3 2 7 (2,3) 
Diplomatic efforts 4 2 - 6 (2) 
Do nothing 3 1 - 4 (1,3) 
 On the systemic dimension, the alternatives are scored from highest to 
lowest according to their impact on Turkey’s stand in the international arena and 
the decision’s effect on Turkey’s foreign relations. On the domestic politics 
dimension, alternatives are ranked according to their ability to satisfy public 
opinion while improving the situation on the island in favor of Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey. On the military dimension, they are scored according to their ability 
to successfully achieve military objectives. 
Under the systemic dimension the most favorable option that emerged was 
‘diplomatic efforts’ since solving the question by peaceful methods will be ranked 
higher since this option would not cause a war in the region. Thus, this alternative 
would ease the pressure from third parties (i.e. the US or the USSR). The 
chronology showed that Turkey received strong criticism from ‘super powers’ 
when it announced its intention to intervene as a solution. It is important to note 
that the early 1960s witnessed high tension of the Cold War. Definitely, as a 
member of the Western Bloc, Turkey was also affected by this tension negatively. 
As a result Turkey had to reconsider its ‘use of force’ decision. 
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 On the other hand, under the domestic politics dimension the ‘military 
intervention’ option ranked as the best option since the audience and the 
opposition parties were expecting some kind of action towards Cyprus in order to 
provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the administration had to choose a 
policy option which would not damage the government.  
Under the military dimension the ‘air strike’ option scored as the best 
policy alternative since Turkey’s capacity to carry out a full scale military 
operation was relatively lower than the ‘air strike’ decision.  
It is important to note that the 1964 crisis supported the assumptions of the 
poliheuristic decision making model. First of all, according to the model, the 
administration identified a ‘key dimension’ (i.e. systemic) in the first stage of the 
decision making process and eliminated the policy options the administration 
considered ‘unacceptable’. At this stage the İnönü administration eliminated 
‘military intervention’ as an option though this option was ranked as the second 
best policy option. In other words, the administration’s decision supported the 
‘non-compensatory’ principle of the poliheuristic model. 
In the second stage the İnönü administration evaluated remaining policy 
alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision 
emerged as ‘air strike’ which was the ultimate decision of the İnönü 
administration. 
İnönü, one of the founders of the Republic of Turkey, considered himself 
responsible for the future of Turkey. This responsibility led İnönü pursuing a 
foreign policy based on diplomacy and negotiation. This is why, despite strong 
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criticism against its policies towards Cyprus, the İnönü administration continued 
to seek international support for Turkey’s views. After realizing the fact that the 
status quo was changing against the interest of Turkey, the İnönü administration 
declared its intention to intervene. The intention stopped by the US president’s 
well-known letter. It could be argued that with this move the administration had 
two objectives: i) finding a face-saving justification not to use force; and ii) 
avoiding endangering Turkey while trying to save Turkish Cypriots on the island. 
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CHAPTER V:  
 
 
 THE 1967 CYPRUS CRISIS 
 
 
 
The Turkish Air Forces’ mission resulted in an end of intercommunity conflict on 
the island in August 1964. However, Turkey’s ‘air strike’ decision did not pave the 
way for settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The Cyprus dispute entered a period of 
peace though the parties were far away from finding a lasting solution. 
 Although from time to time the Cyprus dispute emerged as an international 
issue to be dealt with, the Turkish public gradually lost interest in the Cyprus 
dispute in the following years. Nevertheless, Greece continued to pursue enosis 
and support Greek Cypriots even with supplying arms. 
 The Cyprus dispute entered a new phase when a coup took place in April 
1967 in Greece. The ‘Greek Junta’ ruled the country until 1974 and during its rule 
the junta considered achieving enosis a way to cover domestic problems. In late 
1967, the Cyprus dispute was renewed, and again Turkey and Greece were on the 
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brink of war. During the whole month of November (1967) tension was high 
between Turkey and Greece. During the crisis Turkey several times announced its 
intention to intervene in Cyprus as a solution, but did not make the final decision. 
Instead, Turkey favored ‘diplomatic efforts’ as a policy option. In this chapter, the 
thesis will study Turkey’s decision making process during the 1967 Cyprus crisis 
from April 1967 to November 1967. 
 
5.1. The Aftermath of the 1964 Crisis 
Turkish decision makers ordered the Turkish Air Forces to cease fire when the 
situation on Cyprus calmed and intercommunity conflict ended. After this 
decision Turkish decision makers again returned to the negotiation table to find a 
peaceful solution to the Cyprus question. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
İnönü was favoring non-belligerent foreign policy and considering himself 
responsible for the future of the Republic. This is why, actually, İnönü decided to 
continue negotiations immediately after the air strikes. 
 Negotiations continued in August 1964 in Geneva under the auspices of 
the US mediator Dean Acheson.  It is important to note that during the first 
Geneva negotiations Turkey accepted the so called ‘Acheson Plan’ as a basis for 
discussion in July 1964. According to the plan Turkey would have a base on the 
Karpas peninsula in the north-east of the island.  The base would have Turkish 
sovereignty, as was the case for the British bases on Cyprus. In return for the base, 
Cyprus would unite with Greece which would end the demands for enosis.  
Additionally, Turkish Cypriots would have ‘minority’ rights, which would mean a 
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retreat from their rights according to London and Zurich agreements. Nonetheless, 
Turkish Cypriots would establish their autonomy in two or three areas where they 
were forming the majority. The plan was actualizing enosis with some 
adjustments in favor of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. However, Makorios had 
objections to the plan and declared that his aim was to unite Cyprus as a whole 
with Greece, not just part of it (Fırat 1997: 136-137).  
As the first Geneva negotiations demonstrate, Turkey was ready to discuss 
a plan though it might change the established status quo against Turkish Cypriots. 
Actually the same approach continued during the second Geneva talks which took 
place just after Turkey’s air strike decision. This time, however, the situation was 
slightly different from the previous proposal. The Greek side changed its stance 
and offered Turkey the chance to ‘lease’ a base which was smaller than the first 
one. Since Turks and Geeks did not sit down at the same table to discuss the 
situation on Cyprus, Acheson transmitted this proposal to Turkish delegates. 
According to the ‘second Acheson Plan’ Turkey would lease a base on the island 
for fifty years. Furthermore, the autonomous Turkish Cypriot zones were removed 
from the plan. Turkish delegates immediately refused the proposal since they 
considered it to be far from meeting both Turkey’s security needs and Turkish 
Cypriots’ rights (Bölükbaşı 2001: 139).  
 Greece also considered the Acheson Plan ‘unacceptable’ though it could 
have accepted the plan if it were proposed a few year earlier. Greek authorities, in 
accordance with Makarios, favored the ‘independent Cyprus’ formula and refused 
the plan (Iatrides 2003: 91).  
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 According to Bölükbaşı (2001: 140) İnönü did not make the decision to 
intervene since the Geneva talks still were continuing, and as a result there was 
hope of reaching an agreement through negotiations and mediation. Also the 
previous chapter supports this view. However, the talks were ultimately fruitless.  
Additionally, İnönü was a leader of the government whose dominance in 
the parliament was hanging by a thread. During the days that followed the Geneva 
talks, İnönü tried to convince the opposition parties that the Cyprus crisis was an 
inter-alliance (NATO) dispute and US support for a lasting solution was 
mandatory. Conversely, the main opposition party, Adalet Partisi, did not share 
İnönü’s views and accused İnönü of seeking support from the United States 
(Bölükbaşı 2001: 141).  
 The US mediation efforts failed when parties reached a complete deadlock 
instead of an agreement on the Acheson Plan. Besides, the United Nations 
appointed another mediator due to the sudden death of the former UN mediator, 
Sakari Tuomioja. The new mediator, Galo Plaza, prepared a report on the Cyprus 
dispute. The report argued that only the two communities of the island could find 
a lasting solution for the dispute. As a result, other parties (Turkey, Greece or 
another country) should not interfere in this dispute. Additionally, since the 
intercommunity clashes took place on the island it became almost impossible to 
reestablish the status quo according to the London and Zurich agreements. The 
report proposed that Cyprus should become fully independent
13
 but had to agree 
not to unite with another country. Although Greece and Greek Cypriots considered 
the report constructive, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots reacted negatively since the 
                                            
13
 In other words, there would be no ‘guarantor state’. 
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report expressed the impossibility of restoring the status quo prior to 1963. The 
above-mentioned report was also discussed in the UN General Assembly in 
December 1965 and the result was approval of the report
14
. As a result, the UN 
General Assembly approved the independent status of the Cyprus Republic which 
was totally against Turkey’s views on the issue (Fırat 2008: 733-734). It is 
important to note that during each negotiation the two communities of the island 
had generally echoed the views of ‘mainland’ guarantor states, though to varying 
extents. As the events suggests this ‘tradition of echoing’ resumed when Galo 
Plaza proposed his report (Mirbagheri 2010: 156).  
 Before and after the UN General Assembly session, Turkish public opinion 
again focused on the Cyprus issue. For instance, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil 
proposed bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey to settle the dispute. 
Additionally, Çağlayangil asked NATO members to participate in efforts to 
resolve the conflict on the island (Milliyet 4
th
 Dec. 1965). During the UN General 
Assembly session, Çağlayangil stated that Turkey would not stand idly by if 
Greek Cypriots attempted to massacre Turkish Cypriots on the island. He 
illustrated that the presence of Greek platoons on Cyprus was a stumbling block to 
finding a peaceful solution (Milliyet 12
th
 Dec. 1965). When the UN General 
Assembly resolution resulted against the wishes of Turkey, Çağlayangil stated that 
Turkey would not be bound by this resolution and Turkey would not accept the 
mediation of Galo Plaza (Milliyet 19
th
 Dec. 1965). 
 Following the UN General Assembly resolution, opposition parties 
demanded to discuss the issue in the parliament. Although the Demirel 
                                            
14 
Only four countries alongside Turkey voted against the report and these countries were: The US, 
Iran, Albania, and Pakistan(Fırat 2008b: 734) 
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administration was just formed in November 1965, it found itself in the middle of 
the Cyprus dispute. During the parliamentary sessions the speaker of the 
parliament, Ferruh Bozbeyli, stated that the issue would remain separated from 
domestic politics. The political parties declared that Turkish foreign policy should 
be revised after the UN General Assembly resolution. It is important to note that 
almost every party accused the US administration for preventing Turkey from 
intervening in Cyprus.  Nihat Erim stated on behalf of the CHP that the parliament 
should release the Johnson Letter in order to avoid the misunderstanding that there 
was not any US pressure on Turkey in 1964 (Milliyet 28
th
 Dec. 1965). The 
Demirel administration, however, rejected the CHP’s proposal to release the 
Johnson Letter since the letter might be used to support anti-Americanism 
(Milliyet 29
th
 Dec 1965a). In the Senate, the senators adopted a similar attitude 
towards the Cyprus dispute.  Some senators demanded the release of the Johnson 
letter. Senator Ahmet Yıldız argued that although there were some technical 
difficulties in carrying a military operation without informing NATO, Turkey had 
the capacity to intervene in Cyprus back in 1964 (Milliyet 7
th
 Jan. 1966).   
 Although the Demirel administration did not want to release the Johnson 
letter, the newspaper Hürriyet published the letter in January 1966. On the same 
day the government decided to officially release the Johnson letter and İnönü’s 
response to Johnson (Milliyet 14
th
 Jan. 1966). 
 Later in 1966, public opinion and the media gradually lost interest in 
Cyprus dispute. For instance, when Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who 
was Vice President of Cyprus Republic, attempted suicide, the press printed the 
event as a headline (Milliyet 29
th
 Jan. 1966). However, when Dr. Küçük healed a 
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weak later the press did not pay  much attention (Milliyet 6
th
 Feb. 1966), though 
the Cyprus issue remained important for a while due to the dispute among 
political parties.  
 Rauf Denktaş, who was one of the leading figures among Turkish Cypriots 
and who was in ‘exile’ in Turkey, published a book in 1966 to demonstrate his 
thoughts on Turkey’s foreign policy in the Cyprus dispute. Denktaş (1966: 8) 
argued that finding a solution through diplomacy had become impossible and 
since Turkey did not have a common foreign policy it could not achieve any 
objective on Cyprus. Although Greece was supporting Greek Cypriots and even 
supplying arms, Denktaş continued, Turkey was still pursuing ‘legitimate’ ways to 
support Turkish Cypriots who definitely needed Turkey’s help (1966: 9). After 
listing the objectives of Greek Cypriots, Denktaş argued that there was only one 
objective to achieve, and that was revoking the Guarantee Agreement (1966: 39). 
Denktaş not only complained about the current situation but also declared a 
solution: “Greeks want enosis but they want to achieve this objective without 
confronting war with Turkey. When Turkey will risk confronting war with Greece 
and declare it directly, Greece will retreat” (1966: 46) 
 
5.2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy of Turkey 
 
5.2.1. Domestic Politics 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the third İnönü coalition mainly focused on 
the Cyprus dispute throughout 1964. During the same year important changes 
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took place in the domestic politics of Turkey. First of all, the leader of a main 
opposition party, Ragıp Gümüşpala, died in June 1964 and the party congress 
choose Süleyman Demirel for the post after a contentious election in late 1964. 
Demirel’s Adalet Partisi brought down the İnönü administration in February 1965 
as its first accomplishment. During the budget negotiation in parliament, 
opposition parties voted against the proposal and as a result the third and last 
İnönü coalition lost its legitimacy to rule (Çaylak and Baran 2010: 433-434). 
Actually the third İnönü coalition could have been brought down at any time, but 
Demirel chose to wait for an appropriate time while securing his position both 
within the party and among the generals (Ahmad 1993: 137). In the following 
days Turkey was ruled by a caretaker ‘supra-party’ government formed under the 
leadership of Senator Suat Hayri Ürgüplü. Since Demirel was not a member of the 
parliament at that time he became deputy prime minister and did a kind of 
‘internship’ (Çaylak and Baran 2010: 437). 
 When the elections took place in October 1965 Adalet Partisi not only 
secured enough seats to form the government but also won a landslide victory. 
Although CHP lost the elections it still was the second party after AP. 
Additionally, for the first time in history of Turkey Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP - 
Labor Party of Turkey) won 15 seats in the parliament thanks to the election law 
which was favoring minor parties vis-à-vis major parties such as Adalet Partisi 
and Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. As a result of the election, the parliament consisted 
of six parties and only Türkiye İşci Partisi was ‘new’ in the parliament. 
  Türkiye İşçi Partisi, the only party with a Marxist orientation in the 
Turkish parliament, blamed the West and the US in particular for the difficulties 
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Turkey faced in both domestic and international arenas (Giritli 1969: 354). TİP 
also accused the US administration of pursuing ‘imperialistic’ policies with regard 
to Cyprus dispute. As İsmet Giritli argues, TİP became a base for opposition to the 
US: “Why, they asked, should the US not support a struggle for freedom and 
human rights in Cyprus as it did in Korea? Why in particular should it not support 
the country that had fought with it in Korea and was its faithful ally in the Atlantic 
Alliance” (Giritli 1969: 357). 
 Actually, the rise of Türkiye İşçi Partisi was a result of the changes in 
Turkey’s domestic politics. Politics in the 1960s was quite different than in the 
previous decade. First of all, the 1961 constitution introduced a liberal 
environment in politics that Turkey had not experienced before. Ideological 
politics were present in daily politics and left-wing thoughts were gaining ground 
in universities. In response to the rise of leftist ideas, right-wing parties also 
became more active in politics. Although Turkey pursued pro-American policies 
during the 1950s, during the 1960s an opposition grew and anti-Americanism 
became an issue
15
 (Ahmad 1993: 139-141). 
 At first leftist organizations expressed their discontent with domestic 
politics and the influence of these groups outnumbered other radical groups. 
However, when the Cyprus crisis erupted and a sense of disbelief in the US 
emerged among the public, the focus of criticism shifted to foreign policy. These 
organizations accused the West of pursuing imperialist aims and being a 
stumbling block to modernizing Turkey. In other words, Turkey’s backwardness 
was a result of Western powers’ policies. In this context, the US was the main 
                                            
15
 It is interesting to note that during the 1960s Greece also witnessed anti-Americanism (Iatrides 
2003: 91). 
84 
 
cause of Turkey’s troubled times. Even in early 1965 anti-Americanism was so 
high that when İnönü could not get the vote for the budget and resigned from 
premiership, some argued that it was an act of conspiracy tailored by the US 
(Harris 1972: 129-132). 
 However, it is important to note that anti-Americanism was not limited to 
radical organizations or student demonstrations. There were criticisms of the US 
administration even among Turkish intelligentsia.  For instance, just after İnönü’s 
decision to use military force in August 1964, the journal Forum stated that the 
future of the US administration’s attitude towards Turkey was more critical than 
the Cyprus dispute. Forum argued that since Turkey was not a ‘satellite’ the US 
could not dictate Turkey to follow its policies at the expense of Turkey. 
Additionally, Forum declared that the US policy of leaving Turkey alone in case 
of Soviet threat was totally a mistake
16
 (Forum 1
st
 Sep. 1964). 
 President Cemal Gürsel’s health condition deteriorated in 1966. Although 
the president went to the United States for treatment, efforts to cure his illness 
were unsuccessful. As a result, Gürsel returned to Turkey and GATA (Gülhane 
Askeri Tıp Akademisi – Gülhane Military Academia of Medicine) issued a report 
indicating that the president could not resume his post. At this point, Demirel 
considered Cevdet Sunay, Chief of Staff, the ‘most suitable candidate’ for 
presidency since he was against military involvement in politics and supportive of 
the parliament. Sunay was elected as the fifth President of Turkey in 1966 (Çaylak 
and Baran 2010: 440).  
                                            
16 The Johnson Letter was then ‘unknown’ in Turkey, though its content and impact on Turkey’s 
decision not to intervene in Cyprus was ‘well-known’. 
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5.2.2. Foreign Policy 
After the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) Turkey realized that it could be a target of 
the Soviet Union. Although Turkish decision makers started to revise their 
policies, they could not form a neutral foreign policy since they considered 
Turkey incapable of pursuing such policies. On the other hand, Turkish decision 
makers wanted to warm up frosty relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union 
in 1963. However, this process of rapprochement was halted by the eruption of the 
Cyprus crisis in late 1963 (Göktepe 2010: 412). 
 Although the Cyprus crisis affected the rapprochement process between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union, it could not prevent it totally. When Turkey realized 
that it could not rely on its allies in case of war, Turkey declared its intention to 
open a new page in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Obviously, Soviet 
authorities continuously wanted to improve bilateral relations with Turkey since 
the death of Stalin in 1953, and the Cyprus crisis paved the way for 
rapprochement. The first important step taken by Turkey was when Turkish 
Foreign Minister, Feridun Cemal Erkin, visited Moscow and signed some 
agreements related to cultural affairs (Göktepe 2010: 415).  
This rapprochement process continued during the Demirel administration. 
Indeed, Demirel’s foreign policy had four dimensions: i) securing Turkey through 
diplomatic relations; ii) funding Turkey’s economic development with foreign 
sources; iii) establishing good relations with neighboring countries; and iv) 
finding supporters for Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the international arena. Actually, 
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to achieve these aims the Soviet Union emerged as a suitable candidate for 
broadening the scope of Turkish foreign policy (Bölükbaşı 2001: 158). First of all, 
the Soviets had the capacity to foster development in Turkey. For instance, the 
Soviets provided financial and technical aid to Turkey to realize huge projects 
such as iron and steel industry in Erdemir, aluminum industry in Seydişehir, and a 
petroleum refinery in Aliağa (Arcayürek 1985: 125). Secondly, the Soviets were 
backing Greek Cypriots’ views in 1964, which was encouraging the Makarios’s 
administration to act more independently. As a result, a change in the Soviet 
policy might lead to a decrease in tension on Cyprus. Thirdly, establishing cordial 
relations with the Soviet Union would result in a decrease in Turkey’s threat 
perception from its northern neighbor. 
 Despite having a more neutral foreign policy Turkey did not cease to 
participate in NATO. On the contrary, Turkey remained a part of Western 
economic and military institutions besides establishing ties with ‘other’ countries. 
The change in Turkish foreign policy was a result of putting Turkey’s interests 
first (Giritli 1969: 360). In other words, beginning in the mid-1960s Turkey 
pursued a foreign policy serving mainly its own interests.  
 The Cyprus crisis affected Turkey’s relations with the West in general and 
the United States in particular. For instance, in 1962 the Kennedy administration 
proposed establishment of a nuclear naval force under NATO, known as the 
Multilateral Force (MLF), and Turkey was one of the supporters of this proposal. 
However, the attitudes of the US administration during the Cyprus crisis of 1964 
in general and the Johnson Letter in particular changed Turkey’s pro-American 
foreign policy and its decision to support every US foreign policy. In January 
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1965 Turkey announced its withdrawal from the MLF. Actually, other European 
NATO members were also not supporting the MLF, and realizing this fact had 
some effects on Turkish decision makers to revise their policies (Erhan 2008: 691-
692). 
In 1967 the Republican People’s Party, now in opposition in Turkey, 
organized a panel and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of being a 
NATO member. According to this panel Turkey should remain in NATO but it 
should change its bilateral agreements with the member countries in order to gain 
more freedom of action (Harris 1972: 141-2). 
However, arguments on whether Turkey would stay in NATO or end its 
membership and act more neutral continued in public debate. Proponents of 
withdrawal from NATO argued that Turkey maintained a huge army which 
diverted crucial resources from spending on development. Additionally, 
supporters of this view stated that in case of a nuclear war between opposite blocs, 
Turkey would be a victim of nuclear attack and thus be affected severely. 
Furthermore, according to these adherents, as a result of the balance of power 
between rival super powers the United States would not allow the Soviet Union to 
dominate the Middle East politics of which Turkey was considered a part. On the 
other hand, supporters of continuation of Turkey’s membership to NATO argued 
that Turkey still had a lack of national resources to defend itself. Obviously, 
according to proponents of continuation of membership, withdrawal would lead to 
a shift in the balance of power in the favor of Greece, since Greece would 
continue to get Western military aid while Turkey would not get any support. 
Moreover, Turkey was getting economic assistance from Western powers, 
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especially from the US, and if Turkey decided to withdraw then the future of the 
aid would be in question (Hale 2000: 151-152).  
 Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East also changed during the 
same period. Actually, the major shift in Turkish foreign policy happened after the 
AP’s landslide victory in 1965 general election. First of all, Adalet Partisi had a 
conservative orientation and wanted to reorganize foreign policy according to its 
political views. Secondly, authorities of Adalet Partisi wished to normalize 
Turkey’s relations with its Arab neighbors which had deteriorated during the 
Domokrat Parti governments. Additionally, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
world witnessed détente between rival blocs, and Turkey used this relatively 
stable period to improve its relations with its neighbors. Furthermore, when Galo 
Plaza’s report on Cyprus was discussed in the UN General Assembly in 1965, 
Turkey realized that it could not get support from its neighbors. According to 
Turkish decision makers, Arab states at the UN General Assembly voted in favor 
of ‘Christian Greeks’ at the expense of ‘Muslim Turks’ which stirred Turkey to 
revise its policies towards the Middle East (Armaoğlu 2000a: 194-195).   
 The 1967 Arab-Israel war, or the ‘Six Days War’ gave an opportunity for 
Turkey to deepen its relations with the Arab world. When the first rumblings of 
war were heard in April 1967, Turkey adopted a neutral attitude towards events 
that took place between Arabs and Israel. In general, Turkey’s tone was 
constructive and in accordance with the previous UN resolutions which prohibited 
armed conflicts as a mean of solution. At this stage, Turkey still did not blame any 
party for escalating crisis. Furthermore, during the course of the war Turkey tried 
not to abandon its ‘neutrality policy’ by supporting only UN resolutions.  
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However, when the war ended with a definite Israeli victory, Turkey sent in-kind 
aid to its Arab neighbors which cost Turkey nearly 500,000 million US$.  
Additionally, in the aftermath of the war, during both NATO and UN meetings 
Turkey declared that acquiring land through using force was a violation of 
international law, which was an implicit way of accusing Israel. It is important to 
note that during sessions of the UN General Assembly Turkey acted with Arab 
countries while its NATO allies were siding with Israel. In other words, Turkey’s 
policies and its Western allies’ policies clashed on the 1967 Arab-Israel war. 
(Armaoğlu 2000b: 218)  
 Turkey became more reluctant to allow the use of its facilities for non-
NATO operations after the 1964 Cyprus crisis (Kuniholm 1991: 39-40). During 
the course of the Arab-Israel war of 1967 Turkey strongly opposed utilization of 
military bases in connection with the Middle East disputes. Accordingly, Foreign 
Minister Çağlayangil, declared that the US authorities could not use these bases 
without getting explicit permission from Turkey. It is important to note that all 
opposition parties joined the government in supporting this ‘restriction on US 
actions’ policy. Actually, the origin of this policy lies in late 1965, when a US 
reconnaissance plane crashed in the Black Sea. Although the US administration 
suspended these flights immediately, Turkish authorities asked Washington to stop 
such reconnaissance activities (Harris 1972: 165-166). Additionally, during the 
course of the war, there were demonstrations in Istanbul against the US Sixth 
Fleet. Demonstrators argued that the Sixth Fleet was responsible for Turkey’s 
decision not to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 and they saw the Fleet as symbol of 
American imperialism (Harris 1972: 169). 
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5.3. The 1967 Cyprus Crisis 
When the calendar reached 1967 Turkey was faced with another Cyprus crisis. 
Before discussing the 1967 Cyprus crisis in more detail it might be helpful to 
know the dramatic changes that took place in Greece in 1967. The most important 
switch was in domestic politics when the Greek army brought down the 
government and established a ‘Colonels’ regime’ better known as the ‘Greek 
junta’ in April 1967.  
When the junta in Greece controlled the military forces on Cyprus, 
Makarios had no option but to place a certain amount of confidence in the junta 
(Constandinos 2011: 26). The Greek military junta, because of its lack of domestic 
support, wanted to show some external success to the Greek public in order to 
hide domestic problems. In this case, Cyprus was considered a source of external 
success; however, Greek forces in Cyprus caused crisis by attacking Turkish 
Cypriot villages and the two countries were again on the brink of war (Fırat 1997). 
Although the junta was a result of domestic politics of Greece, it affected Greece’s 
foreign policy until restoration of democracy in 1974. 
May 1967, Athens informed Ankara that Greece wanted to achieve enosis 
by peaceful means (Milliyet 6
th
 May 1967). Three stick of dynamite exploded 
near the house of Dr. Fazıl Küçük on Cyprus, and the explosions affected three 
houses of Dr. Küçük’s aides (Milliyet 20th May 1967). As the Middle East was 
approaching an Arab-Israel war in the summer of 1967, the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affair published a notification to declare that Turkey supports efforts to 
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ease the tension in the Middle East (Milliyet 29
th
 May 1967). Additionally, Turkey 
declared that it would not allow the US to use military bases against the Arabs 
(Milliyet 30
th
 May 1967). 
June 1967, war erupted between Arab countries and Israel, and Foreign 
Minister Çağlayangil repeated Turkey’s policy of not allowing its bases to be used 
in the war (Milliyet 6
th
 Jun. 1967). The president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
sent a message to President Sunay and thanked him for Turkey’s attitude and 
support for Arab countries (Milliyet 15
th
 Jun. 1967). In New York, Çağlayangil 
met with the Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, and representatives of 
Eastern Bloc countries to discuss the future of Cyprus (Milliyet 25
th
 Jun. 1967). 
Turkish youth in İstanbul organized a demonstration against the US (Milliyet 25th 
Jun. 1967b).  
July 1967, the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Kollias, had an 
interview with Milliyet and declared that establishing enosis was the best solution 
for Cyprus. He compared the relationship between Greece and Cyprus to a 
mother-daughter relationship (Milliyet 10
th
 Jul. 1967).  As a reply to Kollias’ 
enosis proposal, Çağlayangil stated that Turkey could not consider enosis as a 
basis for bilateral talks (Milliyet 11
th
 Jul. 1967). Although Turkish response was 
negative, Greece continued to declare enosis a ‘sacred objective’ and said they 
would achieve enosis though Communist countries opposed the idea (Milliyet 12
th
 
Jul 1967). During July 1967 some intercommunity clashes happened on Cyprus. 
August 1967, intercommunity clashes continued on the island. Çağlayangil 
declared that Turkey would never accept enosis as a fait accompli solution 
(Milliyet 14
th
 Aug. 1967). However, Greek authorities continued to announce that 
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they would continue to pursue enosis (Milliyet 17
th
 Aug. 1967). Turkish Cypriot 
mucahits (civil fighters) organized a demonstration without permission in Ankara 
and the police suppressed the group (Milliyet 24
th
 Aug. 1967). Demirel declared 
that the Cyprus issue could not be solved at the expense of Turkey (Milliyet 30
th
 
Aug. 1967). 
September 1967, Demirel and Kollias agreed to hold negotiations to 
discuss Cyprus near the two countries’ border (Millliyet 5th Sep. 1967).  The 
negotiations took place on 9 and 10 September, and these negotiations are known 
as Keşan-Alexandroupolis (Dedeağac) meetings. İnönü, as the leader of the main 
opposition party, declared that the CHP supported the government on the Cyprus 
issue (Milliyet 10
th
 Sep. 1967). Turkey repeated its objection to enosis and 
declared that Turkey also did not consider taksim a solution (Milliyet 12
th
 Sep 
1967). Demirel visited Romania and the two countries agreed to strengthen their 
partnership in various areas (Milliyet 18
th
 Sep 1967). After Romania, Demirel had 
a long visit to the Soviet Union in September 1967. Turkey and the Soviet Union 
agreed to continue cooperation on economic issues. Regarding Cyprus, both 
parties agreed that a lasting solution could be found through peaceful methods and 
that Cyprus should remain united and independent (Milliyet 30
th
 Sep 1967). 
October 1967, Çağlayangil stated at the UN General Assembly session that 
the latest developments might lead to a break of the peace on Cyprus (Milliyet 4
th
 
Oct 1967). Chairman of Millet Partisi (Nation Party), Osman Bölükbaşı, was 
denied a visit to Cyprus by Cypriot authorities and Bölükbaşı declared this event a 
‘scandal’ (Milliyet 19th Oct 1967). Demirel visited Iraq to sign agreements on 
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trade and cooperation, and he declared that Turkey’s ties with its Arab neighbors 
were improving (Milliyet 25
th
 Oct 1967). 
November 1967, Rauf Denktaş attempted to enter Cyprus illegally and he 
was caught by Greek Cypriot authorities (Milliyet 1
st
 Nov 1967). British Foreign 
Minister George Brown, stated that the United Kingdom would talk with the 
Makarios administration about setting Denktaş free (Milliyet 3rd Nov 1967). 
Turkish youths organized demonstrations to protest the detention of Denktaş, and 
during these protests clashes happened between police and demonstrators in 
Ankara. The police took 30 youths into custody (Milliyet 12
th
 Nov 1967). The 
Greek Cypriot authorities set Denktaş free and he returned to Turkey. Denktaş 
stated that enosis was de facto achieved since the Greek army was present on 
Cyprus (Milliyet 14
th
 Nov 1967). Greek platoons under the command of Grivas 
attacked Turkish Cypriot communities. This massive attack alarmed Turkey 
(Milliyet 16
th
 Nov 1967). Although the conflict ended the following day, the 
parliament issued an act to send military ‘oversees’ and the government sent a 
diplomatic note to Greece accusing Greece of destabilizing Cyprus (Milliyet 18
th
 
Nov 1967). Turkey declared that if the Greek army did not leave Cyprus 
immediately Turkey would intervene in Cyprus (Milliyet 19
th
 Nov 1967). Ankara 
warned that if Athens would not give a guarantee of withdraw of its platoons from 
Cyprus, Turkey would intervene within one or two days (Milliyet 23
rd
 Nov 1967). 
The US administration sent Cyrus Vance as a special envoy to mediate the crisis. 
The tension started to deescalate when Greek authorities considered removal of 
Greek soldiers from Cyprus (Milliyet 26
th
 Nov 1967). The parties reached an 
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agreement on removal of Greek platoons stationed illegally according to the 
founding agreements of Cyprus (Milliyet 30
th
 Nov 1967). 
Although Turkey and Greece reached an agreement, Makarios had some 
objections to the agreement. The crisis was fully resolved when Makarios agreed 
to implement the agreement (Milliyet 5
th
 Dec 1967).  
 
5.4. Analyzing events 
When the Cyprus crisis erupted as another international crisis in 1967, Turkey had 
experienced single-party rule under Süleyman Demirel’s Adalet Partisi since the 
October 1965 elections. Although the Demirel administration faced the dispute as 
early as just one month after forming the government, the following months were 
relatively peaceful and Cyprus did not demand the attention of Turkish public 
opinion. This thesis will now study the approach of the Demirel administration to 
the renewed crisis on the island. As discussed earlier, the poliheuristic decision 
model consist of two stages; here the thesis will evaluate Turkey’s decision in 
1967, and analyze how Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus using the 
poliheuristic decision making model. 
 
5.4.1. First stage of decision making 
In the first stage of the poliheuristic decision model, decision makers eliminate the 
policy alternatives which have a low value in a key dimension. The thesis argues 
that in this stage ‘domestic politics dimension’ was considered the key dimension 
by the Demirel administration. Before applying the first stage of the poliheuristic 
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decision model to the 1967 Cyprus crisis, it might be helpful to discuss AP’s and 
the administration’s approaches to foreign policy. 
 Before the 1965 general elections Adalet Partisi published an election 
manifesto. The document stated that: “For building up and developing our 
country, for not wasting lives, efforts, and energy of Turkish citizens we need total 
peace, security, and stability in domestic and foreign policy” (AP 1965: 31). As a 
result of this aim, Turkey should pursue a foreign policy away from ‘adventures’ 
to direct its energy to development within its borders, the document continued 
(AP 1965: 31). 
 Regarding the Cyprus issue the document argued that Adalet Partisi 
‘sincerely’ wanted to solve the Cyprus dispute through negotiations with Greece 
on the basis of existing agreements and wanted to defend Turkey’s and Turkish 
Cypriots’ interests. The document declared that the AP’s approach should not be 
considered ‘weakness’ since the AP was ready to retaliate against any act against 
Turkey’s wishes (AP 1965: 32). 
 It is important to note that even the foreign policy chapter of the manifesto 
of Adalet Partisi discusses Turkey’s development and creating domestic stability 
in Turkey. This was not a coincidence since the document’s focus was on 
development and stability. The manifesto demonstrates that AP’s priority was 
domestic politics, even discussing foreign issues. This is why the thesis argues 
that the ‘domestic politics dimension’ was the key dimension in decision making 
process of the Demirel administration during the 1967 Cyprus crisis. 
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 In 1972 Adalet Partisi published a book covering its rule from 1965 to 
1971. The foreign policy chapter of the book showed the AP’s foreign policy 
priorities. For instance, the document argued that although Turkey considered 
NATO as a guarantee for its security and stability, it still did not hesitate to review 
its relations with the US on bilateral basis (AP 1972: 47). The document discussed 
that Turkey improved its relations with its neighbors during the AP rule. 
Additionally, by improving cordial relations with the Soviet Union, Turkey started 
to establish positive relations with other Eastern Bloc countries. The document 
argued that establishing peace and stability in the Middle East region requires 
preservation of Arab countries’ ‘legitimate’ rights and interests. Additionally, the 
AP indicated that the UN would pave the way for peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East (AP 1972: 48). Actually, this approach was quite different from the 
previous administrations’ foreign policies. First and foremost, the former 
‘adversary’ (i.e. the USSR) became a source of economic development and a 
balancing factor for Turkey’s relations with the West. Additionally, Turkey turned 
its face to East and sought new ways to cooperate with its ‘brother’ (i.e. Muslim) 
neighbors. During the 1960s the existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict established 
a basis for cooperation for Turkish decision makers. Although Turkey refrained 
from providing full support for the ‘Arab cause’, it still adopted policies favoring 
Arab countries. 
On the Cyprus dispute the document argued that (AP 1972: 49):  
Solving our national cause, the Cyprus dispute, according to 
Turkish community and Turkey’s rights and interests was always 
our unchangeable aim. […] The AP government responded the 1967 
Cyprus crisis intently and with determination. As a result, previous 
five years were relatively peaceful on the island. 
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According to these views, the Demirel administration followed a foreign policy to 
sustain development in Turkey. Additionally, in the Cyprus dispute the 
administration adapted a peaceful but ‘determined’ method to settle the matter. 
During the first stage of the decision making process, the administration 
analyzed attitudes of the Turkish public towards the Cyprus dispute. As the 
chronology showed there were demonstrations with or without permission to 
support Turkish Cypriots in various cities of Turkey. Furthermore, during some of 
these demonstrations the police had to use force to suppress demonstrators. As the 
demonstrations spread the administration even declared that “it is impossible to 
achieve a national cause by illegal demonstrations” (Milliyet 25th Aug 1967). 
Additionally, during various sessions of the parliament, opposition parties stated 
that Turkey should act to stop conflict on the island though it might have to use 
force to end this dispute. For instance, after the UN General Assembly session of 
December 1965, Osman Bölükbaşı argued on behalf of MP that “as long as 
Turkey does not risk confronting war with Greece we should admit that we lost 
Cyprus cause” (MMTD 1965: 21). İsmail Hakkı Yılanlıoğlu argued on behalf of 
CKMP that Turkey should use its right under the agreements to intervene since 
Turkish Cypriots could not live under common rule on the island (MMTD 1965: 
26). 
The AP promised the masses stability and economic development. The 
İnönü coalitions were fragile and could not dominate the parliament except for the 
first coalition formed with Adalet Partisi - though this coalition was dissolved 
when AP withdrew from the coalition after just six months. The İnönü coalitions 
were followed by a ‘caretaker’ and ‘supra-party’ government under the 
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premiership of Senator Suat Hayri Ürgüplü which ruled the country until the 
October 1965 general elections. As a result, there was a demand for stability in 
Turkey and the AP emerged as a suitable candidate for this post. 
Actually, to win the elections Adalet Partisi had to represent interests of 
many different social backgrounds. Demirel often described the AP as a mass 
party representing different classes to secure enough vote to win the elections. The 
AP considered itself as a party for ‘social justice’ and the way to achieve this 
justice was “through a real increase in the national income” (Levi 1991: 140). In 
other words, the AP’s most important goal was economic growth in Turkey.  
 Following its formation in November 1965, the Demirel administration 
pursued development-focused policies. Different from the previous governments, 
the Demirel administration dedicated its energy to strengthening the Turkish 
economy with investments, whereas the İnönü coalitions had been busy with both 
domestic (coup attempts) and foreign (Cyprus) problems. This is why the AP 
government wanted to foster development while preserving domestic and foreign 
peace. 
 Although Demirel’s Adalet Partisi won a landslide victory in the 1965 
elections, there were quarrels between Demirel’s fraction and that of Sadettin 
Bilgiç within the party. Sadettin Bilgiç ruled the AP following the death of Ragıp 
Gümüşpala and then lost the party leadership to Süleyman Demirel. Despite 
losing the leadership to Demirel, Bilgiç remained in the AP but refused to become 
a minister in the Demirel administration (Komsuoğlu 2008: 145). However, Bilgiç 
and his supporters composed an opposition group within the party. After the 1965 
elections, Demirel formed the cabinet and the names of members of the cabinet 
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were read in the parliament. When all the names were read, the parliament 
remained silent and no one showed any gesture of ‘approval’ for the cabinet. The 
MPs changed their approach while announcing the government program in the 
parliament (Arcayürek 1985: 17). In other words, Demirel witnessed a sign of 
opposition from his party from the first day of his premiership. 
Since the Demirel administration was confronted with the Cyprus dispute 
just after forming the government, and since there was criticism for the previous 
governments for not taking any risk to solve the dispute, the Demirel 
administration decided to eliminate the ‘do nothing’ policy alternative during the 
first phase of the decision making process. 
 
5.4.2. Second stage of decision making 
In the second stage of the poliheuristic decision model, a decision maker uses 
analytic evaluations and tries to maximize gains by minimizing losses. Since the 
‘do nothing’ alternative was eliminated in the first stage, the Demirel 
administration had three remaining policy options: i) intervention; ii) diplomatic 
efforts; and iii) air strike. The thesis will evaluate each policy alternative 
according to the remaining dimensions: systemic and military. 
Systemic dimension: Although the rapprochement process between Turkey 
and the Soviet Union started during the third İnönü coalition, the process gained a 
fast pace during the Demirel administration. Actually, the Demirel administration 
not only established cordial relations with the Soviet Union but also cooperated 
with the Soviets on economic matters. For instance the Soviets extended credit for 
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constructing some of the noticeable projects in Turkey and provided technical 
assistance to Turkey. 
 During the Demirel administration, although Turkey did not shift its 
foreign policy from the West, the administration established relations with the 
Soviets and Arab countries to maintain Turkey’s economic development 
(Komsuoğlu 2008: 165). It is important to note that though the basis of Turkey’s 
new foreign policy was economic, Turkey had the chance to inform third parties 
about its policies directly thanks to improving relations. For instance, the attitudes 
of the Soviet Union were relatively more ‘supportive’ for Turkey on the Cyprus 
dispute. As Mehmet Ali Aybar discussed at the parliament, the Soviets abstained 
during the vote for the Plaza report in 1965 at the UN General Assembly and this 
was a change in the Soviet policy: during the 1964 crisis the Soviets warned 
Turkey not to intervene and this warning was ‘reminded’ of in the Johnson Letter. 
However, later the Soviets – still being against foreign military presence on the 
island - adopted a policy supporting a bi-communal solution for Cyprus (MMTD 
1965: 31-36). As a result of improving relations with the Soviet Union during the 
1967 Cyprus crisis, there was almost no reference to the Soviet Union as a threat 
(Göktepe 2005). 
 Following the Greek attacks against Turkish Cypriot villages in November 
1967, the US administration adopted a more balanced approach and did not send a 
‘harsh latter’ to any party. Actually the US administration had two options to 
decrease tension: i) inviting President Sunay and King Konstantin to Washington 
to discuss the situation with President Johnson; or ii) sending a special envoy to 
the conflict area. The administration chose the second option and appointed Cyrus 
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Vance for the post (Bölükbaşı 2001: 184). Vance immediately started ‘shuttle 
diplomacy’ in the region. 
 However, before appointing Vance for the mission, the US administration 
sent messages to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey and asked for reducing “the threat 
for peace” 17 (FRUS 2000: 647). Ambassador Hart delivered the massage to 
Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and he especially expressed that he did not bring a 
‘letter’ which could be subject to conversation. During the visit Çağlayangil 
informed Hart that “tortures like the ones used in the Middle Ages have been 
[used] against the Turkish community” including burning alive an 80 year old 
man. Additionally, as the situation on the island worsened at the expense of 
Turkish Cypriots “the Turkish public opinion and the Turkish community have 
been incurably aroused against the Turkish Gov[ermen]t”. When the ambassador 
declared that the “prospect of a war between two allies was a nightmare for us 
all”, Çağlayangil replied that going “through this nightmare once and for all is 
preferable to seeing a nightmare every night” 18 (FRUS 2000: 648-650). 
Since Turkey left the door open for peace negotiations by sending a 
diplomatic note to Greece, the US administration had a chance to solve the dispute 
by diplomacy. Actually, Cyrus Vance was not alone in this duty: Manlio Brosio, 
secretary general of the NATO, and Jose Rolz-Bannett, special representative of 
the general secretary of UN, helped Vance in dealing with the situation. Brosio 
and Vance’s focuses were on mainland countries while Rolz-Bannett concentrated 
more on Cyprus. The strategy was something similar to this one: The US would 
                                            
17 
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus, November 17, 1967. 
18 
Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, November 18, 1967. 
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first find a solution between mainland countries and then would forward it to 
Cyprus (Sönmezoğlu 1995: 24-25). 
 Cyrus Vance witnessed strong criticism in the Turkish public. 
Demonstrators did not allow his plane to land in Esenboğa airport. The public 
considered the ‘Vance mission’ another step taken by the US to prevent Turkey 
from pursuing its ‘just’ decision to intervene in Cyprus (Bölükbaşı 2001: 185). 
The demonstrators argued that the US had prevented Turkey from using American 
arms on Cyprus in 1964 though Greece was now using such arms to massacre 
Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus. President Sunay declared Turkey’s intention to end 
the dispute ‘once and for all’ (Purcell 1969: 383). 
 Although Greece immediately called Grivas back to Athens and Grivas 
resigned from commanding Greek forces on Cyprus, Greece did not reply to 
Turkey’s diplomatic note before 22nd November. When Greece replied to the note, 
the tone was negative about withdrawing its forces from Cyprus. Since Turkish 
decision makers were ‘determined’ to solve the dispute ‘once and for all’ the 
Vance mission put more pressure on Greece.  
 Actually, Vance knew that both Turkey and Greece were receiving aid 
from the US and these countries were in need of foreign aid to maintain their 
economic and military development. During the 1967 crisis, the US press 
published some articles which argued that if war erupted then the US might cease 
sending aid for these countries. The US administration decided to avoid further 
deterioration of relations with Turkey in 1967. As a result, the US pressured 
Greece more since this country was somehow isolated from the rest of the world 
and could be influenced more easily (Sönmezoğlu 1995: 25-26).  Additionally, 
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Greek decision makers considered Cyprus a secondary foreign and security issue 
when a strong party (i.e. the US) forced them to choose a policy (Coufoudakis 
2003: 117). 
 Vance, recognizing Turkey’s stand on the issue, pressured the Greek junta 
and Makarios. Vance’s mission was successful in persuading the Greek junta to 
withdraw Greek forces from the island. On the other hand, it is argued that if a 
democratically elected government were in power in Greece during the 1967 
Cyprus crisis, the Cyrus Vance mission could not have been successful and a war 
would have broken out between Turkey and Greece (Hart 1972: 141). In other 
words, if the Greek junta had external support for its policies the 1967 crisis have 
may lead to a war. It is important to note that the 1967 crisis happened just after 
the Arab-Israeli war which had resulted in regional instability. This is why the US 
pressured even more to prevent another devastating war in the region 
(Coufoudakis 2003: 115) 
Before the eruption of the renewed crisis in 1967, the Demirel 
administration announced its intention to solve the dispute through  negotiations 
between Turkey and Greece. The administration, however, stated that Turkey’s 
right to intervene remained valid in case of a massive attack against Turkish 
Cypriots. 
When the Cyprus crisis was renewed in 1967 Demirel, who criticized 
İnönü for not being determined to solve the dispute by any means, acted as İnönü 
and pursued a cautious foreign policy from the very beginning (Hale 2000: 153). 
Since the clashes were ended the following day the ‘urgency’ to intervene 
decreased. On the contrary, deciding to intervene might turn the international 
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opinion against Turkey. Furthermore, once the US administration’s pressure was 
directed towards Greece, Turkey might benefit from this opportunity to change the 
balance in its favor. 
Military dimension: Turkey warned Greece that it would retaliate if the 
situation on the island did not change in favor of Turkish Cypriots, and if the 
attacking troops did not cease fire and retreat. Definitely, it was not the first time 
such a warning had been issued by the Turkish government. However, the 
message reached the ‘audience’ as the US administration got involved and tried to 
prevent the war between its NATO allies. 
 Turkish intervention would result in establishing ‘de facto’ taksim, as 
Greek military presence established ‘de facto’ enosis which was argued for 
previously by Denktaş. Turkey declared that if Greece would not withdraw its 
troops, Turkey would get even and send Turkish platoons to balance out Greece. 
Actually, this act might have triggered a war between Greece and Turkey which 
was a ‘nightmare’ for the US administration. 
 However, Turkey’s capability to intervene ‘successfully’ in Cyprus was a 
question for the Demirel administration which was definitely ‘unknown’ to both 
Greece and the US during that time. Arcayürek (1985: 118-119) argues that 
although Turkey wanted to make the decision to intervene in Cyprus, its 
‘readiness’ was a big question for the administration. For instance, when the 
cabinet met to discuss the current situation the chiefs of staff were also present. 
Demirel declared the administration’s intention to intervene in Cyprus, then 
commander of ground forces, Refik Yılmaz, asked what the target would be. The 
administration realized the fact that the army was not prepared for such an 
105 
 
operation. Next Demirel, accompanied by foreign and defense ministers, visited 
Turkish General Staff and there they once again saw that the army did not have 
the required equipment to intervene. 
 Additionally, the presence of Greek army on Cyprus would make the 
military operation more difficult for Turkey. Besides, Greek National Army 
strengthened itself with the equipment and training provided by the Greek army. 
After being confronted with the crisis, Turkish generals argued that an amphibious 
landing would be one of the most difficult military operations and emphasized the 
need for required materials: landing crafts, helicopters, and air landing brigades. 
Turkey was not materially ready for such an amphibious operation. Although 
there was an effort to build up military industry in Turkey, the military industry 
was far away from producing its own landing crafts (Yavuzalp 1996: 115-116). 
 Despite all efforts to build up military industry, the Turkish army had other 
needs to operate more efficiently. For instance, there was a need of housing for 
officers, border stations, and military barracks. The Demirel administration 
granted huge amounts of money after 1965 elections to provide these facilities for 
the army at the same time establishing factories for military purposes (AP 1972: 
43-44). 
The US administration was so devoted to preventing  a war between its 
allies that US Secretary of State, Rusk,  sent a message to the US ambassadors in 
Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey stating: “The stakes are such that the future of our 
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bilateral relations are secondary to the prevention of hostilities between Greece 
and Turkey” 19 (FRUS 2000: 660) 
The first impression of the US ambassador to Turkey, Parker Hart, was that 
Turkey would not decide to use force as long as another bloody event would not 
take place on the island. Additionally, according to Hart, Turkey was accusing 
Grivas of causing troubles on the island
20
 (FRUS 2000: 644).   
  
5.4.3. The Decision 
In the second stage the Demirel administration evaluated remaining policy 
alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision 
became ‘diplomatic efforts’. 
Table 3 shows the decision matrix of Demirel. 
Table 3: Decision matrix of Demirel 
 Dimensions  
Policy options Systemic Domestic 
Politics 
Military Total (Average) 
Military Intervention 1 4 1 6 (2) 
Air strike 2 2 2 6 (3) 
Diplomatic efforts 4 3 - 7 (2,3) 
Do nothing 3 1 - 4 (1,3) 
 
                                            
19 
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, 
November 23, 1967. 
20 
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, November 15, 1967. 
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On the systemic dimension, the alternatives are scored from highest to 
lowest according to their impact on Turkey’s stand in the international arena and 
the decision’s effect on Turkey’s foreign relations. On the domestic politics 
dimension, alternatives are ranked according to their ability to satisfy public 
opinion while improving the situation on the island in favor of Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey. On the military dimension, they are scored according to their ability 
to successfully achieve military objectives. 
Under the systemic dimension the most favorable option that emerged was 
‘diplomatic efforts’. Solving the question by peaceful methods will be ranked 
higher than other alternatives since this option would not cause a war in the 
region. Thus, this alternative would ease the pressure from third parties (i.e. the 
US or the USSR). It is important to note that although there was rapprochement 
between Turkey and the USSR, the Soviets were still not supportive for a military 
operation against Cyprus. 
On the other hand, under the domestic politics dimension the ‘military 
intervention’ option ranked as the best option since the audience and the 
opposition parties were expecting some kind of action towards Cyprus in order to 
provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the administration had to choose a 
policy option which would not damage the government. However, since the 
Demirel administration’s priority was economic development a war could damage 
Turkey’s development plans severely. This is why the administration tried to find 
a non-military solution for the crisis. 
 Under the military dimension the ‘air strike’ option scored as the best 
policy alternative since Turkey’s capacity to carry a full scale military operation 
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was relatively lower than the ‘air strike’ decision. Although Turkey realized its 
dependence on foreign military aid during the 1964 crisis and started to develop 
its own military industry, the current level of industrial achievements were still 
quite limited to produce required military equipments for a landing operation. 
It is important to note that the 1974 crisis supported the assumptions of the 
poliheuristic decision making model. First of all, according to the model, the 
administration identified a ‘key dimension’ (i.e. domestic politics) in the first stage 
of the decision making process and eliminated the policy options the 
administration considered ‘unacceptable’. At this stage the Demirel administration 
eliminated the ‘do nothing’ option though this option had a high score under the 
systemic dimension. In other words, the administration’s decision supported the 
‘non-compensatory’ principle of the poliheuristic model. 
In the second stage the Demirel administration evaluated remaining policy 
alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision 
emerged as ‘diplomatic efforts’ which was the ultimate decision of the Demirel 
administration. 
Pursuing a policy based on diplomacy was a priority for the Demirel 
administration. However, since both the public opinion and the hawks within the 
parliament were demanding a ‘strong response’ the administration had to find a 
face-saving policy. At this point, the administration tried to force Greece to 
withdraw its military forces from Cyprus, which was exceeding legal limits 
granted under prior agreements. It could be argued that with this move the 
administration had two objectives: i) calming the anger of both public and hawks; 
and ii) preventing Greek troops from attacking Turkish Cypriots. 
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CHAPTER VI:   
 
 
THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS 
 
 
 
During the 1967 Cyprus crisis Turkey achieved almost all of its objectives while 
‘unauthorized’ Greek forces had to retreat from Cyprus. Additionally, Turkish 
Cypriots who suffered from Greek attacks during the 1967 crisis would receive 
compensation. Furthermore, Grivas, one of the leading supporters of enosis, had 
to leave Cyprus. However, as was the case with the 1964 crisis, the 1967 crisis did 
not lead to a permanent solution in Cyprus. 
 Following the crisis the Demirel administration again focused on domestic 
politics. However, during the following years Turkey witnessed popular 
demonstrations which gradually became ‘acts of terrorism’. When the authorities 
could not handle the worsening situation, the army took the initiative and the 
Demirel administration stepped down from the government in 1971. Subsequent 
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administrations were ‘supra-party’ governments until the formation of the Ecevit 
administration in 1974. 
 The Ecevit administration adopted a pro-active foreign policy and did not 
hesitate to take actions that might damage relations between Turkey and the US. 
Additionally, during these years Turkey’s relations with Greece were problematic 
due to conflict regarding to Aegean Sea. Under these conditions a coup took place 
on Cyprus against the Makarios administration in July 1974. Turkey again 
declared its intention to intervene in Cyprus to restore the state of affairs of the 
Republic. This time, Turkish decision makers choose the ‘military intervention’ 
policy option and decided to use Turkey’s military might to settle the Cyprus 
dispute. This chapter will discuss Turkey’s decision making process during the 
1974 Cyprus crisis from January 1974 to August 1974. 
 
6.1. The aftermath of 1967 Crisis 
During the 1967 crisis, as opposed to the previous crisis, more NATO members 
participated in efforts to find a peaceful solution. The US, the UK, and Canada 
proposed a plan for the immediate withdrawal of Greek forces after the eruption 
of the crisis. The internationalization of the Cyprus dispute continued when both 
the secretary general of NATO and the representative of the secretary general of 
the UN entered these efforts. Later, under pressure Greece agreed to withdraw its 
‘unauthorized’ forces from Cyprus which was the most crucial demand of the 
Demirel administration. However, the 1967 crisis made it obvious that settling the 
dispute through spontaneous acts was fruitless and even more dangerous for peace 
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on the island. As a result, the parties decided to pursue further negotiations (Bilge 
1975: 175-176). 
In the end, the 1967 Cyprus crisis was solved mainly in favor of Turkey. 
First of all, Greece agreed to withdraw its troops from the island which were 
illegally deployed according to the agreements. Additionally, Grivas would not 
return to Cyprus and as a result his influence for the Greek ‘national clause’ (i.e. 
enosis) would be more limited. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots who suffered from 
Greek attacks during the 1967 crisis would receive compensation (Milliyet 30
th
 
Nov 1967). Accordingly Turkey achieved almost all of its objectives.  
In Greece the Colonels’ handling of the 1967 crisis was recognized as a 
‘failure’. Thus, King Constantine tried to utilize this opportunity to bring the 
Colonels’ regime down. However, his attempt at counter-coup was unsuccessful 
and as a result he had to abandon the throne and flee abroad. This abortive coup 
showed that although royalist forces were more competent than the Colonels’, 
they were still unable to stage a coup against the military regime. As was 
expected, the event was followed by a purge within the army to eliminate royalist 
officers (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010: 143-144). 
In early 1968, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and his Greek counterpart, 
Panagiotis Pipinelis, met secretly in Switzerland and reached an agreement on 
starting bi-communal talks to settle the Cyprus dispute (Gürün 1983: 420). The 
talks between two communities of the island started in June 1968 in Nicosia. 
However, the negotiations between representatives of Turkish Cypriots (Rauf 
Denktaş) and Greek Cypriots (Glafcos Clerides) continued until September 1971 
failing to find a solution. Instead, the talks reached a stalemate in 1971. Although 
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the talks were going nowhere, talks restarted the next year in June 1972 and 
continued until June 1974, just before the coup against the Makarios 
administration on Cyprus (Ertekün 1984: 25-26). 
The negotiations could not reach an agreement between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots. According to Eroğlu (1975: 45) the Greek side had two guiding 
principles during the negotiations: i) Greek Cypriots had the majority on the 
island and thus Turkish Cypriots had to ‘quit claiming’ to be recognized as equal 
with Greek Cypriots and accept just minority rights; ii) accordingly, democratic 
rule and the charter of the UN also support the argument of majority rule.  
However, the island was de facto partitioned after the 1967 crisis. In 
December 1967, Turkish Cypriots claimed their own rule under the title of 
‘Provisional Turkish Administration’ (PTA) to manage daily affairs of their 
community. Actually, the PTA did not emerge as a result of the 1967 crisis. 
Instead, the roots of this administration could be found in the 1964 crisis when 
Turkish Cypriots drifted away from the governmental institutions. As a result, in 
1964 Turkish Cypriots formed a ‘General Committee’ to deal with problems and 
make decisions on an ad hoc basis (Bilge 1975: 177). Turkish Cypriots argued that 
since they could not trust their Greek neighbors for their security, they established 
their own ‘enclaves’. These enclaves not only provided security for Turkish 
Cypriots but also founded the basis of governmental institutions (Stavirinides n.d.: 
58).  
Although Turkish Cypriots founded their own ‘provisional’ administration 
on the island, the world continued to recognize the Greek Cypriots as the legal 
government of Cyprus while Turkish Cypriots were not present in the 
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government. Additionally, Greek Cypriots argued that they had the right to govern 
both communities of the island (Borowiec 2000: 60). 
 After the 1967 crisis, although Makarios continued to support enosis, he 
began to consider that enosis could not be achieved immediately; this was the 
argument of groups opposing Makarios (Stavrinides n.d.: 66). This attitude 
resulted in growing opposition towards Makarios among the Greek junta. 
Additionally, the Colonels tried to ‘get rid of’ Makarios and attempted to 
assassinate him at various times. The Greek junta dispatched Grivas to Cyprus to 
overthrow Makarios and to prepare suitable atmosphere for enosis (Kassimeris 
2010: 94). 
Actually, there was a decrease in support for enosis among Greek 
Cypriots. Between 1960 and 1964 when the memories of EOKA’s triumph over 
the British rule were still alive on the island, Greek Cypriots were more ambitious 
to achieve enosis. However, when the situation calmed on the island after the 
1964 crisis and intercommunity clashes decreased, the attention of Greek Cypriots 
turned toward their welfare (Stavrinides n.d.: 67-68). The improved standard of 
living among the Greek Cypriot middle class led to demands for better education, 
a fashionable house, a car,  and luxurious products (Stavrinides n.d.:75). In other 
words, while enosis remained a political objective the Greek Cypriot community 
focused more on improving their daily lives in the 1960s. 
In 1967 Patris, a pro-Grivas  newspaper, published a top secret document: 
the Akritas Plan which scheduled enosis step by step. Actually, the plan was 
tailored in 1963 by Greek Cypriot leaders and Greek army. Patris claimed that 
Makarios established a secret organization and appointed Interior Minister 
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Yeorgadjis as the head of the organization. The plan argued that ‘the final 
objective’ would remain unchanged until achieving enosis. The plan stated that 
international public opinion was against any kind of oppression. That was why the 
organization had to first create the impression that the Cyprus dispute was not 
solved.    Although the Makarios administration did not deny the existence of the 
plan, the administration had to abandon it when the Greek community could not 
establish its dominance over Turkish community ‘within a day or two’ 
(Stavrinides n.d.; 59-60). 
 
6.2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy of Turkey 
 
6.2.1. Domestic Politics 
In 1968 Turkey witnessed a popular demonstration which was actually 
synchronous with the world. As was the case in other countries, in 1968 university 
students started to protest against the status quo in universities. Gradually, the 
focus of the protest turned to demand more democracy and rights outside 
universities and at this point different social groups participated in the 
demonstrations. In Turkey, although the movement started in mid-1960s and 
reached its peak in 1968, the movement did not cause more freedom and 
democracy as it did in the West. Instead, the movement became more ideology-
oriented and had biases which decreased popular support for the movement. 
Opposing views started to clash in the streets in 1969, costing lives on both sides. 
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As a result, the government, which had antipathy toward socialist revolutionary 
movements, used force to end protests (Göktolga 2005: 945-947).  
Çaylak and Baran (2010: 448) argued that student demonstrations aimed to 
topple the government which they considered to be acting against the revolution 
(i.e. coup of 27 May). The unavoidable rise of violence was getting public 
attention and the parliament discussed the issue for months. Additionally, the 
‘commando camps’ had a negative impact on the spread of violence. The 
‘commando camps’ were actually established to ‘counter communist threats’ and 
during these popular movements the camps got support from Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi (National Action Party). 
In 1969 Demirel’s AP won another general election and secured the right 
to form the government. Different from the previous cabinet, Demirel tried to 
form the cabinet without paying attention to the ‘opposition group’ within the AP. 
This act triggered the process of division within the party (Arcayürek 1985: 313-
315). The AP under these conditions could not prevent division of the party in 
1970. The ‘opposition’ fraction established Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party) 
and caused the AP to lose ground in the parliament. It is important to note that the 
right wing in the parliament gained a fragmented outlook with the establishment 
of new parties. For instance, in addition to the  Demokratik Parti, Necmettin 
Erbakan also formed his own party in 1970 (Milli Nizam Partisi – National Order 
Party). After seizing control of the CKMP in 1965, Alparslan Türkeş renamed the 
party Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi and aimed to get votes of middle class citizens 
(Ahmad 1993: 144).  
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Although the right wing had a fragmented presence in the parliament, the 
same was also true for the left. The CHP reoriented itself as left-of-center prior to 
1965 elections and it maintained this approach in the 1969 elections. However, as 
was the case for the AP, there was an ‘opposition group’ in the CHP and this group 
gathered around the leadership of Turhan Feyzioğlu to form the Güven Partisi 
(Reliance Party) (Ahmad 1993: 144). Founders of the Güven Partisi were 
opposing the CHP’s policy of ‘left-of-center’ and by representing the 
‘conservative’ group within the party. Güven Partisi, which campaigned against 
both the AP and the CHP, could only get 15 seats in 1969 elections (Çaylak and 
Baran 2010: 446-447). Before the elections the Demirel administration changed 
the electoral law and abolished the ‘national remainder system’ which was 
favoring minor parties. As a result, the TİP could only get two MPs though it got 
nearly the same percentage of votes as in the 1965 elections (Ahmad 1993: 145). 
Levi (1991: 145) argued that the change of electoral law was a ‘mistake’ since the 
small parties of the extreme right and left which lost their representation in the 
parliament radicalized and adopted terrorist tactics.  
The events got worse when demonstrators started to use violence as 
means. There were even attacks against foreign missions in Turkey. For instance, 
in 1969 the car of the US ambassador to Turkey was burned by protesters (Çaylak 
and Baran 2010: 453), and in 1971 protesters abducted the Israeli consul in 
İstanbul (Ahmad 1993: 151). Since efforts to end violence on the street had failed, 
the army took the initiative by delivering a memorandum warning the Demirel 
administration in March 1971 (Göktolga 2005: 948). 
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The coup was a natural result of the Turkish army’s attitude towards the 
politics of Turkey. First of all, during the 20
th
 century the army considered itself as 
the principal guardian of the regime and ideology of Turkey. As a result, the army 
had the right to intervene in politics and even to stage a coup when it was 
‘required’. This understanding, however, led the army to the conclusion that the 
army had ‘superiority’ over other institutions (Erdoğan 2005: 744-745). 
Additionally, contrary to popular belief the army’s influence in politics 
was not limited to the periods of military rule. Instead, the army preserved its 
presence even after restoring democracy. By implementing changes to the 
constitution, the Turkish army established material mechanisms to control or 
influence politics after each coup (Erdoğan 2005: 747-748). 
Actually, this was an appropriate situation for the coup since the political 
parties were fragmented, opposite groups were clashing in streets, and 
economically the Turkish Lira was devaluated in 1970. The memorandum of 12 
March in summary stated that: i) terror was rising; and ii) there was a need to 
achieve reforms of the 1961 constitution under a ‘supra-party’ government. 
Additionally, the memorandum indicated that if the government could not handle 
the issue the army would take initiative (Fedai 2010: 492-493).    
The political parties’ reactions were divergent. Demirel resigned 
immediately and adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ policy while asking his party members 
to remain calm. Although İnönü’s CHP had a negative attitude as its first reaction, 
the CHP changed its policy from criticism to support for the ‘supra-party’ 
government formed under Nihat Erim, a MP of the CHP. However, İnönü’s 
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attitude bothered Bülent Ecevit, who was secretary general of the CHP at that 
time, and as a result Ecevit resigned from his post (Zürcher 2004: 258). 
Ecevit, who was one of the leading figures in the CHP, played a crucial 
role in designing the party’s election campaigns. For instance, starting with the 
1965 general elections the CHP adopted a ‘left-of-center’ policy which 
demonstrated a shift from the party’s previous statements. As a result the party 
reoriented itself as ‘social-democrat’ party. Although the slogan (left-of-center) at 
first did not seem as a success, it gradually attracted the attention of the masses. 
This was a result of two factors: i) social changes within Turkey; and ii) a new and 
dynamic figure in the CHP, Bülent Ecevit. After resigning from his post Ecevit 
challenged İnönü’s leadership and defeated İnönü in the 1972 party congress. This 
was a dramatic success for Ecevit as he became the third leader of the party, 
following Atatürk and İnönü (Tachau 1991:109). 
Although Erim ruled the country for just under a year, he implemented 
changes to the 1961 constitution. These changes limited previously granted 
freedoms. The Erim government amended 44 articles in total and the constitution 
became less liberal. The amendments ended autonomy of universities, radio, and 
television; the press faced restrictions; the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National 
Security Council) gained the power to issue ‘binding’ advices to governments 
(Zürcher 2004: 260). 
When the term of President Sunay came to its end in 1973 Turkey faced 
the question of electing a new president. The army wanted to impose its candidate, 
Faruk Gürler, who was a general. The AP’s candidate was Tekin Arıburun, who 
was also a former commander. Demokratik Parti nominated Ferruh Bozbeyli, who 
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was the chairman of that party. The CHP neither nominated a candidate nor 
participated in elections to show that it would not support Gürler’s candidacy. 
During election cycle, Gürler could not get the required amount of votes in the 
parliament. As a result, the political parties tried to find another candidate who 
would be both ‘approved’ by the army and ‘neutral’. Fahri Korutürk, an ex-
admiral, was considered a suitable candidate for the post and was elected as the 
new president. The parliament achieved a democratic triumph by electing 
Korutürk  and by not electing the army’s candidate (Fedai 2010: 497-498).  
The general elections took place in 1973. According to election results, the 
CHP under its new leader Ecevit won the elections though it could not secure 
enough seats to form the government on its own. Ecevit, at this point, decided to 
wait and see the results of local elections which would take place just after the 
general elections in late 1973. As a result, the ‘supra-party’ government of Naim 
Talu continued since Demirel’s Adalet Partisi could not form a coalition. The 
local election results supported the general election results and the CHP emerged 
as the top party from both elections. Ecevit, after realizing the popular support for 
his party, decided to form a coalition and at this point Erbakan’s Milli Selamet 
Partisi (National Salvation Party) was considered a suitable partner to form the 
government. 
 
6.2.2. Foreign Policy 
During the 1960s Turkey wanted to reorganize the status of the US military bases 
in Turkey. The agreement was reached in 1969. According to Demirel, by signing 
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the agreement the US administration acknowledge that these bases were the 
property of Turkey. Additionally, Turkey had the right to restrict the US military 
activities in case its national security required such a decision. Most importantly, 
the US administration agreed not to use the bases against a third country without 
getting permission from Turkish authorities (Erhan 2008: 697).  
During the late 1960s Turkey’s economy was severely affected by the US 
decision to limit foreign aid as a result of domestic pressure to balance the US 
budget. For instance, Turkey received nearly 155 million US dollars in 1967 and 
105 million US dollars in 1968 as foreign aid from its Western allies. As Turkey’s 
foreign income decreased dramatically, Turkey had to devaluate Turkish Lira but 
Demirel decided to postpone this decision until the general elections of 1969 
(Erhan 2008: 700).  
Cultivation of opium poppy was a problem between Turkey and the United 
States. During his presidential campaign Nixon stated that he would end the usage 
of drugs in the United States. Beginning in 1969 there was a campaign against, 
Turkey which was accused of supplying 80% of opium used in the United States; 
however, the total amount of opium produced in Turkey was below the demand in 
the United States (Erhan 2008: 701-702). The relations between Turkey and the 
United States deteriorated even more when the ‘supra-party’ Erim government 
implemented a ban on opium production in 1971 and later, in 1974, Ecevit’s 
government revoked the ban (Hale 2002: 154). 
In 1969 Muslim countries reacted to the burning of the Al Aqsa mosque in 
Kudüs (Jerusalem) and decided to organize an international conference to discuss 
the issue. Saudi Arabia and Morocco took the initiative to organize the conference 
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and Turkey also received an invitation letter. President Sunay declared that Turkey 
was a secular country and he did not have any intention to attend, but the 
government could decide whether to attend the conference or not. Sunay’s 
statement was a clear warning shared by the army. At this point, Demirel stated 
that the conference was not religious and there would not be any barrier to 
attending a conference on political issues. Demirel argued that attending the 
conference would be in accordance with Turkish foreign policy. As a result, 
Turkey decided to attend the conference as an observer. The conference was held 
in Rabat and made two critical decisions: i) Israel should retreat from all occupied 
territories; and ii) the establishment of a secretariat to organize the conference 
annually at the foreign ministerial level (Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 791-792). 
The fourth Arab-Israeli war erupted in 1973. During the course of the war 
Turkey declared that it would not allow the US to use İncirlik base to support 
Israel. The war had two critical consequences: i) Israel lost the war; and ii) Turkey 
maintained its cordial relations with Arab countries while some Western countries 
faced the ‘oil embargo’ imposed by OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries). Later in 1974 Turkey benefited from its relatively friendly 
relations with Arab countries. Turkey got support from Arab countries in the 1974 
Cyprus crisis. For instance, Libya supplied fuel and tiers for Turkish Air Forces to 
continue its flight operations on Cyprus (Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 795). 
During the 1970s Turkey and Greece had disputes related to Aegean Sea. 
Actually, the root of the dispute lies in Greece’s intention to expand its territorial 
sea from 6 miles to 12 miles. According to Turkey such a decision would prevent 
Turkey from reaching open seas through the Aegean Sea. Additionally, 
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prospecting for oil in Aegean Sea was another problem between Turkey and 
Greece which took place just before the 1974 Cyprus crisis (Fırat 2008b: 750-
753). 
 
6.3. The Cyprus Crisis of 1974 
In 1974 the Cyprus dispute entered another phase for settlement. This section 
discusses the 1974 crisis chronologically starting from the formation of the Ecevit 
administration in late January 1974. Since only the Ecevit government could make 
the radical decision for a military intervention in Cyprus, it might be helpful to 
study the days just before the decision. 
February 1974, one of the first statements of the new government was on 
revoking the ban on cultivation of opium (Milliyet 2
nd
 Feb 1974). Foreign 
Minister Turan Güneş stated that Turkey was politically engaged with the West, 
but it would maintain its security outside NATO and establish relations with Third 
World countries. Additionally, the Foreign Minister stated that Turkey had 
concerns related to the enosis demands on Cyprus following the death of Grivas 
(Milliyet 6
th
 Feb 1974). During the rest of February, focus was mainly on 
economic problems and issuing amnesty for prisoners.  
March 1974: The Ecevit administration declared that the government 
would let the planting of opium continue for ‘maintaining the quality of the 
product’ (Milliyet 10th Mar 1974). Turkey declared that it would allow planting 
opium in limited areas with tight governmental control. The administration stated 
that negotiation between Turkey and the US might be helpful on the subject 
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(Milliyet 12
th
 Mar 1974). Two representatives from the US congress visited 
Turkey to discuss the opium issue. The representatives declared that they would 
try to end US aid for Turkey if the latter would revoke the ban (Milliyet 15
th
 Mar 
1974). The main opposition party leader, Süleyman Demirel, argued that Turkey 
was an independent country and stated that the administration did not fulfill any 
of its election promises (Milliyet 19
th
 Mar 1974). Turkey organized a NATO 
military drill in the Aegean Sea and according to news sources the US and Italy 
decided not to participate in the drill as a result of Greece’s objections (Milliyet 
30
th
 Mar 1974). 
April 1974, Defense Minister, Hasan Işık, stated that Turkey wanted to 
resolve the disputes related to Aegean Sea through negotiations between Turkey 
and Greece (Milliyet 5
th
 Apr 1974). Prime Minister Ecevit declared that Turkey 
wanted a just solution for the Aegean problems and did not want to cause tension 
(Milliyet 8
th
 Apr 1974). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that Turkey 
would continue prospecting for oil in Aegean Sea (Milliyet 10
th
 Apr 1974). 
Foreign Minister Turan Güneş accused Greece of creating ‘artificial’ problems 
and argued that Turkey believed in solving disputes through negotiations (Milliyet 
12
th
 Apr 1974). Greece proposed not prospecting for oil in the Aegean Sea until 
finding a solution for the dispute between Turkey and Greece. In response, Güneş 
stated that Turkey would not allow the Aegean Sea to become the ‘Greek Lake’ 
(Milliyet 23
rd
 Apr 1974).  
May 1974, Defense Minister Hasan Işık stated that Turkey had to find a 
separate army outside its NATO forces (Milliyet 6
th
 May 1974). In reply to a 
request from an AP senator to give guaranty to Western allies, Turan Güneş stated 
124 
 
that actually the West had to give guaranty to Turkey and inform Turkey, for 
instance, about its policy towards the Middle East. During the same Senate 
session opposition parties accused the Ecevit administration of isolating Turkey 
(Milliyet 10
th
 May 1974). On Cyprus militants of the Greek National Guard 
threatened to attack a Turkish Cypriot village (Milliyet 11
th
 May 1974). In 
replying to a question on Greece’s ‘seriousness’ about engaging in war with 
Turkey, Turan Güneş stated that Greece believed the US would intervene in case 
of a war between its allies. However, Güneş argued, that the US administration 
did not want to take part in this dispute (Milliyet 25
th
 May 1974). Turkey started 
prospecting for oil in Aegean Sea and the mission was escorted by Turkish 
warships. Greece, as a response, ordered a Greek fleet to patrol the Aegean Sea 
while Greek Air Force prepared for possible operations (Milliyet 30
th
 May 1974). 
June 1974, the Foreign Minister of Greece, Spyridon Tetenes, claimed that 
it was impossible to reach an agreement on the status of the Aegean Sea as long as 
Turkey did not accept the first three articles of Geneva Convention of 1958 
(Milliyet 2
nd
 June 1974). Turkey stated that it would not allow Greece to expand 
its territorial sea from 6 miles to 12 miles (Milliyet 12
th
 Jun 1974). Turkey 
declared that Turkey’s condition would not be worse than Greece’s in case of a 
war (Milliyet 17
th
 Jun 1974). The Secretary General of NATO, Joseph Luns, stated 
that a conflict in the Aegean region might cause bitter consequences and proposed 
bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece (Milliyet 20
th
 Jun 1974). Although 
foreign ministers of both Turkey and Greece had meetings to discuss the Aegean 
issue they could not reach an agreement. Additionally, the US Foreign Minister, 
Henry Kissinger, stated that it would be better to wait for avail before deciding to 
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act as mediator between the allies (Milliyet 21
st
 Jun 1974). Turkey proposed 
Greece organizing periodical bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece to solve 
the existing disputes. However, the proposal was rejected by Greece. On this issue 
Ecevit argued that since current mechanisms were fruitless to settle problems, 
Turkey had proposed an alternative mechanism (Milliyet 27
th
 Jun 1974). Ecevit 
blamed the Greek junta for pointing at Turkey as ‘nightmare’ to gain public 
support for their rule (Milliyet 29
th
 Jun 1974). The Prime Minister of Greece, 
Adamantios Androutsopoulos, argued that the real cause of dispute in the Aegean 
region was Turkey. Furthermore, he stated that Turkey was sustaining the dispute 
by threatening Greece (Milliyet 30
th
 Jun 1974). 
July 1974, the Ecevit administration regulated planting of opium in seven 
cities (Milliyet 2
nd
 Jul 1974). The Nixon administration summoned the US 
ambassador to Turkey, William B. Macomber, to discuss Turkey’s decision. There 
were claims that the US administration would end its aid program for Turkey 
since Turkey had not even bothered to inform the US of its decision (Milliyet 6
th
 
Jul 1974). On the Aegean problem, Turan Güneş stated that Turkey’s current 
maritime law was incompetent to deal with the problems with Greece. Güneş 
argued that Greece did not want to start bilateral talks on the Aegean dispute 
because Greece decided to achieve its aims thorough negotiations in the UN 
maritime law conference (Milliyet 11
th
 Jul 1974). Turan Güneş argued that the US 
had been giving aid to Turkey prior to the ban on opium cultivation. Ending the 
aid, he added, as a result of revoking the ban was not logical (Milliyet 12
th
 Jul 
1974). The US Senate decided to end the US aid for countries that could not 
prevent drug smuggling (Milliyet 13
th
 Jul 1974). Ecevit stated that this decision 
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would not affect Turkish foreign policy since the country would continue to 
pursue policies serving its interest and security (Milliyet 13
th
 Jul 1974). On 15
th
 
July a coup took place on Cyprus against the Makarios administration. Ecevit 
declared that the coup was tailored by Greece. Turkish Chief of Staff, Semih 
Sancar, stated that the event was expected. London warned that Turkey and 
Greece should act carefully. The US and the Soviet Union emphasized the 
sovereignty of Cyprus (Milliyet 16
th
 Jul 1974). Ecevit discussed the situation on 
the island with leaders of other political parties. Additionally, Turkey asked the 
UK for cooperation in solving the crisis. When the UN and NATO requested 
patience from the Ecevit administration, Turkey replied that the focus of the 
international community should be on Greece and pressure on the Greek junta 
(Milliyet 17
th
 Jul 1074). Ecevit went to London to discuss the issue with the 
British authorities (Milliyet 18
th
 Jul 1974). Ecevit declared that time was running 
out and an urgent reply was required (Milliyet 19
th
 Jul 1974). Turkey started its 
military operation to restore the state of affairs of Cyprus on 20
th
 July. A ceasefire 
was declared on the island on 22
nd
 July and the Turkish army ended its operation. 
Ecevit stated that from then on nobody could act against Turkish Cypriots’ rights 
on the island anymore (Milliyet 23
rd
 Jul 1974). 
 
6.4. Analyzing events 
When the Cyprus crisis erupted into another international crisis in 1974 Turkey 
had maintained a coalition government rule under Bülent Ecevit’s Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi since late January 1974. This thesis will now study the approach of 
the Ecevit administration to the renewed crisis on the island. As discussed earlier, 
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the poliheuristic decision model consists of two stages; here the thesis will 
evaluate Turkey’s decision in 1974, and how Turkey decided to intervene in 
Cyprus with the poliheuristic decision making model. 
 
6.4.1. First stage of decision making 
In the first stage of the poliheuristic decision model, decision makers eliminate the 
policy alternatives which have a low value in the key dimension. The thesis argues 
that in this stage the ‘systemic dimension’ was considered the key dimension by 
the Ecevit administration. 
Following the 12 March memorandum Turkey was ruled by ‘supra party’ 
governments. The first such party, the Erim administration, imposed a ban on 
opium cultivation, which was causing tension between Turkey and the US during 
the late 1960s and the early 1970s. When Turkey imposed the ban the relations 
between Turkey and the US entered a period of cooperation. However, after the 
1973 elections Ecevit formed a government with Erbakan’s MSP and Turkey 
adopted policies neglecting relations with its ally.  
 After its formation in late January 1974 the Ecevit administration decided 
to revoke the ban on opium cultivation. Although the motive of the administration 
was based on domestic politics, the issue turned out to be an international problem 
between the United Sates and Turkey. Actually, this problem was not a surprise for 
the administration which was favoring ‘determined’ and ‘independent’ foreign 
policy (Ecevit 2010, Bölükbaşı 2001: 216). 
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 Besides, Turkey had disputes with Greece on the Aegean Sea. As the 
chronology demonstrates, the Ecevit administration was devoting its efforts to 
dealing with the Aegean dispute. Although Turkey could not negotiate the dispute 
bilaterally with Greece, Turkey still tried to find a diplomatic solution when a 
third party (i.e. NATO) intervened and offered to resolve the dispute.  
As the chronology shows, Turkey –after unsuccessful attempts to 
negotiate- started to consider Greece a ‘troublemaker’ and accused the Greek 
junta of not trying to find a peaceful solution. According to Turkish decision 
makers Greek authorities were blocking efforts for peaceful settlement by refusing 
to negotiate. Ecevit (2010: 75) argued that he decided to negotiate the disputes 
with the Greek side though he did not have much hope of achieving an agreement. 
Additionally, Ecevit stated that he confronted criticism from opposition parties 
when the negotiations ended without any concrete progress.  
 The opium crisis, as the chronology demonstrates, attracted US interest 
immediately and the Nixon administration tried to prevent Turkey from legalizing 
opium planting. However, the US attempts were fruitless. As a result, the US 
Senate played the ‘foreign aid’ card which actually did not sway the Ecevit 
administration though Turkey’s economy might have benefitted from this aid. 
 In 1974 the US witnessed one of the most scandalous domestic affairs of 
its political history: the Watergate scandal. Additionally, during the same period 
Kissinger was busy with peace negotiations in the Middle East following the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1973 (Hale 2000: 155).  
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In June 1974 Makarios sent a letter to the Greek Junta and demanded the 
retreat of Greek officers from National Guards since these personnel were 
committing acts against the authority of the Makarios administration. Makarios 
argued that the EOKA-B organization was against his rule and their activities 
were funded by the Greek Junta (Gürün 1983: 421-422). 
After the coup Ecevit went to London to discuss the situation on the island. 
Actually, Ecevit wanted a discussion with the British authorities on the basis of 
‘military intervention’ to reestablish the state of affairs of the Cyprus Republic. 
During his visit, Ecevit emphasized the need for ‘urgent’ action before it became 
too late. In 1976 Ecevit (2010: 76) stated that although he did not have great 
expectations for cooperation with the British, he had to negotiate the issue with 
the British authorities.  Ecevit argued that by this move he wanted to secure 
Turkey’s right to intervene before the international community.     
 When the US administration wanted to take part in negotiations, Turkey 
refused this demand since the US was not a guarantor state. Instead, Turkey and 
the US had separate talks on the issue. The US Secretary of State, Kissinger, 
appointed Joseph Sisco for this post. Although Sisco was told to ‘do everything’ to 
prevent Turkey’s decision to intervene in Cyprus, Sisco knew that his chances of 
convincing Ecevit were limited. When meeting with Ecevit, Sisco offered 
‘normalization’ of US aid and warned Turkey of possible Greek retaliation. 
However, Ecevit proposed a different plan: i) Sampson and other Greek officers 
should leave the island; ii) Turkey would deploy the same amount of troops on 
Cyprus as Greece did; iii) Turkish Cypriots would have control of an area along 
the coast; and iv) negotiations to establish a federal system would begin. Although 
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Sisco agreed to mediate this plan with Greece, he could not reach Greek 
authorities and spent 36 hours achieving nothing in Athens. When he had the 
chance to discuss Ecevit’s plan, the Greek junta rejected the plan and only offered 
replacement of the officers who participated in the coup. As a result, Sisco’s 
mediation did not lay a foundation for negotiations (Bölükbaşı 2001: 238-240).  
 During his visit Ecevit got the impression that the British authorities were 
neither trying to prevent Turkey from intervening nor giving permission to 
intervene. As Ecevit described the situation in the parliament: 
In London during our meetings with either the British or the Americans, I 
got this impression: Of course, they did not give us the green light to 
intervene in Cyprus, but there wasn’t the red light at all. However, they 
have concerns that the world would consider these countries as agreed 
with Turkey on intervention […] We accepted this normal. (MMTD 1974: 
24) 
It is important to note that in the same speech on Greece Ecevit stated that: 
Turkey’s misfortune is that it’s surrounded by countries that Turkey is 
friends with. Despite showing eagerness and goodwill Turkey couldn’t 
establish friendship with only one country, Greece, which is Turkey’s ally 
in NATO. Greece did not leave a ‘breath area’ for Turkey in the Aegean 
Sea and it would definitely do the same in the Mediterranean Sea. As a 
result, before the new regime takes root [on Cyprus and] Greece’s military 
advantage increases totally by deployments of troops illegal to 
international agreements, a definite solution had to be found for this 
situation (MMTD 1974: 21) 
Ecevit’s words show that the coup against the Makarios administration on Cyprus 
triggered Turkey’s reaction. When the National Guards brought down the 
Makarios administration and established a new rule under Nicos Sampson, a 
former EOKA member  known for his hatred of Turks, the authorities in Turkey 
realized that the ‘state of affairs’ of the island had also collapsed. The new 
‘government’ on Cyprus claimed that they would treat Turkish Cypriots equally 
and Turkish community would live peacefully on the island. However, Turkey did 
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not take this commitment seriously since Sampson was not the right person to 
keep this promise while hating Turks. At this point, it is important to note that 
once Makarios fled from Cyprus, he declared that Turks were in danger on the 
island and the coup was a direct attack against the independence of the Republic 
of Cyprus (Ertekün 1984: 32). As a result, the Ecevit administration considered a 
more radical action required to reestablish the state of affairs of the island and 
save Turkish Cypriots from fear of massacre. 
 The Ecevit administration was confronted with the Cyprus dispute while 
having other international disputes with Greece and the US, and just after its 
relations with the US had deteriorated. Additionally, since the state of affairs of 
the island was collapsed, which was the ‘required’ condition for intervention 
according to Guarantee agreement, the Ecevit administration decided to eliminate 
the ‘do nothing’ and ‘air strike’ policy alternatives during the first phase of the 
decision making process. 
  The administration eliminated ‘do nothing’ as a policy alternative which 
could not find a way to provide security for Turkish Cypriots. The ‘do nothing’ 
option actually became less pertinent since the coup created insecurity for Turkish 
Cypriots ending the chances to continue negotiations between two communities. 
The administration also eliminated the ‘air strike’ policy alternative since this 
alternative could not restore the state of affairs of the island. The administration 
realized that an air strike operation could only last a couple of days. Such a 
operation, however, could not force the ‘new’ government to step down from the 
office in Nicosia. 
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6.4.2. Second stage of decision making 
In the second stage of the poliheuristic decision model, a decision maker uses 
analytic evaluations and tries to maximize gains by minimizing losses. Since the 
‘do nothing’ and ‘air strike’ alternatives were eliminated in the first stage, the 
Ecevit administration had two remaining policy options: i) intervention; and ii) 
diplomatic efforts. This thesis will evaluate each policy alternative according to 
the remaining dimensions: domestic politics and military. 
Domestic Politics dimension: Although the opposition parties expressed 
their support for the government when the latter decided to intervene in Cyprus, 
the opposition parties were critical to the Ecevit administration’s foreign policy. 
For instance, Demirel accused the administration of trying to ‘veil’ the economic 
problems with international crisis, especially with the Aegean dispute.  
Ecevit cooperated with Erbakan’s MSP to form the government. However, 
the two parties had little in common though some argued that they both had 
‘leftist’ orientations. Ecevit believed that the coalition would remain in the office 
for long time. He even declared that the CHP and MSP would serve Turkey like 
two brothers. In order to form the government both parties compromised some of 
their principles. For instance, in 1974 PTT (Turkish Post Office) did not publish 
special stamps on the anniversary of abolishment of the Caliphate (Arcayürek 
2006: 82-83). A sign of fragility of the coalition, Ecevit wanted to resign from 
premiership in May 1974 but later changed his mind (Milliyet 21
st
 May 1974). 
However, after the 1974 Cyprus crisis Ecevit resigned in September 1974. 
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As the Ecevit coalition government was fragile, the best solution would be 
‘early elections’ and a strong one-party government under the leadership of 
Ecevit. Actually, a ‘success’ in the Cyprus dispute would definitely increase the 
popularity of ‘Karaoğlan’ and secure enough seats in the parliament for this 
purpose. 
Military dimension: When the renewed Cyprus crisis erupted in the 
summer of 1974, Turkey was technically prepared to intervene in Cyprus. It is 
important to note that during the previous crises, although Turkey wanted to make 
the decision to intervene, its military capability to pursue such a policy was 
questionable. For instance, while Turkey had only six helicopters, two landing 
crafts and 150 parachutes in 1967, in 1974 Turkey had 100 landing craft, 100 
helicopters and 15000 parachutes (Bölükbaşı 2001: 235). 
 Turkey was preparing for intervention when the Cyprus crisis first erupted 
in late 1963. In the following years Turkey increased its military capability and 
was formulating its military plans again and again. Each crisis led the Turkish 
army to become more coordinated and strengthened for a possible military 
operation. Besides, Turkey became capable of waging war on two fronts: i) on 
Cyprus, against Greek National Guards and Greek army; and ii) in Thrace and 
Aegean Sea against Greece (Evcil 1999: 16). 
 Turkey had another advantage for military intervention: Türk Mukavemet 
Teşkilatı (TMT – Turkish Resistance Organization). Although TMT did not have 
heavy weapons or any established supply chain mechanism to support an attack, 
they were defending Turkish villages against Greek attacks on Cyprus throughout 
the Cyprus crises. There were two strongholds of TMT: one was covering the area 
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of northern Lefkoşe (Nicosia) and the other was Serdarlı, located in the north-east 
of Lefkoşe. These strongholds and other villages would increase probability of the 
success of the Turkish army’s operation by scattering the Greek National Guards 
around these zones. During the early stages of the operation, the Turkish army 
expected that Greek National Guards would surround these zones and the Turkish 
army would complete its landing operation more successfully (Evcil 1999: 21). 
 Turkey started to consider Greece as a threat to its security when Greece 
claimed to expand its territorial sea from 6 miles to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea. 
According to Turkish decision makers the latter option would change the Sea into 
a ‘Greek Sea’ and prevent Turkey from accessing open seas freely (Ecevit 2010). 
When Turkey considered the coup on Cyprus to be a coup tailored by the junta, 
Turkey feared that its southern borders would also be under threat from Greece 
(Birand 1987: 38-39).  
 After the coup against the Makarios administration, the Greek junta started 
to deploy additional troops to the island to strengthen its military presence. Turkey 
considered that increased Greek military presence on the island would lead to de 
facto enosis which might make it impossible to restore the preexisting regime. As 
a result, defending the rights of both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would be 
relatively difficult. 
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6.4.3. The Decision 
In the second stage the Ecevit administration evaluated the remaining policy 
alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision 
became ‘military intervention’. 
Table 4 shows the decision matrix of Ecevit. 
Table 4: Decision matrix of Ecevit 
 Dimensions  
Policy options Systemic Domestic 
Politics 
Military Total (Average) 
Military Intervention 3 4 2 9 (3) 
Air strike 2 3 1 6 (2) 
Diplomatic efforts 4 2 - 6 (2) 
Do nothing 1 1 - 2 (0,6) 
 
On the systemic dimension, the alternatives are scored from highest to 
lowest according to their impact on Turkey’s stand in the international arena and 
the decision’s effect on Turkey’s foreign relations. On the domestic politics 
dimension, alternatives are ranked according to their ability to satisfy public 
opinion while improving the situation on the island in favor of Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey. On the military dimension, they are scored according to their ability 
to successfully achieve military objectives: restoring the ‘state of affairs’ of 
Cyprus and securing the lives of Turkish Cypriots. 
Under the systemic dimension the most favorable option that emerged was 
‘diplomatic efforts’. As was the case during the previous crises, solving the 
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question by peaceful methods will be ranked higher than other alternatives since 
this option would not cause a war in the region. Thus, this alternative would ease 
the pressure from third parties (mainly from the US). The 1970s witnessed 
relatively low tension between Eastern Bloc and Western Bloc which had an 
impact on Turkish decision makers’ ultimate decision. Although the US Secretary 
of State, Kissinger, did everything to stop Turkey, the US public attention was on 
Watergate scandal.  
On the other hand, under the domestic politics dimension the ‘military 
intervention’ option, again, ranked as the best option since the audience and the 
opposition parties were expecting some kind of action towards Cyprus in order to 
provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the administration had to choose a 
policy option which would not damage the government. Additionally, the CHP-
MSP coalition was not stable to serve Turkey ‘for long time’ as claimed by Ecevit. 
Any discontent among Turkish public would have disastrous political 
consequences for Ecevit’s CHP. 
Under the military dimension the ‘military intervention’ option scored as 
the best policy alternative since Turkey’s primary aim was ‘restoring state of 
affairs’ of the Cyprus Republic and other alternative (i.e. ‘air strike’) could not 
force the ‘new’ Greek government to step down from government. During the 
previous Cyprus crises Turkey’s military readiness was a big question for Turkish 
decision maker. In 1974, however, after nearly ten years Turkey had the military 
capacity and strategy to intervene in Cyprus.   
It is important to note that the 1974 crisis supported the assumptions of the 
poliheuristic decision making model. First of all, according to the model, the 
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administration identified a ‘key dimension’ (i.e. systemic) in the first stage of the 
decision making process and eliminated the policy options that the administration 
considered ‘unacceptable’. At this stage the Ecevit administration eliminated the 
‘do nothing’ and ‘air strike’ options even though the ‘air strike’ option had a high 
score under the domestic politics dimension. In other words, the administration’s 
decision supported the ‘non-compensatory’ principle of the poliheuristic model. 
In the second stage the Ecevit administration evaluated remaining policy 
alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision 
emerged as ‘military intervention’ which was the ultimate decision of the Ecevit 
administration. 
After recognizing the reality of the coup, Turkish decision makers 
demanded an urgent meeting with the British since the UK was one of the 
‘guarantor states’. Although it seemed that the Ecevit administration tried to use 
diplomacy to find a solution, in reality the administration proposed the British 
intervening in Cyprus jointly to restore the state of affairs of the Republic. It could 
be argued that with this move the administration had two objectives: i) checking 
the possibility of joint intervention with the UK; and ii) meeting the requirements 
for unilateral intervention (i.e. consultation among grantor states) which was one 
of the criticisms against Turkey in the Johnson Letter in 1964. 
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6.5. The Aftermath of the Military Intervention 
Following Turkey’s military operation, the Turkish army successfully 
placed nearly 7% of the island under its control
21
. As a result of the military 
operation, the Greek governments in both Greece and Cyprus collapsed. In Greece 
Karamanlis was invited to restore democracy, and in Cyprus Klarides assumed the 
leadership of the Greek Cypriot community since Makarios was abroad. 
After Turkey’s intervention the UN Security Council adopted a resolution 
to end armed conflict and requested a ceasefire among belligerent parties. Turkey 
complied to this request on 22
nd
 July 1974 at 5:00 pm local time (Milliyet 23
rd
 
July 1974). Although the parties agreed to a ceasefire, minor clashes continued on 
the island. Turkey also continued to deploy troops to strengthen its military 
presence on Cyprus. 
The negotiations started among the three guarantor states (Turkey, the UK, 
and Greece) on 25
th
 July 1974 in Geneva, Switzerland. The Turkish side argued 
that Turkey might continue to supply resources to its military presence on the 
island until a final solution could be found. Additionally, Turkey argued that since 
the two communities wouldn’t have a common ground to live together, each 
community should have its own autonomous zone until a final agreement. To 
resolve the Cyprus dispute once and for all representatives of both communities of 
the island had to be present at the negotiation table. The Greek side, on the other 
hand, expressed that the Turkish army had to retreat to its position on 22
nd
 July. 
                                            
21
 Once Turkey started its military operation the US administration had three goals: i) preventing a 
war between two NATO members; ii) obtaining cease-fire; and iii) starting negotiations. Later, 
the US Secretary of State, Kissinger, argued that the US administration achieved its most 
important objective: eastern flank of NATO remained not damaged and Greece and Turkey 
remained on friendly terms with the US (see Kissinger 1999). 
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Although the Turkish army did not retreat, the parties reached an agreement on 
following issues: First of all, the Treaty of Guarantee was still valid. Additionally, 
guarantor states agreed that none of the belligerent party had the right to expand 
its territory after 30
th
 July.  Greek forces had to retreat from Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves. The negotiations to reestablish the state of affairs of the island had to 
start on 8
th
 August with the participation of representatives of both communities 
(Gürün 1983: 428-429). 
Although the second phase of negotiations started on 8
th
 August, the 
parties could not find an agreement. Turkey argued that the Greek side did not 
have any intention of solving the dispute through negotiations. Although the 
democracy in Greece and the new administration in Cyprus were just restored, 
Turkey insisted that the Greek side was pursuing its former policy on disputes 
between Turkey and Greece. Actually, during the year of 1974 Turkey had 
disputes with Greece over the Aegean Sea, and these disputes reinforced Turkey’s 
stand against the Greek side during the second phase of negotiations (Fırat 
2008b).  
Since Turkey considered it almost impossible to reach a solution to the 
Cyprus dispute through negotiations, Turkey started its second military operation 
on 15
th
 August 1974
22
. 
  
                                            
22
 The thesis did not discuss the second military intervention in more detail since the second 
operation was a strategic/tactical decision. 
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CHAPTER VII:   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis studied one of the continuous questions of Turkish foreign policy: the 
Cyprus question. The focus of the thesis was on Turkey’s ultimate decisions 
during the 1964, 1967, and 1974 crises. To make the subject more specific, this 
thesis studied each crisis to analyze how Turkey decided to ‘use force’ in 1974 
while refraining from taking this decision during the previous crises. In other 
words, the thesis analyzed decision making processes of Turkish leaders during 
these Cyprus crises. 
 To study the crises this thesis adopted poliheuristic decision making 
model. The poliheuristic model enabled the thesis to analyze different aspects of 
decision making. For instance, the model model addresses not only the personal 
attitudes of decision makers, but also the inter-state (system) and domestic 
variables. Domestic and inter-state variables may vary (e.g. the role of ‘Super 
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Powers’, alliances, current political/economic situation, and elections). As a result, 
this thesis studied different components of the Cyprus crises from 1964 to 1974. 
The poliheuristic decision making model argues that leaders weigh loses 
and gains, rewards and risks when making a decision. The model analyzes each 
political decision in two stages. While cognitive heuristics are more important in 
the first stage of decision making, leaders adopt rational choice calculations in the 
second stage. Leaders define a ‘key dimension’ and eliminate options do not 
satisfy leader’s political objectives in the first stage of decision making process. 
These eliminated policy options usually have low value in the key dimension. 
Although the eliminated policy option may have higher scores in other 
dimensions, these high scores does not compensate low score in the key 
dimension. This principle constitutes ‘non-compensatory’ characteristics of the 
model. In the second stage, leaders evaluate remaining and choose the best 
remaining policy option. 
 This thesis utilized Brule’s (2005) methodology and research design with 
modifications required by the Cyprus case. The thesis argued that during each 
crisis Turkish decision makers had four policy alternatives on the table: i) military 
intervention; ii) air strike; iii) diplomatic efforts; and iv) do nothing. There were 
three dimensions to evaluate these policy options: i) systemic; ii) domestic 
politics; and iii) military. By constructing the same decision matrix for the Cyprus 
crises, the thesis analyzed how Turkey reacted during each crisis. 
The thesis argued that at the heart of the Cyprus question was Greek and 
Greek Cypriot demands for enosis, the unification of Cyprus with Greece. As the 
previous chapters demonstrated, Greece and Greek Cypriots had a desire for 
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enosis just after the independence of Greece. Although there were minor uprisings 
and demands for enosis among Greek Cypriots, this desire did not gain 
momentum until the 1950s. During the 1950s, however, the Greek community of 
the island started to demand enosis more vigorously. Additionally, in 1955 Greek 
Cypriots established EOKA and the future of the island became a question for the 
British authorities who had been ruling the island since 1878. 
 When the armed conflict between Greek Cypriots and the British 
authorities escalated after 1955, the UK considered revising its policy towards the 
Cyprus problem. Although the British authorities proposed some changes to the 
status of the island, these proposals did not satisfy the Greek community since 
their ‘national cause’ was enosis. As a result, armed conflict continued on the 
island and the Greek community furthered their demand for enosis. 
 Turkey and Turkish Cypriots did not have a clear objective for Cyprus. 
Actually, Turkey first supported status quo on the island when the issue emerged 
as an international problem. Gradually, however, Turkey changed its policy to 
support taksim of the island between the Greek and Turkish communities. 
Additionally, Turkey considered it possible to solve the dispute within the 
framework of NATO. Finding a solution within the framework of NATO, 
according to Turkey, would maintain the friendship between Turkey and Greece 
which was established in the 1930s. 
 Later the parties agreed on an ‘independence formula’ for Cyprus while 
granting sovereign military bases for the UK and setting a balance between 
Turkish and Greek communities in governmental positions. As a result, the 
Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. Although the Republic was an 
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independent state, there were three ‘guarantor’ states (the UK, Greece, and 
Turkey). The constitution of Cyprus generated a system providing ‘veto’ power 
for the Turkish community via the Vice President of the Republic who had to be a 
member of Turkish community. 
 After becoming independent Cyprus experienced internal disputes related 
to governmental duties. Although the London Treaties established an independent 
Cypriot state, the constitutional mechanism of the island did not work properly 
and it caused disputes between Turks and Greeks. For instance, there were a 
number of disagreements such as disputes over collecting of taxes, municipality 
borders, and proportion of involvement in governmental services at the very 
beginning of the newly established Republic of Cyprus. 
When the governmental problems caused ineffectiveness, Makarios 
proposed amendments to the constitution which perpetuated the conflict-ridden 
situation. Although there was tension between Turks and Greeks on almost every 
issue, in late December 1963, just after Makarios’ proposal, an incident triggered 
intercommunity conflicts on the island with casualties on both sides. This 
remarkable event internationalized the Cyprus dispute when Turkey threatened to 
intervene in Cyprus as long as the conflict continued. 
 Turkey showed determination to settle the dispute by using force in 1964, 
but later abandoned this policy once the US took initiative and warned Turkey not 
to intervene. Although the causes of the dispute were not solved by this initiative, 
a war between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus was averted. As a result, the 
renewed Cyprus dispute emerged in 1967 when Greek Cypriot forces attacked two 
Turkish Cypriot villages. Again a war between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus was 
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averted when the US successfully mediated crisis. Actually, in 1967 the US 
administration also coordinated the UN and NATO’s mediating efforts to settle the 
dispute. However, as was the case with the 1964 crisis, the 1967 crisis did not find 
a permanent solution for the Cyprus dispute. Although the following years 
witnessed relative calm on the island, in 1974 the Republic experienced the most 
dramatic event in its history when a coup took place against the Makarios 
administration. Considering the situation de facto enosis, Turkey reacted to the 
coup by intervening in Cyprus. The intervention was intended to restore the state 
of affairs of the Republic though it caused establishment of a new status quo on 
the island. 
 This thesis applied the poliheuristic decision making model to the Cyprus 
crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. The thesis revealed some similarities and 
differences among Turkish decision makers’ approaches to the crises. 
 Table 5 shows the overview of Turkey’s reactions during the Cyprus crises. 
 
 Table 5:  Overview of Turkey’s reactions during the Cyprus Crises 
Crisis Time Frame Type of 
Government 
Leader Two stage 
process 
Key dimension Non-
compensatory 
principle used 
Eliminated Policy Turkey’s major 
response 
1964 Dec. 1963 -
Aug.  1964 
Coalition 
(CHP + 
nonpartisans) 
PM* 
İnönü 
Yes ‘Systemic’ 
(Peak of the Cold 
War) 
Yes ‘Military intervention’ ‘Air strike’ 
1967 Apr. 1967 – 
Dec. 1967 
One Party 
(AP) 
PM* 
Demirel 
Yes ‘Political’ 
(Domestic 
stability + 
economic 
expansion) 
Yes ‘Do nothing’ ‘Diplomatic efforts’ 
1974 Jan. 1974 – 
Aug. 1974 
Coalition 
(CHP+MSP) 
PM* 
Ecevit 
Yes ‘Systemic’ 
(Coup on Cyprus  
+ Detente ) 
Yes ‘Do nothing’ and ‘Air 
strike’ 
‘Military intervention’ 
* PM: Prime Minister 
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 First of all, during each crisis Turkey was not prepared for or expecting a 
crisis on the island. In late 1963 when Cyprus witnessed intercommunity 
conflicts, Turkey had internal problems with the dissolution of the second İnönü 
coalition.  Turkey could not formulate an official policy towards the crisis until 
after forming a third coalition under İnönü. In 1967, although Turkey had a one-
party government under Demirel’s Adalet Partisi, the Demirel administration was 
not prepared to confront an international crisis. Although the Demirel 
administration confronted with the Cyprus question just forming the government 
in 1965, the administration was not expecting a bloody conflict on the island in 
1967. Instead, during the same period the administration was busy with 
establishing new economic ties with its neighbors. In 1974, Turkey was ruled by 
another coalition government under the leadership of Ecevit. The 1974 crisis 
erupted when the Ecevit administration was busy with revoking the ban on opium 
cultivation. Until the coup on Cyprus the Ecevit administrations’ priority was 
revoking the ban on opium cultivation. Even the day the coup took place in 
Nicosia, Ecevit was on the way to go Afyon to attend a rally to announce Turkey’s 
decision on the ban. 
  Secondly, during each Cyprus crisis the international community was 
motivated to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece over the Cyprus dispute. 
In 1964, the US administration took the initiative by sending a harsh letter to 
İnönü and warning of possible consequences of an intervention decision. 
Although Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus during the 1964 crisis, the 
İnönü administration used the letter as a face-saving instrument in domestic 
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politics. In 1967, the Demirel administration expressed its intention to intervene in 
the island if Greece and the Greek community would not take a step backward 
from pursuing enosis while attacking Turkish community. During the 1967 crisis, 
again the US administration had a pivotal role in deescalating the crisis.  Turkey 
responded to US mediating efforts cautiously and warned the US administration 
not to send a message similar to the Johnson Letter. As a result, the US pressure 
was focused on Greece and Greek community. Additionally, the US 
administration also coordinated the UN and NATO efforts for peaceful settlement 
on the island. In 1974, Turkey considered the coup against the Makarios 
administration the cause of the collapse of the Republic. The Ecevit 
administration expressed its intention to intervene on the island in order to restore 
the regime. Although the US administration adopted the same method used in the 
1967 crisis by sending Sisco as mediator, this effort had no impact on Turkey’s 
decision. Actually, in 1974 Turkish authorities did not give much credit for US 
mediation to solve the dispute. Instead, the Ecevit administration felt the need to 
act immediately to restore order on the island. 
 During each crisis the priorities of Turkish decision makers differed in the 
first stage of the poliheuristic decision making process. The İnönü administration 
in 1964 considered the ‘systemic dimension’ the key dimension. The thesis argues 
that since international relations had an impact on İnönü’s decision, he eliminated 
the ‘military intervention’ option in the first stage of decision making. İnönü 
considered the 1959 agreements as a result of international and intra-alliance 
pressure, so during the 1964 Cyprus crisis international pressure (especially the 
US opposition to any kind of military intervention) prevented İnönü from making 
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a decision to intervene in Cyprus. In 1967, the Demirel administration 
contemplated the ‘domestic politics dimension’ as the key dimension. Demirel’s 
Adalet Partisi had promised economic development and stability for its supporters 
during its election campaign. As a result, its main focus was on the economy and 
not on foreign policy. Since the Demirel administration was confronted with the 
Cyprus dispute just after forming the government, and since there had been  
criticism for the previous governments for not taking any risk to solve the dispute, 
the Demirel administration decided to eliminate the ‘do nothing’ policy option 
during the first phase of the decision making process. In 1974, the Ecevit 
administration considered the ‘systemic dimension’ to be the key dimension. It is 
important to note that Ecevit’s CHP was quite different than the CHP under 
İnönü’s leadership as far as its dealings with international relations. While İnönü 
was cautious not to endanger Turkey by taking a risk in foreign policy, Ecevit 
tried to pursue an ‘independent’ and ‘active’ foreign policy. As a result, the Ecevit 
administration eliminated the ‘do nothing’ policy alternative since this alternative 
could not find a way to provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, the 
administration eliminated the ‘air strike’ policy alternative since this alternative 
could not restore the state of affairs of the island. 
 In the second stage of the decision making process Turkish decision 
makers took different policy options. In 1964, in the second stage İnönü evaluated 
remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most 
favorable decision became ‘air strike’. In 1967, in the second stage the Demirel 
administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total 
ratings. Here the most favorable decision became ‘diplomatic efforts’. In 1974, in 
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the second stage the Ecevit administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives 
according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision became ‘military 
intervention’ since it was the best option according to all three dimensions.  
Although Turkish decision makers did not consider ‘military dimension’ 
the key dimension in any of the Cyprus crises, this dimension had a definite 
impact on the leaders’ ultimate decisions. When the situation worsened and 
intercommunity clashes took place on Cyprus, Turkish leaders announced the 
world that ‘military intervention’ option was on table. Even İnönü’s last and 
highly fragile coalition threatened to use force against Cyprus as long as the 
conflict continued on the island during the 1964 crisis. However, Turkey’s 
capacity to carry out full scale military operation was quite limited during the 
1960s. In lieu of full scale military operation, the Turkish army during the crises 
of the 1960s responded with ‘show of force’. For instance, in the early stages of 
the 1964 crisis the Turkish Air Forces flew over Cyprus and the Turkish Naval 
Forces sailed to Mersin, a strategic location with access to national railway in the 
south-eastern coast of Turkey. The same ‘show of force’ operation took place also 
in the 1967 crisis. 
Despite Turkey’s readiness and capacity to carry out full scale military 
intervention, the world leaders feared that Turkey would use force to settle the 
dispute on Cyprus. The Western bloc countries, especially the US, at this stage 
took initiative to prevent Turkey from intervening in Cyprus, and Greece from 
retaliating against Turkey. The US initiatives were successful in 1964 and 1967 
and war was averted among NATO members. In 1974, however, Turkey had the 
required military equipment and strategy to intervene successfully in Cyprus 
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which encouraged Turkish decision makers to act ‘immediately’ to restore order 
on the island.  
Lastly, it is important to note that the closed sessions of TBMM are not 
published by Turkish authorities. For instance, during both the 1964 and 1967 
crises the parliament held closed sessions to discuss the situation on the island and 
formulate a foreign policy. However, these sessions still remain ‘unknown’ to the 
public. On the other hand, the closed session during the 1974 crisis was already 
published by Turkish authorities. 
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